Die Welt · Vol. V, No. 38 · 20 September 1901
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No. 38 — "Die Welt" — Page 9

(continued from page 8)

…this has the following grounds. Achad Haam's theories may be in no wise life-furthering — for that they seem to us to contain all too much of negation, that hereditary failing of the Jew — yet their creator is nevertheless a spiritual and moral power which can awaken not merely our interest, but also our sympathy. His critical analysis of the movement we, who serve the unconditional synthesis, decidedly reject. Of his positive teachings much does not content us, because our willing is a greater and a more comprehensive one. But in spite of all defects and errors we shall honour in him the boldly thinking, deep-sighted, upright son of the people which we love. For he is a new proof of that people's intellectual and moral fruitfulness.

In this sense we mean to bring into our paper the one and the other of Achad Haam's more important essays, and at the same time critical appreciations of his intellectual labour from various standpoints, out of which — precisely by reason of their diversity — there should emerge a unified judgment of his place in modern Jewish intellectual life and of his worth for its development.

Imitation and Assimilation.

By Achad Haam.

Authorised translation from the Hebrew by Doctor Israel Friedlaender.

By the word "imitation" we designate, for the most part in an unfavourable sense, everything that a man speaks and does, thinks and feels, not out of the depth of his own nature; not as the necessary consequence of the state of his spiritual forces and of their relation to the outer world, but in consequence of the inclination rooted in him to do as others do, to make a thing himself in such a fashion merely because others make it so.

If it be true, as many philosophers maintain, that the morally good is absolutely good and the evil likewise absolutely evil, and that we distinguish between the two not by conclusions of the understanding but by a moral instinct dwelling within us, then we may well pronounce imitation to be morally inferior, since our moral instinct does not approve this apish quality. But if those others speak truly who trace the distinction between good and evil back to a weighing of their advantage, or respectively their disadvantage, for the welfare and the development of human society, then we are surely entitled to call in question the unfavourable verdict of our moral instinct upon this point. Even though the theory of the French philosopher Tarde, who regards the whole history of mankind as the result of imitation working according to definite laws, is not without exaggeration and one-sidedness, yet a little reflection already suffices for us to acknowledge the correctness of the fundamental fact, namely, that this ugly quality does in truth form one of the foundations of human society, without which that society could neither have arisen nor, after its rise, have developed itself. For in very truth! Were men so constituted that they were in no point influenced by one another, but each thought and acted out of the depth of his own nature, without suffering any alien spiritual power in any wise to work upon him — how should such men ever have attained to conventional social possessions, to fixed laws and usages, to general religious and moral conceptions and more things of that sort, all of which, taken in their totality, are indeed natural consequences of general causes, but in their particulars presuppose special, individual causes? Yet what weighs above all: how, in any society whatever, were the rise and development of language conceivable, if each did not imitate the other, but rather waited until his own spiritual forces should bring him to designate every object with precisely the same name as his neighbour? — And thus man would have remained without speech and would never have wrestled himself upward out of the animal state.

However, imitation too would not suffice to carry through the diffusion of these possessions among all the individuals of a society, if it merely brought it about that each imitated all his neighbours in exactly the same measure. For then the bearers of imitation would be just as numerous as the imitators themselves, and each, according to the state of his spiritual forces, would seek out for himself from among many one bearer as the object of his imitation, so that once more no uniform social possessions would be possible. In order, therefore, to give to the whole of society a uniform stamp, it is necessary that there exist a common centre which is able to subject all hearts to itself, those near at hand immediately, those afar off by means of the near, and in this way to constitute the sole, or at least the principal, bearer for the imitation of all the rest.

Such a general centre we do in fact find in every society in the first stages of its development, and especially in that hoary time when the spirit of man wrestled itself painfully upward out of the depth of animality to the height of a human, social life. Upon this lower stage, which in similar form we still find again to-day among the savage tribes, when man is girt about with dangers on every side, he feels especially the worth of bodily strength and pays divine honours to the stronger. The whole family or the whole tribe then looks up with humble reverence to its head and protector, the "divine prince," and divests itself, as it were, of its own self together with all its peculiarities and inclinations before the sublimity of this "ideal." It is therefore not to be wondered at that he it is who now forms the centre towards which the imitative craving of his fellow-men of itself presses, and that without any doing of his own, solely and simply in consequence of the self-divestiture of the lower individuality before the higher, his words, deeds and manners become the common property of society. This common property is then transmitted from the fathers to the sons, and among these too there is found in every generation a "divine prince," who faithfully preserves the inheritance of the fathers and, where it no longer suffices for the advanced needs of life, adds his own, which again by means of imitation becomes common property. In this manner there easily enlarges and develops itself a social, firmly stamped communal life in every society, whose individuals in the course of time appear in a manner as many copies of one single collective type.

There is no nation and no society, not even among the very youngest, which in its initial stage has not found itself in this or in a similar condition: in the condition of the rise and of the union of the separated elements into one single social body round about great "central" men, by means of imitation, of self-divestiture. Only that in later times, after the human spirit has somewhat advanced, the cause of the self-divestiture, and therefore also the cause of the imitation and of the social union, may become not merely a bodily force, but likewise some great spiritual force.

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But imitation of this kind, whose centre is formed by a "central" man, necessarily diminishes from generation to generation. For since every new generation inherits from those preceding it the hitherto attained results of imitation, that is to say, the acquisitions which have already become common property, and since with their diffusion and enlargement the stamp of society gains ever more in completeness, there comes at length the time when this social stamp is completely formed and sharply outlined on every side, without the heads of the living generation still having occasion for Ein-