Mount Tzvi
…and benefits a perutah tomorrow; thus we require that he benefit at the time of the damage. And in sowing a consecrated field there is at the time of the sowing only the hope of benefit after some time. And further, even if I grant him that with what is detached, in such a case, he commits sacrilege by the sowing alone, and we say that it is as if he had used it, or had lifted it in order to use it and to benefit from the growths, I am still astonished to know what place there is for this proof, to compel from it a new law, that when one sows in a consecrated field the growths are unconsecrated. And if it is because otherwise there would be a difficulty for us: let him derive it from the fact that without this it is of no avail even with what is detached; to this one may well say that the one depends on the other, and that is the very reason: where the law of sacrilege applies, as with what is detached, it rightly goes out to unconsecrated status, since he committed sacrilege his acts have taken effect, and his sacrilege causes it to go out to unconsecrated status; as we find (Bava Metzia 99a) concerning one who lends an axe of consecrated property, that he has committed sacrilege according to the value of the benefit in it; and see Tosafot there, that although the body of the axe is consecrated, nevertheless, through his having committed sacrilege, the benefit of its use went out to unconsecrated status. And here too, if the law of sacrilege applied to sowing, as with an unperforated pot of consecrated property, we would have to say that only the benefit of its nourishment went out to unconsecrated status, and for this reason, since he committed sacrilege, one may certainly well say that the fruits are unconsecrated, like the permission to use the axe; which is not so with ground, in which the law does not apply: the fruits that are its growths also remain in their sanctity, for where has the sanctity that was in them gone? And consecrated property does not go out for nothing without sacrilege, as we say (Pesahim 27b) concerning wood of peace-offerings: "Since they are not subject to sacrilege, they do not go out to unconsecrated status"; and so it is explicit in several places. And according to this, even with what is detached, as with an unperforated pot, it is likewise not a general rule that the growths are unconsecrated, but only when he acted unwittingly, where he committed sacrilege; in that case one may judge that they are unconsecrated on the ground of sacrilege; but one who acted deliberately, who has not committed sacrilege, we are not compelled to say that the growths are unconsecrated; and likewise with a gentile who sows, to whom the law of sacrilege does not apply, the growths too will not be unconsecrated. And from the language of the Mirkevet ha-Mishneh mentioned above it is plainly visible that his intention is to prove that in every case, even when deliberate and with ground, the growths are unconsecrated, not on the ground of the law of sacrilege. And above them all, there is a difficulty for me in the words of the Mirkevet ha-Mishneh: granted sowing; ploughing, what is there to say? Surely with mere ploughing there is no law of growths; and it is forced to say that he speaks of one who ploughs for trees, or a sown field, where by the ploughing too he has effected something, since he causes it to grow, as is stated in Sukkah concerning "there is one who ploughs one furrow", where the Talmud asks, "Then let him also be liable on account of sowing"; and as (Shabbat 73b): "The Tanna stands in the Land of Israel, where they sow first and afterwards plough"; for certainly in the language of Maimonides there is no reason to interpret so. And further, in such a case, where it was sown from the start, or for trees, he should have said that the growths are consecrated, as we hold that sacrilege applies to growths. And were I not afraid, it would seem to me to interpret the words of Maimonides mentioned above in another way, of which one may say, "This is it." It is known in the laws of sacrilege that they are of two kinds: "1" one who benefits from consecrated property; "2" one who removes from domain to domain, who has committed sacrilege, and it has gone out to unconsecrated status. And the definitions of removal from domain to domain, such that one becomes liable for sacrilege through it, have already been explained in several places, and in Tosafot; and let us preface here the language of Tosafot, Me'ilah 18b: "And as soon as it has changed into the domain of an ordinary person, that is, that the ordinary person has performed upon it an act that counts as taking possession and acquisition from one ordinary person to another" (although he did not benefit). It is explicit from their words that any act of acquisition that is effective to take possession of the property of an ordinary person, if he did the like with consecrated property unwittingly, in order to take possession of it, he has committed sacrilege and it has gone out to unconsecrated status. And so it is proved from the difficulty the Talmud raises (Me'ilah 20a), where it asks: "There, why do I need 'until he dwells under it'? Since he altered it, he has committed sacrilege"; and this too is because he performed an act of acquisition that is effective to acquire with an ordinary person (see Tosafot there), and therefore he has committed sacrilege. Now we hold that ploughing is an act of acquisition with ground, and sowing too is effective to acquire a field from one's fellow, as Maimonides wrote (in chapter 1 of the Laws of Sale)
