The Maccabaean
regarded as exhibits in a medical diagnosis. This sudden prejudice which has sprung up all over Europe since the close of the war may in fact best be regarded as the consequence of what may be called vicarious hatred. For almost five years the peoples of Europe, belligerent and neutral alike, were arrayed in ranks of animosity against one another. Everybody was urged on by a thousand influences, subtle and crass, to hate somebody. We all took sides with bitter intensity. Now peace has come, but the soul wishes to go on hating. It has become a habit. Hate is not an unpleasant emotion, especially for those who (like Mr. Cannan and his hero) have sedulously cultivated the "home front." It is enjoyable to be able to hate; it expands one's personality; it gives play to the usually repressed emotions. And who is there better fitted to receive such hatred than the convenient Jew? There are so many excuses; and historically he has always been a vicar for one thing or another. And as long as the post-bellum state of mind continues, so long, no doubt, Mr. Cannan and his clan will also continue to prostitute themselves to the current wishes of the public. Tomorrow, if the popular mood changes, Mr. Cannan, with equal lack of doubt, will be decked in other finery to attract attention.
Meanwhile, one hopes that the American publishers will manage to convey a hint to Mr. Cannan that their present splendid list of books is not improved particularly by such undemocratic presentations as this tale of rogues, demimondaines, and swindlers.
M. J. H.
His Blind Spot
Problems of the Peace, by WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.
The processes of thought by which a man is led to affirm the right of almost all nationalities and yet deny the right of the Jewish people are beyond our comprehension. You either deny the right of all nationality and affirm the 18th century principle of legitimacy or else you affirm the right of all nationalities, without exception. So that Dawson's exception against the Jewish people is an exception motivated rather by ill-concealed prejudice than by any process of reasoning.
He does not argue against the right of the Jewish people to Palestine, as he argues for the right of the other subject nationalities. One wonders why. Is it because he has so much to say for the rights of the other peoples and has nothing to say against the right of the Jewish people? That is the likely answer. After presenting the facts and figures which, to him, prove the right of the Poles and the races of Austria-Hungary and Alsace-Lorraine, he arrives at the problem of Turkey and the Middle East and toward the end of the chapter, he devotes just one paragraph to Palestine. And this is what he scoffingly writes:
"The future political control of Palestine would appear likely to pass to one of these Powers or to Great Britain. It might be a happy solution if a country which will always be sacred ground, as the cradle of the only universal religion which the world has ever known, were held in trust by the Powers as the patrimony of Christendom, but such an idealistic scheme is rather for the age in which Tancred lived than for the hustling twentieth century. It has been suggested that Palestine shall be returned to the Jews, and if the Jews would only consent to go there, which they will not do, the proposal might be, as Lord John Russell said of a territorial scheme of his day, 'a very good arrangement for Europe.' In the absence of such a wholesale migration of population as this proposal would involve, however, the only effect of converting Palestine into a Jewish State would be to place in the hands of the leaders of the Hebrew race still greater political power than they now possess, a project not to be contemplated with satisfaction."
Perhaps if Mr. Dawson had understood the Jewish problem of Poland he might not have so easily assumed that Palestine would be without a sufficient population. He shows a keen awareness, in
his chapter on The Polish Problem, of the condition of the subject Poles in relation to Austria, Prussia and Russia, but he is altogether oblivious of the well-known fact that there are Jews in Poland to whom the possibility of migration to Palestine might offer the only solution for their ills. There is but one extenuating circumstance for Mr. Dawson and that is that this book was written in the summer of 1917, though published later in London and a little later in the United States. But it is not a circumstance which frees Mr. Dawson from the responsibility of seeing facts in the face.
Gallipoli and Palestine
The Dardanelles Campaign, by HENRY W. NEVINSON. Henry Holt and Company, New York.
The men who planned and fought the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign planned and fought for big stakes against heavy odds. Lord Fisher gave his consent to the campaign reluctantly because he understood the danger and the likelihood of defeat awaiting the fighters. Those who insisted on the waging of the Gallipoli campaign understood that victory, though dearly bought, would end the war in the Spring or Summer of 1916 instead of being drawn on to a possibly inconclusive end on the Western front. The capture of Ypres had been declared an impossible task; the Germans battered it; military historiographers had declared Constantinople invincible; it still remains so, the one big and disastrous fact in the military history of the Allies.
It is not hard to see what effect the capture in 1916 of the Dardanelles would have had in bringing Palestine nearer to the Jewish people of the world. One cannot deny that successful war made for the realization of Palestinian hopes. The campaign at Gallipoli was the first real campaign—not battle—in the Near East. It had for its purpose the subjugation of Turkey and the domination of the Balkan states to the end that they might understand the advantage of a military alliance with the Allies instead of with the Germans. Allied influence would also have been supreme in Greece had Gallipoli been won. But also, Palestine would have been assured in the Spring or Summer of 1916 instead of on November 11, 1918, when the Armistice was signed. For not only would the capture of Constantinople have meant the crushing of Turkey, but it would have brought with it so complete a demoralization of the Teuton Entente that the continuance of war on the Western front would have been difficult for the Germans, due to their necessity for re-enforcing the fallen Turks and meeting an attack made likely by a Gallipoli victory by the Allies and the very likely defection of Bulgaria, Germany's Balkan ally.
But the Gallipoli exploit failed and the war continued in the course in which history has already carefully set it, and the hopes of a Palestinian restoration were further put off. But though it was a failure the Gallipoli adventure cannot fail to have a melancholy interest for the whole Jewish world, for the fighters who died and bled on the hills and plains about Gallipoli died not only to make British influence supreme in the East but to bring nearer the day of the Palestinian restoration. Whether they knew it or not, they died none the less gloriously.
This story of Mr. Nevinson’s is told not in the epical and poetic manner of John Masefield’s “Gallipoli,” but in the manner of the military historiographer and what it lacks in sweep and beauty it makes up in exactness in detail. Mr. Nevinson, in his preface, seems to regret that he is obliged to speak of the campaign in terms of non-human battalions, for he realizes, he writes, that the glory of the battle was achieved through the heroism of individual men, men who fought not only when they were commanded, but volunteered on exploits so hazardous that they never returned. Gallipoli is one of those mistakes of leaders which serve as the occasion for humble men to show their mettle, without even a mention in the despatches, acts of heroism having become so commonplace that there was no longer any rcom for the names of unknown men.