No. 42. — "Die Welt" — Page 9.
(continued from page 8)
…set for itself. Through lectures and discussions Jewish girls and women are to be afforded the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the national history and literature. It is to become a point of union, where we shall learn to bear with pride and with love the name of Jewess, which is so often hurled at us as a term of abuse.
As enthusiastic Jewesses, true to our conviction, we shall then become valiant fighters as well for the welfare of the Jewish people, for the high and proud goal towards which the Zionist movement strives.
We beg all Jewish girls to join us, for only with united forces can a victory be won.
Further information is given by: Ina Schimmer II., Rembrandtstrasse 30.
Amélie Gelbtuch, IX., Liechtensteinstr. 17.
Achad-Haam as Historiosopher.
By Salomon Schiller.
Achad-Haam's research is applied historiosophy. His theorems have always a practical background. His attention is directed in the first place upon the present-day problems of Judaism. Their solution, however, is to be furnished him by the past of the Jewish people. There he traces out the grounds of origin, the analogies and the counterparts of that which at present keenly occupies us. And the analogies and counterparts to the problems of to-day which are found in the Jewish past are in their turn to receive their interpretation through comparison with the cultural life of other peoples, but above all through a reaching back to the mainsprings of social movements, to the motives of human nature in general. This setting out from particular practical questions was decisive for the shaping of Achad-Haam's intellectual work. It offers no comprehensive, rounded view of the development of the Jewish nation, but rather a wealth of isolated historiosophical thoughts, delivered fragmentarily, aphoristically, which nevertheless in their totality point to a common root, to a unified conception of the world.
Achad-Haam's historiosophy is a strange synthesis of evolutionism and ideology, of English empiricism and German constructive philosophy. As a disciple of David Hume he is averse to rationalism with its sharp logical delimitations; yet his methodology, his systematic procedure, has in it an echo of the Hegelian dialectic of the Idea. As a shrewd psychologist, endowed with a fine sense for the instinctual life of men and of peoples, he is well aware “that life is not governed by logical laws,” “that the soul harbours within it a wealth of contradictions which logic absolutely does not tolerate”; and yet no right relation to reality! As a modern psychologist it assuredly does not escape him that our thinking is overgrown by the needs of the heart, that our declared thoughts, if they do not actually spring from impulses and instincts, inclinations and aversions, are at least borne up by them; but for sheer psychology he frequently loses the real ground beneath his feet, and there is withdrawn from his clear eye the objectivity of things, which is after all the first spur and at the same time the regulator of our emotional activity. It is true that Achad-Haam indicates the social conditions in all his treatises; but after he has touched them fleetingly (commonly in an interpolated sentence), after tiresome objectivity has done its duty, he quits them as quickly as may be in order to revel in unbounded fencing of the heart. The developments and entanglements which Achad-Haam depicts so charmingly might be described as a counterpart to the Hegelian dialectic of the Idea, as the dialectic of the heart. We regard it as the fundamental defect of the Achad-Haamian historiosophy that beside the social psychologist the economist never gets a word in. Whosoever would utter anything fruitful upon the history of peoples must first of all come to terms with materialism, must first of all ask himself how far the mode of production and the distribution of products, social power and social decline, forms of dominion, inventions and discoveries (which after all influence social life quite particularly) — in short, how far the whole complication of the life and struggle of definite spheres of interest is favourable or obstructive to certain ideas and conceptions of the world. Of all this there is not a trace in Achad-Haam! His battles between “Two Powers,” between “Positive and negative systems,” “Past and Future,” “The premature and the belated,” are fought out in a cloud-cuckoo-land, and might refer just as well to the pre-Christian as to the post-Christian era. It is true that with Achad-Haam it is a question of abstract, typical phenomena, which are to be determined solely by the psychic nature of men and of associations as such. But the question is precisely whether such types possess vitality without being filled with individual, that is to say socially determined, content, and whether it is not this very content that is the spiritus movens of all movement of culture. Hence it comes that Achad-Haam does indeed set before our eyes, aptly and expressively, the elementary psychological substructure of society, but not society as it lives and breathes — which is the more fatal since, as we premised above, his research means to be applied historiosophy, since he means to draw from his teachings practical consequences for the Jewish people. Happier is his psychological analysis of fairly primitive and homogeneous social organisations; where, on the other hand, it is a question of richly ramified, highly differentiated cultures, there the bloodlessness and barrenness of his disquisitions, the artificiality of his constructions, is displayed in astonishing fashion — although here too we come upon a wealth of excellent thoughts, most worthy to be laid to heart.
Achad-Haam's favourite subject is the application of Darwinism to social psychology, the transference of the theory of descent to the culture-creations of mankind. The struggle for existence, the victory of the better adapted, and heredity are the fundamental conditions not only of the modification of species, but likewise of the modification of convictions, customs, religions, cultures. “Even the slightest change in any department of life is not accomplished without a struggle — not even a change in orthography.” War and peace, like motion and rest, are only relative conceptions; they are distinguished merely by their manner of manifestation. “By war we understand the open, purposeful wrestling between two camps, a wrestling whose course, cause and effect we are able to survey; by peace — those constant little struggles which either, by reason of their insignificance, escape our consciousness, or of whose existence we are indeed aware in a general way, but whose details and causal concatenation we are unable to embrace.” These vanishingly small struggles, which proceed beneath the threshold of the social consciousness, and the small (culture-) transformations that follow in their train, sum themselves up in the course of time into great masses of culture widely divergent from one another, which then fall into open and purposeful war against each other. There is thus repeated in the psychic life of society a phenomenon familiar from individual psychology: out of the background of the half-unconscious associative processes there emerge, in consequence of interest and attention, clear and well-ordered apperceptions; the dull impulses are heightened, in the course of intellectual development, into conscious expressions of will, only to become mechanised and organised through practice and habituation, and to sink back again into associations. This mechanising and organising of thoughts and expressions of will in the life of society is accomplished, according to Achad-Haam, by way of the inheritance of departed generations (that is to say, upon the ground of the second Darwinian fundamental law), as in the life of the individual it is accomplished through the influences of the environment. “Every man of culture who lives in an ordered society stands constantly under the hypnotising influence of his environment. This suggests to him (the individual), by way of education, a mass of commandments which determine in advance his future manner of life, and upon his understanding and temper a definite form