Page 4 — "Die ✡ Welt" — No. 53
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. . . have workers, and had Dr. Friedemann taken the trouble to get into touch with us, he would certainly have found my assertion confirmed.
Four motives induce Dr. Friedemann to plead for the transfer of the Central Office to London. 1. "The English Government maintains lively relations with the leadership of our movement." Not only in London. 2. "There is the centre of present-day world politics." A phrase. 3. "There prevails an earnest, businesslike, sober conception of things." So too in Berlin, Cologne and Paris. 4. "There, too, five men can be found who are fitted to take over the leadership." So too in Vienna. Only one must wish to find them.
If one sums up what was brought forward in the first article against Vienna and for London, one arrives at the result that not a single serious argument was put forward, but superficial considerations, empty phrases and gross inaccuracies. The consequences did not fail to appear. The discussion of the question raised, so burning a one, was an exceedingly weak one. The old rule: the weaker the paper, the weaker the discussion. Dr. Friedemann seems to have felt this himself. For he wrote a second article, a commentary on the first. It is to be hoped that he will yet resolve upon a commentary on the commentary. For the commentary is incomplete, superficial, in part naïve.
Let us look at the commentary itself, which appeared under the altered heading "On the Question of Organisation" (Vienna or London). First of all Dr. Friedemann makes therein a political confession of faith. In politics he knows no sentiment; in politics he lets himself be guided solely by principles of utility. If the leading statesman of the German Empire or of Great Britain pays homage to this principle, nothing can well be said against it. But if a leader of the Zionist movement, which owes its existence to sentiment, which is held together by sentiment, wishes to eliminate sentiment from politics, that means dealing the movement its death-blow. Dr. Friedemann knows this, and therefore he does not wholly renounce sentiment, and constructs a fine distinction between organisation and leadership. The former is to be ideal to the very bone, the latter realistic to the utmost sobriety. That is preaching wine and drinking water, agitating for Palestine and marching to Uganda. For this comedy no one, surely, will be found.
In merito Dr. Friedemann holds: "We must go to England because we must go with England. For England has not only shown the honest will to be of use to us, but also disposes of the means of power and the influence to further our cause considerably." That, to be sure, is an argument which deserves to be examined. It is true that England, so long as Joseph Chamberlain was Colonial Minister, wished to help us. I assume that the present Government also wishes to help us, for otherwise the dispatch of the expedition to Africa would be inexplicable. But in what does England's help consist? In the offer of Uganda, and in that only. Have we accepted England's offer? Formally, yes, even if conditionally; materially we have declined it. For let us not deceive ourselves: the majority which at the last Congress voted for the dispatch of an expedition to Uganda consisted only in the smallest part of Ugandists. By far the greater part of the majority voted for it partly for reasons of courtesy, partly because our Leader had staked his whole personality on the project. The best proof is furnished by the fact that the means for dispatching the expedition were not voted by the Congress. Had the majority been friendly to Uganda, it would logically have had to grant the means for dispatching the expedition as well. But that did not happen. Ergo it may justly be asserted that the Uganda project is for the present to be regarded as fallen. Yet I readily grant that one may hold the opposite view, that a majority for the Uganda project did in fact exist. In any case, however, the fact stands firm that for the present England wishes to help us with Uganda, and only with Uganda. If now Dr. Friedemann recommends transferring the seat of the Central Office to London because, as he asserts, "the political negotiations will in the foreseeable future be conducted above all in London", it follows that he is a Ugandist.
But what are the reasons which, from his standpoint, he adduces for London? 1. "The negotiators must speak faultless English." On this point I refer to the speech of Chamberlain, in which he characterised Herzl, who, as is well known, spoke English "with a foreign accent", as follows: "I had several conferences with the late Dr. Herzl, a man who made the deepest impression upon me, a man whose honesty, patriotism and ability were so great that . . ." Dr. Friedemann underrates an English statesman, a statesman at all, when he supposes that he will let himself be influenced in affairs of State by external circumstances. 2. "We must for a time attach ourselves to the policy of a particular Great Power; we must go with England and must therefore show our ally a considerable measure of friendship." That borders directly on political megalomania. How does Dr. Friedemann, who professes to be a realist in politics, picture to himself the Jewish-English alliance? And the first sweetmeat he proposes to administer to his ally is to be the establishment of the Central Office in London. A Homeric naïveté.
It is further established that the last Congress was split into two camps, into Ugandists and non-Ugandists, and that the two tendencies continue, now as before, to exist within our organisation. On which side the majority will be at the next Congress, no one knows. In any case one must reckon with the eventuality that the Ugandists may be defeated. Moreover, the result of the expedition to Uganda is not yet known at all; the expedition has scarcely set out. The report of the experts may also turn out against Uganda. Whither with the Central Office if one of the last two eventualities should come to pass? To London? What in all the world has the Inner A.-C. to seek in London if the Uganda project should fall for one reason or another? Ergo the discussion of the seat of the Central Office is, from the standpoint of the Ugandists, premature at present. If the Ugandists wish to ventilate this question already now, they must ask themselves: 1. Whither with the Inner A.-C. in the event of a favourable result of the expedition; 2. whither with the Inner A.-C. in the event that the contrary should occur, or rather in the event that they should remain in the minority at the coming Congress.
I believe the subject must be treated from an entirely different point of view in order to arrive already now at a tolerably satisfactory result. The observations on this head will follow in a second article.
(To be continued.)
Dr. Maximilian Piekarski.
