Tzvi Hirsch Kalischer · Seeking Zion, Jerusalem Edition · 1919
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63 Mount Tzvi

It is explicit] from this that when one sows unconsecrated seed in a consecrated field the growths are unconsecrated; and so it is explicit in our chapter, halakhah 11, that when one sows consecrated produce in an unconsecrated field the growths are unconsecrated; which is not so in our chapter, halakhah 6: one who consecrates a field, and it brought forth grasses of itself, or a tree, and it produced fruit of itself, sacrilege applies to the growths"; thus far his words. Thus he takes it as plain that with the prohibition of consecrated property too, if the two causes are not both consecrated, the growths are unconsecrated, as in the words of the Mar'eh ha-Panim at the end of chapter 7 of Pe'ah, which I cited above. And at first sight there would be a difficulty against this from that passage of Bava Batra 71b, and from Tosafot there, which I cited above to prove that with consecrated ground and an unconsecrated tree the growths are consecrated property, as Rashbam wrote there. But in truth, according to this, even without that there would be a difficulty for us according to the view of Maharshal in Pesahim, that the question of Rami bar Hama is whether with the prohibition of consecrated property we say that "this and that cause" is permitted: if so, why did he not resolve it for himself from that teaching of Rabbi Simeon, who holds that the growths are consecrated although the tree is unconsecrated? And if it is because one may say that he holds like Tosafot in Avodah Zarah, that where the causes are not equal, as a tree and ground, we do not say "this and that cause", nevertheless according to Rashi and Maimonides (and so we hold in Yoreh De'ah, Laws of Orlah (fruit of the first three years)), how will they account for this discussion of Bava Batra? One must necessarily say that this law of Rabbi Simeon does not depend at all on the question of the fruits, to distinguish between consecrated and unconsecrated; and indeed, even if in truth the growths should be unconsecrated, nevertheless it is impossible for the tree of an ordinary person to draw nourishment from a consecrated field. For even with "this and that cause", where they permitted, that is only after the fact, but in the first instance it is forbidden according to all, as is stated in Pesahim 27a, and in Rashi there, s.v. "Yolikh"; see there. And all the more so here, with consecrated property, where one may say that the prohibition is his drawing out the nourishment from a consecrated field, which is complete consecrated property before it leaves the ground; and on the contrary, its becoming deconsecrated from holy to unconsecrated is itself the essence of the prohibition, as in the words of the Mirkevet ha-Mishneh, that one who sows in a consecrated field is exempt because there is no sacrilege with what is attached; and it is implied that sacrilege there is not, but a prohibition there is, as is written in Gittin and in Sanhedrin, and in a great many other places, that with ground too there is a prohibition; and the Ritva on Kiddushin 54 holds that it is a prohibition of the Torah. And now, when we examine well the language of Maimonides, and also what the book Mirkevet ha-Mishneh mentioned above added to it, we find that all their words are astonishing from beginning to end. For in the language of Maimonides there is seemingly cause for astonishment at his informing us that there is no sacrilege with what is attached: "How so? One who ploughs a consecrated field or sows in it is exempt." What kind of benefit is there in ploughing and sowing, that the law of sacrilege should apply to it? And without the reason that there is no sacrilege with what is attached, as with an unperforated pot, why should he commit sacrilege? And whichever way, to what does this exemption refer? If to the benefit of the fruits, behold, with what is detached one commits sacrilege; if to the ground (apart from the benefit of the fruits), there is no benefit here at all, nothing whatever. And see the Mirkevet ha-Mishneh there, on chapter 2, halakhah 16, that one who shears a consecrated beast does not transgress by the law of the Torah when he does not benefit. However, when I came to examine the Mirkevet ha-Mishneh, I saw that he had already sensed what we have scrutinised in the language of Maimonides, and therefore he went down to rescue it, and to prove from this that the growths are unconsecrated, for otherwise there is no benefit here at all. But even with this it has still not been settled for me as fully as needed, what is implied from the words of Maimonides mentioned above, that he gives as the reason for his exemption from sacrilege that there is no sacrilege with what is attached; so that in a case parallel to this, with an unperforated pot, he would commit sacrilege by the sowing alone, because it stands ready "to eat of its fruit and to be satisfied with its goodness"; he needs it. And still, why should he commit sacrilege on account of the benefit of the growths? Surely we hold that we require damage and benefit in one thing, as Maimonides ruled (chapter 6 of the Laws of Sacrilege, halakhah 1); and further, according to our reading in the Talmud, Me'ilah 18, "and its damage and his benefit are at one time", and Rashi explained: to exclude one who damages a perutah today

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