The Maccabaean
as intermediary between the Jews and the Administration, really set up an iron wall between them.
The Commission had brought with it only a great charitable activity but no constructive impulse.
It was necessary in the future that Palestine should be the center and London should become subsidiary.
The Jewish Legionaries had come out expecting to be helped when the fighting was done, but they had not received the slightest encouragement or assistance, and large numbers of them had left the country.
New blood should be introduced into the leadership. The reins should be given into the hands of younger men, who were full of courage and energy, and did not stop to count difficulties.
The leaders were not only at variance with each other but their own statements could not be reconciled.
The Zionist leaders must show the same courage in colonization schemes as they showed in political work.
They (the Zionists) would be entirely lacking in gratitude if they accepted the suggestion of some of the critics that the leaders should be dismissed.
It was not practical politics to ask for big things without taking into consideration the difficulties and obstacles. The Jews of Palestine have no right to arrogate to themselves the right to decide all questions concerning Palestine. The Jews of the whole world had as much interest in Palestine as those who were living there and were as impatient for the establishment of the National Home.
The critics had failed to offer any practical scheme.
The main defense of the administration was left to Dr. Weizmann, although he was preceded by Mr. Ussishkin and followed by Mr. Sokolow. The old-timers remembered very well the adroitness and skill of Dr. Weizmann once he launches into polemics and the air became tense with excitement and expectation.
He began by saying that the critics had failed to make out a case. There was no need of a defense. Moreover, their accusations were based on erroneous impressions. He proceeded to give the facts as they were known to him. In this he succeeded almost invariably. He spoke for over an hour and only toward the end he touched upon the point of divergence between the present administration and the old school of political Zionists. The following is an extract from the record of the proceedings covering this point:
Dr. Weizmann: Not all Englishmen held the same view on Palestine as Mr. Balfour. If we had had 200,000 Jews in Palestine instead of 80.000 their position at San Remo would have been stronger.
Dr. Nordau: Well, why not?
Dr. Weizmann: To us it does not appear possible to go so quickly and to have 600,000 Jews there in a short time (Dr. Nordau's proposal —H. S.).
Not to-day! To-morrow, perhaps.
If the Jewish people would read into the San Remo decision the same things that they desire the British people to do, then we could talk about half a million Jews in Palestine. The Jews merely held meetings and waved flags. Did they give their money? We have done this, Jewish people!
What have you done?
From the applause which greeted Dr. Weizmann when he took his seat, only one inference was to be drawn; the majority of the delegates have vindicated him and his colleagues. San Remo and Sir Herbert Samuels were overshadowing the ineffectiveness of the Zionist Commission and the imputed high-handed methods of the Administrative machinery.
THE CONFERENCE AT WORK
On Thursday, prior to the opening of the general debate, the Senioren Convent announced that the business of framing resolutions to be acted upon by the Conference, would be entrusted to eight committees, on which the various delegations, groups and parties will have a proportionate number of representatives.
When the general debate came to a close, these committees were announced. They were as follows:
1. Palestine—Political: Professor Frankfurter, chairman.2. Palestine—General Work: Professor Warburg, chairman.3. Palestine—Finance: Julius Simon, chairman.4. Palestine—Education: David Yellin, chairman.5. Organization: Louis Lipsky, chairman.6. Organization Finance: A. H. Fromenson, chairman.7. National Work in Diaspora: Leo Motzkin, chairman.8. World Jewish Congress: Morris Rothenberg, chairman.
These committees began meeting at once and it was expected that at least a number of them would be able to submit some definite proposals the Monday following, when the plenary sessions of the Conference would be resumed.
They might have been. But events that had developed in the interim made this literally impossible. All the differences of opinion on minor as well as major matters of policy were overshadowed by a central issue which the Conference developed. As long as this issue remained undecided it was virtually useless to resume the plenary sessions and even the work of the committees had to be halted because of the uncertainty as to this most important decision. It took fully ten days until the plenary sessions were again resumed.
THE DEADLOCK
The scope of this résumé does not permit a detailed account of these critical ten days, during which the fate of the entire movement and the immediate work in Palestine hung in the balance. Only the main currents as they manifested themselves in this surging and stormy sea of intense excitement will be indicated.
Reduced to its most elementary terms, the issue may be defined as hinging around the composition of the New Administration. It was not merely a question of persons, although at times it may have appeared so on the surface. It was rather a question of outlook, of mental attitude, or, what the European delegates so fondly called, a question of principle.
To be a little more explicit: The present administrative machinery was openly charged with inefficiency in every phase of its work, except the political. The administration, through the mouth of Dr. Weizmann, virtually admitted it, excepting the educational work in Palestine.
Next: The political work, taken by and large, was over. The impending job was primarily financial and economic. If you canvass the ranks of the veteran Zionists for a group of men, well-fitted for this new work, you don't find any; that is, there are men, who know something about finance and colonization and industrial organization. But they are not the men. They might consent to take the job. Also, they might be successful in a measure. But, they will not command the full confidence of the Jewish people and still less so of the business world as a whole. This would mean starting with a handicap and probably would result in retarding the work, which, according to the administration, is rather pressing.
The more pragmatic minds, of which Justice Brandeis is the leading exponent, have therefore proposed the election of a small executive committee, three men, with the power to co-opt three or four others, chosen for their special aptitude to initiate and supervise the financial and economic operations in Palestine. These men were to be looked for among the leading British Jews who, although not party men in the stricter sense of the word, were nevertheless known as having strong Zionist proclivities.
On the other hand many of the delegates felt that this would be tantamount to a surrender of the destiny of Palestine and, some said, of the entire Zionist movement to men who are not to be implicitly trusted where Jewish national aspirations are at stake. Their policy might result in a mere colonization scheme, too slow and too conservative. The idea of the Jewish State, to be realized as speedily as possible, might receive a serious setback for many years to come.
This was the main contention of the opponents, although the personal motive was, in a number of cases, not entirely missing. With the election on the floor of the Conference, limited to: three men, a number of the Old Guard would necessarily be eliminated. And