Die Welt · Vol. V, No. 28 · 12 July 1901
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Page 8 — "Die Welt" — No. 28

(continued from page 7)

…ment with Chamberlain that these words enable us "to determine what the Semite has bestowed upon the world" or — the qualification is Chamberlain's — has "forced upon" the world; and what "the particular strength of Judaism" may be, a strength against too favourable a conception of which Chamberlain prudently remarks that it, this particular strength, was "felt by hearts and by so many great minds to be 'alien.'" By Goethe too? Assuredly, thinks Chamberlain, if only one will rightly understand those words of Goethe's; and he gives us a commentary upon them which, in its interpretation and reinterpretation of the originally so clear sense, may well seek its like. I know of no example in which his supposedly unimpeachable method displays its naïveté and perversity so openly before all the world as here; nor do I know of any in which Chamberlain's peculiarity — that of bringing his subjective view, of generally problematical worth, to bear at any price — has expressed itself so drastically as likewise here. In view of this assertion — if it is to remain no mere assertion — you must indeed prepare yourself to go very thoroughly into detail with Chamberlain and with me. First of all, however, let us hear how his commentary upon that passage runs. "Goethe," so he begins, "rightly perceived the most essential point and indicated it also, yet unhappily not in so circumstantial a manner that everyone sees it as he does: for he distinguishes between a natural religion and another, and therefore a not natural one; now, according to Goethe's way of thinking, the opposite of the natural is the arbitrary, that wherein the will 'chooses,' that, this is to say, wherein the will, and not pure knowledge, nor yet the untroubled natural instinct, gives the casting vote. And thus he points out to us not only that between religion and religion there are essential differences, so essential that the same word may denote two different things, but he says therewith at the same time wherein this difference finds its ultimate ground: that religion which he opposes to the natural is precisely the religion of the will."

The religion of the will! The word has fallen, the word towards which Chamberlain's whole train of thought was striving as towards the favourite expression of his own most peculiar coinage, the word which is to pass as the ultimate meaning of those words of Goethe's. Something terrible must surely lie hidden behind the word, if the utmost that Chamberlain knows how to declare of the religion of Judaism is to consist in this, that it is the "religion of the will." Unhappily he has given no connected explanation of what he understands thereby; and only by conjecture, and from a few membris disjectis, can we infer the whole — I had almost said the whole monstrosity. "The will is the most salient trait in the character of the Semite" — that is assuredly of evil omen for the will, and in truth its greatest misfortune. For where Chamberlain speaks of the "will," there one may be sure that he will speak of the Semite also; and so the "will" — even as the Semite — comes off badly in the business.

May there not, after all, be here some echo of Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of the will? Once we come near, in remembrance of that philosopher, to expecting enlightenment upon the point, namely where Chamberlain makes Schopenhauer say to us: " . . . . matter is the mere visibility of the will . . . that which in the phenomenon, that is to say for the representation, is matter, that is in itself will" — but unhappily Chamberlain passes hastily over it, with the excuse that he "does not wish here to pursue metaphysics . . ."

In other words: between Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of the will and that of Chamberlain there is a difference as wide as heaven; there we have to do with a philosophical conception of genius, which signifies a hypothetical indeed, but uncommonly profound explanation of the nature of man and of the world; here, on the contrary, with a petty construction, obstinately and violently pieced together, which, in its exclusive application to the individuality of a single people or group of peoples, may be described as a theoretical monstrosity. And in connection with this monstrosity a Goethe is to stand? In those so wonderfully clear words of Goethe's there is supposed to be expressed what Chamberlain perceives in them: the "religion of the will," or, as he more intelligibly designates it after that saying of Schopenhauer's: the religion of materialism? Back, then, to Goethe! Read, my friend, that passage once more attentively, and let us then go through the commentary of Chamberlain.

First he instructs us that Goethe indeed rightly perceived the most essential point and also indicated it, but unhappily not in so circumstantial a manner that everyone sees it as he does: "for," he continues, "he distinguishes between a natural religion and another, and therefore a not natural one" . . . here already I stick fast, I might say with Faust, before this "therefore" I stick fast. What? Is the opposite of natural religion so self-evidently a, or the, not natural one? In the usage of philosophers and theologians a "natural religion" is very well known, but a "not natural" one, and that as the opposite of the former, has never yet come in my way. To be sure, for Chamberlain's private purpose I understand it well enough, this expression. Chamberlain needs it in order to recoin it, as it were in a turn of the hand, into that which we have come to know as his favourite coin. For let us hear further: "Now, according to Goethe's way of thinking, the opposite of the natural is the arbitrary" — that is it, that is the kernel of the poodle — "that wherein the will 'chooses,'" and so forth; only unhappily this coinage proves to be an impermissible and false one. For even if it be correct that in Goethe's general view the opposite of the natural is the arbitrary, yet Chamberlain has by no means any right on that account to refer this opposition here to religion — the more so as it is quite unambiguously defined in the words of Goethe. But Chamberlain has, strange as it may sound, thoroughly misunderstood that passage of Goethe's. And that, as we shall see, in its very first sentence. This appears indubitably from his commentary upon it. Goethe's sentence runs: "The universal, natural religion properly requires no faith." This assertion of Goethe's displeases Chamberlain; and he finds that Goethe's use of the word "faith" is "obscure and misleading"; that Goethe wished to "simplify" too much. And repeating Goethe's sentence, though in a somewhat abbreviated form — but mark well the abbreviation! — "the natural religion properly requires no faith," Chamberlain observes: . . . . "yet in truth there is more believing in the non-Semitic religions than in the Semitic" — but, in Heaven's name, upon what logic does Chamberlain here identify "natural religion" with the — "non-Semitic" religions? Does Goethe then connect this sense with it? Were this the case, and were we with Chamberlain to set in the place of "natural religion" the "non-Semitic," then the sentence would run: "The universal, the non-Semitic religion properly requires no faith" — a sentence which would be sheer nonsense. Is the non-Semitic religion, then, the universal one? Had Chamberlain retained the wording of Goethe in full, it would hardly have befallen him so greatly to distort the so simple, so clear sense of those words. By "natural religion" Goethe understands what men in the eighteenth century commonly understood by it, much the same as that which Kant expresses in the words: "Religion within the Bounds