Die Welt · Vol. II, No. 14 · 7 April 1898
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English · AI translation, checked against the German

No. 14. — "Die Welt" — Page 15.

Friedheimer (in an undertone to Jacob). Only do not excite yourself!

Jacob. No! . . . (To Schromm.) I am resolved to enlighten you, and I shall go to the very end in it. You have lost your fortune, but for that you yourself bear the blame. This blame was of two kinds. First, the pledging of the shares. Here your ignorance of business played you a trick. I am inconsolable about it. Rabbi Friedheimer can bear witness to it.

Schromm. Oh, nonsense, the Rabbi!

Jacob. But greater was your other guilt, for which you deserve no pity.

Schromm. Now I let you speak your fill, my good sir. I wish to see how far your audacity goes.

Jacob. It goes as far as the truth! The other guilt of which I speak was that you neglected your mine. This slovenly management . . .

Schromm (beside himself). What do you dare to say?

Jacob (growing heated). This slovenly management has destroyed not only your goods and chattels, but the lives of men as well. While you were pursuing your noble passions, you let your slaves drudge for you beneath the earth.

Wasserstein (low, in enthusiasm, to Friedheimer). He is giving it him.

Jacob. Men, women, children in bond-service below ground — for wretched starvation wages.

Schromm (gasping). Go on, go on!

Jacob. Yes, go on! So has it gone on and on — years, decades. And withal not a thought was given even to the safety of life! Until the collapse came that was bound to come . . . Truly, you dare to complain because the mine-water has washed away your evil riches too? . . . And what do you do with the corpses? I have seen these corpses, with my own eyes. And the widows I have seen too, and the orphans who must now go hungry because their fathers died for Captain von Schromm . . . And you were not even at the burial!

Schromm. But you were there!

Jacob. I was there!

Schromm. I was told of it. You were at the strike too. At first I did not understand what business you had there. What is the Jew doing there? I asked myself.

Jacob. The Jew was doing the Christian's duty.

Schromm. Your precious brother-in-law told me that you were a fool, and that he had fallen out with you . . . But now I understand it. You have been playing hand in glove with him!

Jacob. That is not true!

Schromm. Ah, Jew rabble!

Jacob. You will take that back!

Wasserstein (in an undertone to Friedheimer). I shall have him thrown out. (Rings.)

Schromm. And if I do not take it back — you will excuse me right enough, as you did that other time . . .

Servant (enters).

Schromm. I know you! You excuse your brother-in-law — you beg pardon for yourself as well . . . Jew rabble!

Jacob (who at the words "as you did that other time" winced as though struck, now rushes upon Schromm and boxes his ears).

Schromm (staggers, his hat falls from him, in the next moment he would fling himself upon Jacob with a hoarse cry of rage, but Friedheimer and Wasserstein hastily step between, the Servant seizes him from behind by both arms and drags the raving, foaming man to the door on the left. After Schromm has received the blow, while he is being forced out). Let go! Let go! I must chastise him!

Friedheimer (to Jacob). What have you done?

Jacob. I shall perhaps pay for it, but not repent it!

(The curtain falls. — End of the Third Act.)
(Conclusion follows.)


The World of Books.

Hermann Cohen. To the present age there belongs a series of thinkers from whom the framing of systems upon new foundations is not to be expected, but who nevertheless possess an extraordinary significance for the philosophical movement of our time, in so far as, while they undertake attempts at reconstruction only, they attach themselves therein to none less than Immanuel Kant. Already about the middle of this century the admonition had gone forth from various, nay from opposite quarters, that German philosophy must seek to "orient" itself by Kant once more. And in truth, through the irresistible dissolution of the old speculative systems on the one hand, and the growth and the upward flight of the empirical sciences on the other, the need had become very lively of getting out again from the blind alley into which philosophy had strayed, and of returning once more to the starting-point of the century's philosophy. Yet men did not rightly know in what sense they were to attach themselves to Kant. Then, in 1862, Eduard Zeller spoke the liberating word: "Back to Kant." He desired a resumption of epistemological inquiries, nay, set these up as precisely the philosophical task of the age. The former Hegelian and famous historian was violently attacked by his associates on account of his apostasy. But the scientific movement of the age passed over these attacks to the order of the day. Very soon a whole number of thinkers, and younger ones especially, who were recruited in part from among natural scientists as well, had followed Zeller's call and given themselves up to the renewed study of Kant. One may therefore date the boldly aspiring Neo-Kantian school in Germany from this point of time. Among the most eminent Neo-Kantians a place is held by the man whose name stands emblazoned at the head of these lines.

Of decisive importance among his works is Cohen's book "Kant's Theory of Experience" (Berlin 1871, 2nd edition 1885), because here for the first time the whole force of a concentrated labour was expended upon mastering Kant's terminology completely, and thus, by the hand of the most exact determination of concepts, penetrating more deeply into the sense of the old master. That the thoroughness with which Cohen went to work has not remained without fruit is made plain by the exposition of the Kantian philosophy in its relation to materialism, such as we meet with it in the third edition of the well-known "History of Materialism" by Friedrich Albert Lange. "The changes as against the first edition," confesses that exceedingly ingenious man, whose History is a book for life in the full sense of the word, "for the household use of culture and for the questions of the world, "are to be ascribed to a renewed revision of the whole Kantian system, occasioned chiefly by Cohen's book." And in another place he reports: "The alteration of my conception upon this point had already been prepared by studies of my own when Cohen's important work upon "Kant's Theory of Experience" appeared, which moved me to yet another total revision of my views concerning the Kantian critique of reason. The result was that in most points I was obliged to assent to Cohen's conception, so far as it was merely a question of the objective exposition of Kant's opinions." Worthily there attaches itself to the interpretation of the Kantian doctrine of experience the book upon "Kant's Foundation of Ethics" (Berlin 1877), or, what is at bottom the same thing, upon the epistemological foundation of ethics. It brings the continuation of his endeavours for the restoration of the Kantian philosophy. These move within the framework that, in accordance with the critical method and in adherence to Kant's words, he attempts the independent treatment of the philosophical problems. The leitmotiv of both works is the thought that absorption in the work of critical idealism and the independent furtherance of systematic philosophy reciprocally demand and condition one another. The Kantian philosophy signifies for Cohen nothing else than philosophy as science. And science must indeed be dogmatics, yet it is not dogma and does not remain the reading of documents. Science is the ideal of the system upon the ground of steady, methodical labour. There lies a kernel of truth in it when our philosopher exclaims with all that decision into which indignation too is mingled: "Without thorough orientation concerning the inquiries which the history, reckoned by millennia, of the deepest and self-propagating thoughts contains, without exact, sometimes indeed without