Die Welt · Vol. II, No. 3 · 21 January 1898
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No. 3. — "Die Welt" — Page 5.

How, then, could we in the first place demand that the government should safeguard our interests, or that the non-Jewish deputies should defend our rights!

The same lukewarmness, nay ruthlessness, toward the interests of their electors was displayed by the said Jewish deputies also with regard to the harsh provisions of the new Code of Civil Procedure — provisions that endanger the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of conscience and freedom of religion of the Jews — concerning

III. The Sabbath and the Jewish Holy Days.

Hitherto the following law governed the matter:

"The Jews are not to be summoned before the court on their festival days, and the judicial authorities, who are to procure for themselves an exact register of the Jewish festival days, are to be directed to conform accordingly. The Israelites have in the year, apart from the weekly Sabbath days, thirteen holy days, namely: (the enumeration follows)." (Court Decree of 17 January 1818, No. 1405 S.-G.-S.).

A Jew, then, might on no account be cited before the court on a Saturday or a holy day. Had the judge nevertheless done so, through oversight or chicane, the party summoned needed not to appear. Were he condemned, he had the right of the plea of nullity. Among the exhaustively enumerated grounds of nullity belongs the following: "The unlawful appointment of a hearing during the vacations." (Court Decree of 16 June 1788, No. 844, J.-G.-S., point 4.)

These provisions are now abolished, and new ones take their place. First of all, § 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It reads: "On Sundays, as well as on Christmas Day, hearings may not be held. The appointment of a hearing on any other holy day is admissible only in case of danger in delay.

Which days are to be regarded as holy days within the meaning of the law shall be determined by ordinance."

It strikes one at once that the Sabbath and the Jewish holy days are no longer, as hitherto, legally recognized as holy days — nay, are not even mentioned in the law. This recognition is left, in the first instance, to a ministerial ordinance. The ministerial ordinance was indeed published these very days, and by means of it the Saturdays and thirteen Jewish holy days were recognized as holy days within the meaning of the law. But the next minister can alter this ordinance without anyone having the right to call him to account for it. He can recognize our Saturday and our holy days, but there exists no law that compels, for instance, Herr Dr. Pattai to do so, so soon as he should attain the goal of his striving, the justice portfolio.

The Saturday and the Jewish holy days, however, lack not merely the legal recognition; they stand also, in their juridical significance, below the Sundays. On Sundays, as well as on Christmas Day, no hearing may be held; whereas on Saturdays and Jewish holy days a Jew can — in contrast to the law hitherto in force — be summoned to a hearing "in case of danger in delay." What means danger in delay? That the judge himself has to decide according to his free discretion. Not even "the danger of a considerable injury" is necessary, for this passage was struck out by the Judicial Committee from the original wording of § 142 in the government bill (688 of the appendix to the stenographic records of the House of Deputies, IXth Session, 1893, p. 41). It suffices that, in the opinion of the Herr District-Court Adjunct, there be "danger in delay," in order to cite strictly observant Jews before the court in civil matters on the Saturday or on high holy days. Should they not appear, then against the judicial decision no legal remedy whatever stands open to them, for the ground of nullity of the aforementioned Court Decree of 16 June 1788 exists no longer, and the "unlawful proceeding" required by § 477, paragraph 4, of the new Code of Civil Procedure is, given the great elasticity of the concept "danger in delay," hard to demonstrate.

What a dreadful field for fresh judicial chicaneries, humiliations, and mental torments, under which the poor Galician Jews already, in any case, have to suffer in many places.

The new law has already come into force. We have shown what it brings to our kinsmen in people and in faith. And when they shall groan under its harshnesses, let them not forget which Jewish deputies gave their assent to it.

Dr. S. R. Landau.


Paris Letter.

Paris, 14 January 1898.

"The comedy is at an end, the tragedy begins." So wrote a newspaper after the acquittal of Esterhazy. That the proceeding of the court-martial was indeed a comedy, and moreover a right pitiful comedy, of that a doubt is surely impossible. Unhappily it is also true that now the tragedy begins — the tragedy of a martyr, of a family that is day after day publicly reviled, of the whole Jewish people, upon whom a new stain of shame is to be fastened. One must, alas, say it: the saddest thing in the whole affair is that the in-no-wise-proven treason of this single Jew is being transformed into a new brand-mark that men would fain press upon the entire Jewish people. Bernard Lazare, in his lately published pamphlet, rightly remarks that, precisely as the blood of Christ shed by Pontius Pilate came upon the head of the Jews, so too, for this crime, said to have been committed by a Jew, once again all Jews are called to account. In this sense, then, wrote Edmond Lepelletier also, after the trial of Esterhazy: "It was a great fault of the Jews that they created the appearance of declaring themselves in solidarity with Dreyfus." Herr Lepelletier simply forgets that it is always and everywhere usual to ascribe to our people a common responsibility for all that the individual has committed. Thus has the community always had to suffer for the one or for the few, however strongly it defended itself against it.

Now, however, it is not at all a question of shifting this responsibility from us Jews, but rather of proving that the Jew has not committed the crime at all of which he is accused. To be sure, men will by no means admit that it is only the Jewish descent of Dreyfus which has brought it about that he was set before the judges so without much ado and so hardly punished. And yet the occurrences of the last fortnight point with inexorable clearness to the fact that it was in truth a question of the Jew and not of the officer Dreyfus. From the beginning of his career this officer's Jewishness has caused him slights and affronts. Thus had he to content himself with a lower place in the order of rank after his examination in the "Ecole militaire," and thus did the hatred of Jews pursue him even into his bureau in the General Staff. Is it, then, to be wondered at that some one or other had only to be found who designated him, the Jewish officer, as the author of the bordereau, in order that one might see justice proceed with a swiftness and unscrupulousness such as, in the case of a non-Jewish officer, would simply have been out of the question? This whole loathsome spirit is faithfully mirrored, for example, in the bill of indictment of Ormescheville. Of such stuff are the people made who with a light heart cast into the dungeon a man of honourable antecedents and spotless conduct in the service. It is, after all, only a Jew to whom this happens.

Whoever has read the bill of indictment must admit what an utterly incredible importance was attached to the least things, if only they could be turned to the disadvantage of the condemned man. And what a wide field was granted to the combinations! Several incriminated letters are plainly not written by Dreyfus — consequently he traced over the words in order to lead the judges astray. At various domiciliary searches nothing incriminating was found. What is clearer than that he burned all the letters that could compromise him? And in this manner, right up to the end