Die Welt · Vol. VII, No. 7 · 13 February 1903
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Page 4 — "Die Welt" — No. 7

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…ch national consciousness? But that the answer with regard to us Jews cannot be the same as with regard to other peoples will, in consideration of the difference of circumstances, at once be evident to everyone.

I now maintain that there are two factors which make every man, in respect of his nationality, what he is, namely: the consciousness of belonging to a certain people and — on which, however, I lay the chief weight — education. We shall now seek to establish this assertion.

The people is, as everyone knows, only the enlarged conception of the family. The formation of peoples is therefore usually set down as follows:¹) First there was the small family, the house, which was directed by the father of the house (and in the period of mother-right by the mother of the house). Then, when several houses branched off from the one, it was the eldest and most esteemed of the family to whose counsels and reproofs all members of the family submitted. But when out of the one family there came several, the tribe was formed, which was ruled by the wisest or the mightiest. A union of several kindred tribes under one head attained the highest stage of this development, and the people was there.

Let us then begin at once with the beginning of this development and inquire what produces in the child the love for its parents. The mystical notions perhaps still prevailing among the people, of a natural, innate instinct by which children and parents, or even brothers and sisters, are drawn to one another as though by a magnetic force, even if they have not learned the least of their kinship, may perhaps still be turned to account as a poetic motive in novels; in a scientific inquiry they naturally have no value. We now stand in science upon the empirio-critical standpoint, according to which at most mental forms, or more correctly dispositions, but never mental contents, can be regarded as something innate. And the Darwinian theory of heredity likewise asserts no more, so far as the world of mental phenomena is concerned. Only the manner in which someone loves or hates something — superficially or deeply, for example, and so forth — can be innate, but never the content, the object that is hated or loved. In this sense the Lockean proposition, which calls the soul of the new-born child a tabula rasa, stands in full accord with the present standpoint of science, namely that the innate aptitudes, impulses and inclinations of the new-born as yet have no object on which they could assert themselves. These objects, however, are supplied to it by its nearest surroundings. The child loves its parents because they bring it up, because they satisfy its wants, and, when it is grown, also because it knows that they are its parents. If the first factor falls away — if, for example, a child is brought up by its grandparents, who live far from its parents, so that it cannot even visit them often — its love will transfer itself to the grandparents, and the weaker feeling of love for the parents will spring, in the grown person, only from the consciousness that they are its parents. But if the second factor also falls away — if, for example, a child of two years


¹) Be it noted that in analysing the conception of the people we here proceed after the pattern, given in the Aristotelian Politics, of the analysis of the State as something existing, without of course wishing to decide further whether the sequence of stages sketched represents the actual course of historical development or only the logical analysis of what exists, since for our train of thought this remains the same.

is torn from its parents and brought up by strangers without ever learning that they were merely its foster-parents, this child will love these strangers with the same fervour with which one loves parents, and should chance one day bring the grown man into the company of his real parents without his being enlightened as to the true state of affairs, they will be strangers to him.

It is just the same with the feeling of love for one's people. As a rule one feels oneself a member of a particular people only if one has been brought up among it, or at least by members of it. If a two-year-old Malagasy or Chinese is brought to France and brought up there by Frenchmen, he will be a Frenchman. Whether he will also feel anything for his own people when, as a grown man, he learns of his descent depends entirely upon the personal nature of the individual concerned. If a two-year-old German is brought to France and brought up there by Frenchmen without ever in his life learning of his German origin, he will be a full-blooded Frenchman and will probably hate the Germans with the same implacable fury as the genuine Frenchman who can trace his Gallic descent back to the times of Caesar. We see, then, that the national feeling of the individual is produced exclusively by education, without any other circumstance being allowed to co-operate therein, unless it be the consciousness of descent. Be it noted: the consciousness of descent, but not descent without the consciousness of it.

IV.

But here begins the difference between the other peoples and us Jews. Among independent peoples the individual really needs no special national education. The German, for example, can already be regarded as such if only he has grown up and come to manhood in Germany among Germans, even if he has received no education at all. He is a German as soon as he does not feel himself a Frenchman, Jew or Pole, since he has after all grown up at home among his own people, and his childish mind has already absorbed all the qualities and peculiarities that distinguish the Germans from other peoples, and since his mother tongue, too, is German.

But with us Jews it is quite otherwise. Only he can be regarded as a national Jew who bears within him the consciousness of his Jewishness, who feels himself a Jew; and this, as a rule (there are of course, here as everywhere, individual exceptions, which only prove the rule), can and will be the case only with one who has received a genuinely Jewish education. I need hardly set forth the reasons for this. I will nevertheless do so in all brevity. We live among other peoples, we speak their language, we have adopted many of their habits and peculiarities. A genuinely Jewish education nevertheless possesses the remarkable power to make us, in the national respect, into something different from these peoples, into a single and united people — into Jews! But only a genuinely Jewish education is capable of accomplishing this masterpiece. Now a genuinely Jewish education presupposes that it be undertaken and carried through in a genuinely Jewish home. With this we have arrived at the salient, the chief point of our whole inquiry. The Jewish home — that is the firm foundation, the real content of our national life in the Dispersion. For the genuinely Jewish home forms, wherever it may be, a piece of the Jewish fatherland