Die Welt · Vol. I, No. 29 · 17 December 1897
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No. 29. — "Die Welt" — Page 3.

(continued from page 4)

...be changed when these too have become other. That which is supposed to render the Jews incapable of state-building at present is, after all, merely the consequence of their statelessness. I say: supposed to, for doubts are still permissible as to whether the present-day Jews are really incapable of state-building. Where in history have we ever heard that peoples brought with them any special certificate of qualification for state-building? Any group of human beings that forms a whole, anthropologically and sociologically, and that is driven by historical necessity toward political grouping, will surely be capable of it. The capacity for self-government is, at bottom, after all a rather inferior one, because it is purely administrative. The Jewish people, which has proven its intellectual energy in the highest works of culture, may in any case be credited with the capacity to bring forth, for its future commonwealth, the requisite number of customs officials, postmasters, and tax collectors.

The objection that we have lost our social instincts in the Golus refutes itself. They "were lost in the Golus" precisely because in the Golus the struggle for existence had no need of these instincts; there other drives were necessary for the preservation of life. The group-preserving drives can attain a high development only within cohesive groups. The social instinct of self-preservation, which operates in the subconscious of every group, necessarily produces the requisite collective consciousness, or, as Herbert Spencer expresses it, that "the citizen, through his incorporation into a political body, is to a high degree compelled to such sentiments and opinions as demand the preservation of that body." Thus "through his incorporation," but impossibly already before his incorporation, as Achad-Haam postulates.

This, then, gives us no cause for apprehension. The Jewish masses need no preparatory course in patriotism before they return to the homeland; for patriotism is an elementary feeling, as egoism is one. And once we are a group, we shall certainly not lack for group-egoism.

With this I will close for today. My sole concern was to discuss the principle of a merely moral Zionism and to test its tenability. Perhaps these lines too may contribute to bringing some clarity into the Congress discussions that now fill the columns of the Hebrew journals.

What Achad-Haam further says in his essay concerning the mission of the Jews and the age of righteousness sounds so protest-rabbinical that I cannot comprehend how such outlived things could stray into so enlightened a head. I have endeavored to refute his serious objections seriously, but into this domain I cannot follow him.

The Dreyfus Miscarriage of Justice.

(Sitting of the Chamber.)

"The first act is now over. The curtain has fallen after the ghastly spectacle. Let us hope that tomorrow's drama will once more uplift and console us."

Thus does Emile Zola express himself in his splendid article, which was published in the "Figaro." It is the third article that the great novelist has devoted, these eight days past, to the cause of the man banished on Devil's Island, who was condemned against all the laws of justice, of equity, and of truth. When Emile Zola speaks of the end of the first act, he thereby alludes to the decision of General Sauffier, who gave the order to open the investigation against the "Commandant" Eszterhazy. This officer, whose handwriting bears a truly alarming resemblance to that of the notorious bordereau — that bordereau which constitutes the sole proof on the strength of which Captain Dreyfus was condemned — this officer will in all probability be brought before a court-martial. It will be impossible for this court-martial not to shed complete light upon this dark affair, and not to lay before the public all the secrets that have shrouded this affair in such obscurity. But precisely from the complete elucidation of this matter the innocence of the condemned Captain will brilliantly emerge, so his defenders — in whom we place full confidence — assure us unceasingly and with convincing emphasis.

The decision of General Saussier signifies the first victory that the friends of justice and truth have carried off over those who had abused the press, or their power, in this matter. It is a beginning upon which one must congratulate oneself all the more in that it falls within an epoch of general cowardice and sovereign contempt for the truth. It is true, indeed, that even this faint glimmer of justice was darkened again by the assembly that one calls the Chamber of Deputies, and which is the seat of that which one calls, by convention, "the representation of the nation."

It was an indescribable spectacle that played itself out in the Palais Bourbon. Embittered adversaries, more than that, irreconcilable enemies, went hand in hand to sway justice in favor of a true traitor and against an innocent man. And this solely and simply because the innocent man is a Jew, while the guilty one is not. From the two sides of the Chamber, which stand in the sharpest opposition, the two party leaders, who otherwise combat each other without cease, extended their hands to one another in order to crush a Jew. Count de Mun, the great Catholic orator, turned to the government to learn "whether it were true that there existed in France a mysterious and hidden power, so strong as to cast suspicion even upon those who command the army!" The Count has truly deserved that a Drumont should praise him, celebrating him for his "noble bearing." Is there, then, anything nobler than when a zealous adherent of the Church strives to annihilate a wretched Jew? But what is capable of curing us entirely of our dreams of humanity is the bearing of the socialist party, or rather of its leader, the Deputy Millerand, in the lamentable debate of the Chamber. This is no longer the Centre proceeding in common with the Right — this is already the extreme Left! Truly, a refreshing union of beautiful souls. When it is a matter of the Jew, they forget their antagonism, every enmity ceases, they are all brothers, firmly bound together by their common hatred. A day later they will, of course, over some political question or other, tear asunder the fair bond once more and fall upon one another again. But here — here they do after all want to be rid of the Jew. And so: "up and at him, man for man."

The ever-gentle Méline knows better than anyone else how one ought to conduct oneself in the Dreyfus affair. Monsieur Scheurer-Kestner is, after all, his friend — indeed, his intimate friend. Were it not a matter of a Jew, a single word from a man of Scheurer-Kestner's considerable standing would have sufficed to obtain a revision of the trial and, in consequence thereof, the rectification of a miscarriage of justice. Our "gentle Méline," now, as one may assume, when Scheurer-Kestner applied to him, answered somewhat in the following terms: "Certainly, certainly, my friend! You are perhaps quite right! Perhaps a miscarriage of justice has really been committed. But when all is said and done, it is, after all, only a matter of a Jew! Why do you meddle in this pack of Jews?"

General Billot, too, is an intimate friend of the courageous senator. But when one has attained to power, one is loath to step down from it again merely because one has taken the initiative toward the rehabilitation of a Jew.

And these two temperate men declared, when both the Right and the Left demanded an explanation, the one, that there was no Dreyfus affair at all and that a Dreyfus affair could not exist; the other, that in his capacity as soldier and chief of the army he held the verdict to have issued justly and held Dreyfus to be guilty. That is, after all, a strong dose of hypocrisy wherewith to secure oneself a compliant majority. In declaring that there was no Dreyfus affair, Monsieur Méline simply played with words. To the Minister of War, Mathieu Dreyfus most formally declared, in his letter, that his brother had been condemned solely and exclusively on the strength of the bordereau. When the Minister of War ordered the investigation against Eszterhazy, he thereby acknowledged that the bordereau, as Mathieu Dreyfus maintained, had really constituted the actual indictment against his brother. How, then, can Monsieur Méline maintain that there is no Dreyfus affair? If there really can be no Dreyfus affair, then to what end has the investigation been opened against Eszterhazy, who was designated as the author of the crime for which Dreyfus had been condemned? From this there will, in the end, be no escaping.

Monsieur Billot likewise gave a very equivocal answer. He was by no means interpellated as to whether he personally held Dreyfus to be guilty. That we know in any case, that until the revision of the trial has been effected, the