10 — "Die Welt" — No. 4
ON THE QUESTION OF AUTONOMY
I.
When a seed, cast into the earth without the sower promising himself much from it, springs up and thrives unexpectedly with undreamt-of swiftness — it is a sign that the soil had long been ready, that it was yearning to receive the seed. When a watchword, flung among the masses without the leader and champion in the fray having built great hopes upon it, sets the masses in motion, shakes them out of their customary inertia, leads them to battle, it is a sign that the people was already ripe for this watchword, that circumstances had prepared the ground for new conditions, and that only the redeeming word was needed to transform the dull foreboding into living deed.
So it was with all movements; so it is too with the present great movement in Austria. The Habsburg State has grown rotten. The country is weary of the endless internal quarrels that turn upon old rights and formulas outstripped by life. It is weary of the dust of documents that covers the whole surface, stifling every fresh seed. It longs for a rain. And the wind, the harbinger of this refreshing rain, which in its flood of waters is to wash away all the old, tottering piles of the black-and-yellow empire, is already blowing. . . . Austria wants to have itself renovated. And since the fundamental question of this country is the question of nationalities, it wants to revise this question too, to solve it in a modern form adapted to the times, or to do away with it. The system of centralisation has run its course. Everyone sees that. It is in contradiction with the real forces of the country that a minority in the Empire should rule over the great majority of the inhabitants, merely thanks to chartered rights, thanks to yellowed documents. The nations in Austria want to come into their right; they want to be co-ordinated side by side instead of subordinated or superordinated. That is the yield of the whole of Austrian history since the year 1848. That is the result of the policy of the Taaffes, Badenis, Körbers and Gautschs.
To the last of these it is perhaps granted to sing a requiem for the old Austria and to create a new, rejuvenated Austria. Instead of a national State, a State of nations; instead of a government of castes, a government of the people. The sign of our time is self-administration, "self-governement." Towards this old political ideal of the English continental Europe is advancing, half willingly, half drawn by the force of circumstances. Thus the question for Austria itself is fairly clear and simple. For the State as a whole, as for its individual component parts, the nations. But here another question awakens, one that is no longer so clear, that is on the contrary hard to solve and intricate — the Jewish question.
The Jewish question has, moreover, the privilege of always being the most difficult. Why? Does it lie in the question itself, in its nature? Or is it only the other peoples who have brought it about that the Jewish question has become a problem at all? One thing is clear: the fundamental idea that was at every time the leading motive of policy, namely that of the unity of the State, of homogeneity, always came up against the Jewish question, always found itself in contradiction with it. Formerly it was the idea that religion in the country must be uniform, undivided and unseparated. The statesmen of the old time proceeded from the principle of the predominant religion and therefore laid every other confession under ban and interdict.
And when the centre of gravity of the life of the State, of the idea of the State, was then shifted from religion to other, secular domains, the idea of the unitary State, of the national State, arose. In this sense Joseph II pursued his Germanising policy,
along this line moved the whole of European life, in the free as in the unfree States, in England as well as in Russia. England, which refuses the Irish their Home Rule, and Russia, which sought to melt a countless host of peoples in the crucible of Russianism, working towards this, however, with such high pressure that the crucible at last burst, Germany, which inaugurated the policy of German expansion towards the East as towards the West — all of them obeyed the same idea of the unity of the State, of the dominant people. And the consequences did not fail to appear. Every pressure produces counter-pressure. A people which, left to itself, might perhaps have been driven by circumstances themselves, by the economic development of the country, into the arms of another, stronger people, and have assimilated unconsciously, becomes exclusive, hostile to every subjection to the influence of the other people, when it is compelled to assimilate. This, and the economic causes that lie in the growth of the national markets, have called forth the high tide of the national movement, which has at present become one of the chief factors of policy in Europe. Social Democracy, too, which was formerly strictly international, which believed itself freed from the fetters of nationality, now sees its error. The mass clings to the soil. The masses have the heaviness of the earth about them — and they compel the leaders as well, the free spirits who pay homage to an ideal of pure humanity, of a perfect freedom and liberation from all prejudices, to accommodate themselves to the given reality, to adapt themselves to it. And in this way the nationalist movement has been sanctioned. The future, at least the nearest future, belongs to it.
But how does the desire for a life of one's own express itself? What is its political formula? It is that of independent statehood, or at least of autonomy. An autonomy may be national or it may not, but political it must be — that is its characteristic. In other words, an autonomy may serve to create for a particular nationality a milieu in which it can "live itself out," translate its qualities and peculiarities into culture, and then it is a national one. It may, but it need not. An autonomy is conceivable which, as in Canada, Australia, etc., pursues absolutely no culture — that is, no national interests. The Americans in their War of Liberation fought for their independence not because they wished to "live themselves out" nationally, but because they wished to be politically free. The first condition of an autonomy is therefore political independence. National-cultural individuality is often the presupposition, more often still the consequence, of political autonomy. And therefore we see, in the struggle for liberation which the enslaved peoples are waging in Austria as in Russia, the demand for political autonomy written on the banner of the combatants. But what does political mean? It is a transformation of the old concept "pertaining to the State." The State is no longer regarded as an end in itself, and its place has been taken by the concept of political composition, of political position. The Ruthenians, Poles and Czechs in Austria, the Poles, Letts and Caucasians in Russia demand autonomy. What does that mean? They demand a recognition of already existing facts. They demand that their good right, the claim to their soil, which both historically and in fact belongs to them, shall not be trampled underfoot by a foreign people. Most of these peoples were formerly independent, fell by force into bondage to the stronger peoples, and can
