ing tremendously wrong-headed, but he has determination. In this respect he excels all other leaders. The administration is an instrument of the organization. It is bound to reckon with the sentiments of various groups. It cannot be stubborn, and being under the necessity of always keeping its ear to the ground, it at times appears to be vacillating and incapable of a definite policy. Ussischkin is the power behind the throne. He has no call to reckon with Zionist public opinion. He holds no leading position. He can, therefore, be determined and obstinate and even at times rebellious. The position of the Inner Actions Comite is not so striking or impressive as is Ussischkin's. When Ussischkin arose on the first day to give his opinion of the Inner Actions Comite he spoke with arrogance, but he was definite and certain. They were the instruments of his policy, he seemed to say; had they been good, loyal instruments capable of discharging the duties of their office? He declared without equivocation that they had, and they deserved to be re-elected, and he hoped to re-elect them. He spoke only Hebrew, which on his tongue became a guttural, harsh language emphatic in the Slavonic manner, but remarkably in keeping with his character.
The issue of the Congress was to have been the question of the Bank control. Wolffsohn's speech, the opposition of the American and Canadian delegates, of the entire Mizrachi delegation, disposed of the issue early in the Congress, although the compromise arranged by the Permanenzausschuss was delayed until the last day. The reference of the matter to the Ausschuss was irregular, but procedure is still in its infancy in the Congress. The arrangement made by the Congress two years ago giving a majority control in the Aufsichtsrat of the bank to Wolffsohn and men of his selection, and providing for a majority for the administration in the greater Actions Comite, was continued with the addition of Jean Fischer,
Rosoff, Ussischkin and Julius Simon to the directorate of the Bank. The abortion of the entire issue was due first, to the irrational procedure of the Congress, and, second, to the indefiniteness of the issue as formulated by the Inner Actions Comite. The Congress at no time knew what the Inner Actions Comite hoped to gain by the change in control, nor was it clear how this change was to be accomplished.
The Inner Actions Comite mistook the temper of the Congress throughout. The Congress had not concluded that Zionism had reached the stage where its affairs could be entrusted to representatives of only one party. The idea that the Inner Actions Comite represented the party in control, and that all opponents of the party must be treated as disloyal or recalcitrant members of the movement, certainly could not receive the votes of a corporal’s guards. So in the matter of Die Welt. A majority of the delegates disapproved of Dr. Nordau’s tactics in writing his letter to the Times, in dellivering a criticism of the Inner Actions Comite in Paris and not attending the Congress, but Die Welt, so the opinion seemed to be, had been guilty of gross mismanagement when it had assumed to be the censor of Zionist opinion and on that theory excluded Nordau’s remarks from its pages. But the Inner Actions Comite is amenable to reason, and it is doubtful whether the same management will be continued in Die Welt.
X.
The so-called political Zionists did not make much criticism of the Inner Actions Comite, but they had a great deal to do with the formation of Congress opinion. Jean Fischer is an uncompromising political Zionist but aside from his one or two discussions, little or nothing was said of a program advocated by political Zionists. What I have said elsewhere as to the futility of an alignment of parties on a division of practical and political Zion-
