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…"Jewish Songs" we perceive that Donath is not only a good poet, but also a good Jew. Formal merits of Donath's poems are terseness and precision. With a few strokes he sketches effective, richly coloured pictures. The reader says to himself that he has a poetic individuality before him. With that much is said.
Z. A.
Feuilleton.
Salomon Maimon and Critical Scepticism.
By Dr. S. Rubin.
Heinrich Heine, in a comparison of German philosophy with French political conditions, calls Kant the Robespierre of philosophy. Looked at in a clear light, that is false. For although Kant would clear away the old metaphysics by mercilessly laying bare its incongruities, a reign of intellectual terror was assuredly no part of his design. His theory of knowledge, which stepped into the place of the metaphysics hitherto current, was a modest sovereign, cherishing no appetite to conquer foreign, supersensible territory, to carry over her categories into regions beyond. She sought only to subject the small circle of phenomena to her sceptre, in order to be able to reign undisturbed.
One commits an error in believing that Kant's chief struggle was directed against the old metaphysics. Oh no! This venerable matron with all her whims would never have goaded Kant into that embittered struggle, had not another and far more dangerous enemy lain lurking in ambush. It is the acute sceptic David Hume. This philosophical nihilist, who threatened to sweep all knowledge from the face of the earth, struck a positive terror into Kant. And it was against him alone that the heavy artillery was brought into action. It is a remarkable phenomenon in the history of philosophy that at all times the most brilliant minds have expended all their knowledge upon denying knowledge. Thus the first Sophists — who are by no means to be identified with the later rabble of jugglers and mountebanks, as Zeller has already shown in his famous work "The Philosophy of the Greeks" — were sceptics kat' exochen. A Protagoras and a Gorgias were no buffoons who would have applied all their intellect to amusing the stupid mob for a gratuity, which is what is commonly understood by Sophists. No! They were earnest, acute thinkers, who by virtue of their genius recognised the insufficiency of all our knowledge. And even after a Plato and an Aristotle believed they had erected everlasting supports for metaphysics, scepticism runs on through the whole history of philosophy, until in more recent times it found in Hume its greatest representative. This acute thinker, who stood tower-high above his contemporaries — who did not so much as understand him — concentrated all his sceptical attacks upon a single point, namely upon the law of causality, with which all knowledge must stand or fall. To be sure, it never remotely occurred to Hume to banish the law of causality from practice. A starving man who would take no food to still his hunger because he was not convinced whether food is at all the cause of satiety, Hume would have declared a candidate for the madhouse. But is theory thereby helped? Does not the question press itself all the more forcibly upon us, whence comes that apodicticity with which we cover the nakedness of the law of causality? From practice it cannot be fetched. Experience can offer only the fig-leaf of probability, and not the godlike raiment of necessity. This alarm-cry, which could not tear the contemporaries of this heaven-storming Titan out of their deep slumber of dogmatism, was mighty enough to appear to a Kant as a storm-signal. It was no longer a question of metaphysics alone, but of philosophy in general, that ornament of the human understanding, which the ruthless Scot would annihilate. To save it, Kant had to summon up his whole intellectual force in order to raise a giant work which should defy every attack. As we see, it is properly Hume who is the Robespierre of philosophy, while Kant employed his labour upon bringing about a modest restoration of philosophy. He summoned all his powers to rehabilitate the law of causality, to erect firm supports for it. But if the new edifice was to be capable of life, the old one, grown rotten, had to be entirely pulled down. Hence the clamour which Kant's contemporaries raised. For it fared no better with this great critic than with his famous predecessor, the sceptic Hume. A swarm of professors of the chair, who took their old rusted school-wisdom for sterling coin, raised a hue and cry at the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason, and summoned all their powers to rid the world of these new subversive ideas. They were for the most part people who did not even understand the Critique, who did not grasp the seriousness of the matter, and were therefore put in their place by Kant with contempt. So much the greater must be the interest awakened by the man to whom Kant gave the testimony that "no one among his opponents had understood him (Kant) so rightly as he." I mean Salomon Maimon.
Salomon Maimon! This name appears even to-day like a phenomenon in the history of philosophy. Without any education, without any preliminary studies, but equipped with a keen intellect that dissolves everything, and with the knowledge of the many folios of the Talmud, a man comes out of Poland to Germany, where he begins to occupy himself with the newer philosophy. Rapidly he studies all the systems one after another — Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke and Hume. This last exercised a lasting influence upon him. His analytic spirit, which resolves everything into atoms, found here in Hume its congeniality. Like him, he grasped that all our knowledge rests upon feet of clay, that we believe we know what we can at most surmise. When therefore he studied the Critique of Pure Reason, it was for him neither a book with seven seals, as it was for most of his contemporaries, nor a sanctuary which commands awe of him who enters. He grasped the situation, he knew what the matter turned upon, and he knew still more, namely, that Kant was moving in a circle, that he had not solved Hume's question at all. It is Vaihinger's great merit to have uncovered in the most recent time the error which Kant and his commentators committed in throwing together and confounding the two Humean problems. Hume sets up two questions. Whence do we know that every event must have a cause? And granted that we knew it, how can we determine for each particular occurrence its cause? These two different questions Kant confounds, so that, notwithstanding the great difference, he touches now upon the one and now upon the other as need requires. In my recently published work upon "Maimon and Kant" I show that, upon the exact keeping apart of these two problems, the whole edifice of the Critique must fall asunder. Here I content myself with establishing that this discovery of Vaihinger's is not new. It was made a hundred years ago, immediately after the appearance of the Critique, by Maimon, and was not, as Vaihinger supposes, merely touched upon in passing, but emphasised with force. Maimon brings out repeatedly that Kant answered only the first of Hume's two questions. The hypothesis that the law of causality, just as well as space and time, has its origin in the subject, suffices only to justify the general law of causality. We assert, that is to say, that every event must have a cause because we must think causally, because the law
