the Jewish individuality even less marked by a great deal than it is, we might reasonably assume it were worth while to give it a chance for expression. Surely, if one believes, in whatever degree, that the vocation of Israel is justice, he is bound to admit Israel's claim to a seat in the body whose business it is to formulate international justice.
The matter does not end here. After formulation, application. In the application of international justice we may safely draw an analogy from the domestic law. No legislature is wise enough, nor should one ever be foolish enough, to specify in a statute every particular case that may arise under its provisions. The most meticulous laws must 56 general to a degree; otherwise, they are not laws, but prescripts. It is the business of the courts to apply the general acts of the legislature to the specific complications of facts, the specific cases, which come up. Where the law to be applied is not statute, but ancient custom, an equal, if not greater, discretion is vested in the courts. We are told, indeed, that precedent governs in the Common Law, that is, the customary or case-law of English-speaking countries. On the strict theory of this law, the judges must do no more than to vindicate, over and over again, the precedents which have been handed down to them in the case-books. And unfortunately, too often the practice. no less than the theory, of this law recalls to mind the shaft which Moliere hurled against the physicians of his time. Dr. Bahys says, in L’Amour Medecin, “It is better to die according to rules than to recover contrary to them.” On the Procrustes-bed of precedent, justice has been stretched and strained, so that, to relieve it from its rigors, equity came to be established. But that is another story. The endeavor, in common-law courts, to bring every case under a precedent leads to the most astonishing ingenuity and intellectual dishonesty on the part of both bench and bar. For all that, there is such a thing, even in common-law jurisdictions, as judicial degislation. Rarely is a case quite on “all fours,” as lawyers say, with a precedent. and judges must decide on principle, though they profess to decide on precedent. On the continent, moreover,
where the tradition of the Roman Law holds sway, they are not at all keen on precedent, but determine what is just in every case without regard to any other in the light of the reason and principles of the code. There, frankly, is recognized the necessary discretion wshich must preside in a court that proposes to dispense justice to every newcomer. In American juris- pudence, this largeness of view and fearlessness have inspired the interpretation of the Federal Constitution. That instrument is now heard to say mostly what our great Chief Justice Marshall put into its mouth to say. Marshall was wont, at times, to conclude his masterly decisions in some such way as follows: “These seem to me to be the conclusions to which we are conducted by the reason and spirit of the law. Brother Story will furnish the authorities.” And we may guess Brother Story often had to bite his nails for the authorities.
So much for the large and the necessary share which courts exercise in the dispensing of domestic justice. Equally, perhaps greater, will be the part played by international courts in international justice. International law takes its source and spirit from the Roman Law, and the Roman Law was a body of principles independently applied by the judges in every case. The second Hague Conference, it will be remembered, made provision for two international courts—the first permanent international courts in history. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, established by the first Hague Conference, is really an occasional court, constituted out of a list of members from all the States for a particular case when one comes wp, and the only thing permanent about it, besides the list of members, is the bureau and secretariat at The Hague. I refer to the Judicial Arbitration Court and the International Prize Court. Article I of the Draft Convention relative to the creation of a Judicial Arbitration Court (which was annexed to the first wish of the Conference) reads as follows:
"With the view of promoting the cause of arbitration, the Contracting Powers agree to constitute, without derogation to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a Judicial Arbitration Court, freely and easily accessible, composed of judges representing the various judicial systems of