"Die Welt" — No. 52 — 9
(continued from page 8)
...result of the book he has written on the "Hilsner Case", which has recently appeared in Berlin, published by A. W. Hayn's Heirs, under the title "The Polna Ritual-Murder Trial". Professor Franz v. Liszt has written a few introductory words to this book. He rightly points out that the Hilsner trial furnishes "a contribution to the psychology of testimony" "which puts in the shade all theoretical discussions of this subject and all experimental investigations". But it is equally justified when he says that Nußbaum's book is no tendentious pamphlet... but a sober, strictly scientific account, resting throughout on the contents of the record. Too sober perhaps; to some the calm that lies over this work may seem too cool, a work that nowhere rises to emphasis, from which only here and there a note of bitter, cutting mockery is heard, when the statements and assumptions which the course of the work compels it to refute become altogether too absurd. But all the more forcefully must this book act upon everyone who is not from the very outset — unwilling to let it act upon him.
The guilt or innocence of a human being, the question whether as a murderer he is guilty of death or not — as a party question! Can there be anything more monstrous than this one fact, which dominates the whole Hilsner trial? A man, the guilt of a man, the fate, the liberty, the life of a man as a weapon in the struggle of parties! Can one imagine anything in more glaring contradiction to the inmost nature of criminal justice? If even in purely political trials this element so often repels, how must it act in a trial for murder, in a trial conducted to the end that the conviction, or at any rate the condemnation, of this one Jew might become a battle-cry against all Jewry!
Here we have a trial, a proceeding of the State, conducted in the name of the law, whose verdict is pronounced in the name of the Head of the State, which from its very first beginnings until far beyond its formal conclusion is borne along on the agitated waves of party passion, of racial hatred — and of the most narrow-minded superstition. If a man cannot abide the Jews, if he "hates" them, that is his own affair; so long as he does not exercise this hatred where he may not exercise it, it is, for all I care, his right. But whoever carries any hatred, be it "only" Jew-hatred, into the domain of law: he is a scoundrel, whoever he may be.
In this trial, however, we have heard how, from the very first moment, before even the first beginnings of a conviction resting on factual grounds could have formed, a watchword was given out and the war-cry raised; we have heard how a deputy, under the protection of his immunity, boasted that pressure had been brought to bear upon the Minister of Justice in this case; we have been able to observe that investigating committee, quite unique of its kind, which, not merely with the toleration but with the support of public authorities, pitched its tents beside the temple of justice, examined witnesses, made inquiries and — worked up feeling and practised suggestion; we have seen that everything which might have told for the guilt of third persons scarcely existed for court and public prosecutor; we have followed what grotesque statements, inwardly quite impossible and standing in the wildest contradiction to one another, witnesses and — experts made under the spell of the mass suggestion that had been awakened; and finally we have been able to read in the reports of the daily papers that after the verdict was pronounced the jurymen who had condemned Hilsner as a murderer, and the counsel of the "private parties", were received in the street with "thunderous cries of Nazdar and Slava" and "deafening shouts of joy", but Hilsner's defenders with "cries of Hanba and Pereat from many hundreds of voices". And had Hilsner been a thousand times guilty — this mob, which rejoices because a man has been condemned to death, would not on that account be one atom less repulsive and loathsome than it must be to every man who has but a spark of finer feeling.
But that is just what is hideous, what is terrible in such agitations: that they drown every stirring of humanity, of sound and natural sense, and in the intoxication of the moment make beasts of men who were decent men and perhaps will be so again later. I cannot help it, but I always believe that if one could catch a single man out of the mass and set before him in private what he is actually doing — every one, even were he one of the agitators and leaders, would have to cover his face with his hands and perish with shame.
To be sure, I may well be somewhat optimistic there! Seven years have passed since the verdict of Kuttenberg, six since the verdict of Pisek — there would have been time for reflection. But if today any report emerges of a trace, of a suspicion, leading away from Hilsner, the battle-cry sounds anew; and when the trace dies out, when, as recently, someone who might perhaps have committed the deed is consigned to the madhouse instead of being brought before the judge, then shouts of joy break forth again. Not so loud, not so violent, only here and there — but then it had only been a matter of a remote danger. But when the whole Hilsner trial is reopened — let us not deceive ourselves — we shall hardly be spared seeing again things that we have once already seen with sorrow and indignation.
And nevertheless this trial must be reopened. And it will be reopened. Hilsner may be guilty or innocent. I do not know.
And who can say that Leopold Hilsner is guilty? After this legal proceeding, no man. For hatred gave birth to this trial, hatred suckled it, and hatred led it to its end. And slovenliness, superstition, error and untruth have been its faithful companions.
On 1 April 1899, on the day before Easter, the body of Agnes Hruza was found in the Brezina wood near Polna. Already with the recording of the facts and the post-mortem report begins the series of fateful omissions and blunders. Conclusions instead of facts!
But as the rumour of the cut wound on the throat flies out of little Polna, as the word "ritual slaughterer's cut" is uttered, at once everyone is after the "ritual murderer" Hilsner. I know very well that it has long been established beyond doubt that the Jewish rite, or the rite of any Jewish sects whatever, contains not the slightest thing that could furnish a starting-point for so monstrous an accusation against a whole people as the "doctrine" of ritual murder presents. Nevertheless I do not underrate the power of suggestion. But for another reason. Insane superstition has a gruesome power: the power to make true the premises of some mad offspring of fancy. I will not speak of the religious superstition which, in the name of so many religions, has already claimed bloody victims. I will only refer to the chapter on "thieves' candles" in the "Pitaval". Whoever kills a man and makes himself a candle from his tallow becomes invisible by the light of that candle. Is there anything stupider in the world than this superstition? And yet it has bred murderers! Wherever we have a criminal procedure containing at least some guarantees for the observance of the most primitive elements of a legal proceeding, no ritual murder has yet been established by a final verdict. Indeed, nearly all the charges quickly proved to be the silliest nonsense — or worse. Once Maggi's soup extract had been — "human blood", as in the "KrauB" case; another time the "victims" had themselves inflicted the wounds of "tapping" which they displayed, and so on. Hilsner too was no longer condemned as a ritual murderer at the second trial. But if the day should ever come when some deluded man said to himself, "there must be something true after all in what we are always being told; Christian blood must after all have some mysterious power" — then those wretches and villains who, against their own conviction and from the vilest, lowest instincts, nurse, cultivate and scatter this insanity abroad, would be the real murderers!
By the influence of this horror-tale, by the excitement carried into the masses, is also to be explained that phenomenon, of so melancholy an interest, which we can observe in various ritual-murder trials, but which positively dominates the Hilsner case: the "phenomenon of the increasing memory of witnesses", as it has aptly been called.
At first the people who are examined know almost nothing at all. But the more time passes, the more they know; the pictures do not fade, they grow livelier, more colourful, richer, ever new pictures awaken — and ever new witnesses come forward, to whom it had not hitherto occurred to report themselves, and who now have the most remarkable things to tell. What things! As though fetched out of a penny novelette, and always the same recurring types: some, peering by chance through chinks, have seen Jews crouching together and overheard them just as they were holding the most momentous conversations about the murder; others have seen the accused on the way to the scene of the crime, or near it, behaving in the most conspicuous manner, handling the murder weapon very drastically, illustrating the future murder and preluding it; and even then there arose in them, the people who afterwards let weeks, months, years go by without stirring, the foreboding of something dreadful that was preparing there.
In the statements of the witnesses who were examined in the Hilsner trial one sees superstition, this sad
