Page 14. — "Die Welt" — No. 4.
In § 7 we have a peculiar passage upon which the Assyriologists are not agreed. It states, namely, that if the stolen thing belongs neither to the temple or the State nor to a private person, but to a third juristic person, he must pay so and so much. Now the opinions of scholars concerning this third juridical category are in dispute. Prof. Müller, with Zimmern, reads muskenu and translates it: almshouse (Hebr. Misken); other scholars, however, such as Scheil, Winkler and Kohler and Peiser (l. c.), read the word as an ideogram, Ma-Sen-Kak, and translate it "nobleman," "freedman," "ministerial." I cannot decide who is right in this question, but it seems to me incredible that in ancient Babylonia such an institution as almshouses existed at all, and that they attained so great a social importance. For this we have no beginnings even in the kindred Semitic legislations. In the Code of Hammurabi, too, which is after all so scrupulously exact, nothing is made known of such an institution. But the assumption of the other scholars also seems to me unwarranted. Though officialdom was strongly developed in Babylon, special laws for the protection of this class are contained elsewhere in the Code. And I should like to venture a hypothesis which has nothing to do with the philological side of the question. The hypothesis might, namely, be advanced that in ancient Babylonia there was a middle class who were neither freemen nor slaves. They were a survival of the old clan order. These were the bondmen, who in Athens were called metics, in Rome clients. That this class was not foreign to ancient Semitic social life either is proved to us by the life of the ancient Arabs, who besides the freemen and slaves had a class of clients who were called Nawali. And even now a trace of this social class exists among the Bedouins, who call them dakhil ³). This hypothesis of mine might cast a ray of light upon the social life of Babylon. A characteristic of Babylonian law, which is proper to the Mosaic as well, is the fivefold restitution for theft, which is laid down alongside the twofold. This number five is foreign to Roman law. According to the latter there exists the penalty of twofold (furtum nec manifestum), threefold (consummated theft) and fourfold (furtum manifestum) restitution.
Prof. Müller explains this fivefold restitution in a very acute and complicated manner, by which he also explains the relevant passage in the Bible (Exodus 21, 37—23). It is questionable, however, whether the old jurists of Babel allowed themselves to be guided by such far-reaching principles.
Moreover, it still remains unclear why, in the above-mentioned case, the judge found guilty had to pay twelvefold. Prof. Müller's explanation (p. 106) is here a very acute one, but not wholly satisfying, for he takes a single possibility and generalises it. The paragraph concerning the false judge stands in no connection whatever with the juridical case in which the condemned man must restore precisely fivefold. There are, after all, still other possibilities. Nor can Prof. Müller's theory by any means make clear § 9, that "if the seller (of the stolen object) has died, the buyer receives the amount claimed in the suit fivefold." Why fivefold here?
But that the number five was a customary unit of penalty among the ancient Semites is obvious. When we compare the laws of Hammurabi concerning theft with the Mosaic ones, the latter appear to us far more humane.
³) Cf. W. Robertson Smith: Kinship and Marriage in early Arabia, 1885 p. 41—43.
But the cause, too, is clear. The social organisation of the Babylonian people was incomparably more complicated than that of the Jewish. They stand to one another as the Middle Ages to modern times; for that every people has its social periods of antiquity, of the Middle Ages and of modern times, the more recent historians, such as Ed. Meyer, Kurt Breysig and others, have proved.
Sociological analysis also illumines the Mosaic legislation. It arises out of the conditions of its time; it is a product of the state of society of that day. The same holds good of slavery also.
In the laws of Hammurabi the life of the slave plays a very considerable part. (§ 226; § 279—282, and others.) The slave was without rights, was no persona juris, was a chattel. He might not of his own accord have his mark scratched out (§ 226 according to Köhler and Peiser; Prof. Müller translates "impress") and so forth. When we compare the Mosaic legislation in this respect, it appears to us incomparably more humane. But here too the reason is clear and transparent to us. Israel had a very slight, still undeveloped economic life, although it already knew a money economy, whereas in Babylon the money economy was already in full swing. Among the African peoples, for example, the slave laws are likewise very mild, since the slave has the right to pass at will from one master to another, the so-called bodo and tombika. (Compare A. H. Post: Afrikanische Jurisprudenz, and Kohler and Peiser l. c.) In later Babylonia the position of the slave was considerably improved; he could become a persona juris, could even himself keep slaves. ⁴) The red thread, the substructure of the whole legislation of Hammurabi, as of all legislation whatever, is the primeval law of talion. "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth," it says in the lapidary language of the Bible. "If a man breaks another's limb, one breaks his limb," says Hammurabi (§ 197). The Twelve Tables, too, express it in almost the same terms: (VII) "Si membrun rupit ni cum eo pacit talio esto." Old as the human race is this institution of blood-revenge. And only the narrow mind of the Antisemites could reproach the Jews with their ancient ordinances. Does not blood-revenge survive even to this day (the Corsican vendetta)! But the Mosaic law in this respect is far more humane and moral than the Babylonian. It knows not this minute distinction between the freeman and the slaves, this contempt for the life of the slave. A very remarkable institution, which occupies an important place in Mosaic law, is lacking in the Babylonian Code — that of the asylums. It is an old Semitic, Arabian custom that the avengers of blood allowed the criminal a respite of 3 ⅓ days in which to flee. If he succeeded within this respite in reaching another tribe, he was saved. He became the protégé of the tribe (jár, pronounced dschar — Hebrew ger) ⁵). In Athens too we find remnants of this custom, and likewise among the Usambara in Africa (Post l. c. II 36). That this custom no longer existed in Babylon is to be explained only by the revolution in the social structure and the transition from the clan order to the State order, which came about through the influence of the Sumerians upon the Semites and the collision between these two elements. Gumplowicz's theory of the formation of States is confirmed once more by this example. I shall not enter upon the remaining laws, either the family laws or the fiscal ones. They are indeed not without interest, and they shed light for us upon the ancient life of Babylon and of
⁴) Kohler and Peiser: Aus d. babyl. Rechtsleben 1890. ⁵) W. Robertson Smith l. c.
