Page 4 — “Die Welt” — No. 3.
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…results of the entire proceeding and of the presentation of evidence, to judge according to free conviction whether a factual statement is to be held true or not.”
This principle, which has already governed criminal procedure since the year 1873, now attains full validity in civil procedure as well. We will characterise its scope by an example.
Some years ago a curious case came to decision before the criminal court in Cracow. A Jewish shopkeeper wished to settle in a village near Bochnia. Since in this locality there existed a Christian association (kółko rolnicze) and the antisemitic agitation had undermined the whole neighbourhood, the man succeeded only with great difficulty, and against a comparatively high rent of 14 fl. a month, in finding suitable premises with a peasant. The whole village, the priest at its head, fell into an uproar over it. They threatened the peasant with ecclesiastical penalties and grave maltreatment; it availed nothing. Only when it was said that the red cock would be set upon his roof did he give way. He implored the Jew for compassion and bound himself, in the presence of several witnesses, to refund him the monthly rent should he move out. The Jew left the village, but did not receive the 14 Gulden. So he now had recourse to law. Upon his complaint a date for a small-claims hearing was appointed by the district court in Bochnia. Here, however, the peasant declared under oath that he had promised the Jew nothing. The latter was nonsuited, and now lodged a criminal information with the public prosecutor’s office in Cracow. The investigation was set in motion, and its result moved the public prosecutor to bring the charge against the peasant. It came to a public trial before the criminal senate, over which Provincial Court Councillor Giebułtowski presided. The four witnesses, Jews, who were examined alongside the private complainant, affirmed unanimously under oath that the peasant had promised the refund of the 14 Gulden. Nevertheless the court acquitted the accused of the crime of perjury. It grounded this, in the reasons for its decision, by declaring that, despite the concordant testimony of the four witnesses, the court could nevertheless not hold the guilt of the accused to be proven.
That is the free evaluation of evidence! If even four witnesses — Jews, for example — swear to a fact, the judge may nevertheless declare it untrue; but a fact to which even a single witness — a non-Jew, for example — swears, he may nevertheless hold to be true. Therein consists the difference from the hitherto prevailing “formal theory of evidence,” under which the court was obliged to accept as true every statement confirmed by the testimony of two witnesses.
Whoever knows exactly the conditions in the small Galician towns, where the masses of our people are pressed together, will, by the guidance of the case mentioned, arrive at the correct recognition of what the granting of a boundless plenitude of power to the district-court adjuncts signifies under present-day conditions.
II. Documents in the Hebrew Language or Script.
Whoever nowadays in Austria wishes to draw up a document concerning a legal transaction, to use his correspondence, accounts, business books as means of proof, may thereby avail himself of any language and any script — only not the Hebrew. That hundreds, indeed even thousands of businessmen and tradesmen avail themselves, in their business dealings, in the drawing up of letters, receipts, accounts, and the like, of Hebrew characters — of this the legislators have taken no account. A Greek, Japanese, or Chinese document constitutes, in the translation of a judicially sworn interpreter, a means of proof — only not a Hebrew one, or one written in Hebrew. The laws in question read:
“Instruments written in the Hebrew language or with Hebrew or Jewish letters shall be regarded as invalid and void.” (Court-Chancery Decree of 22 October 1814, No. 1106, J.-G.-S.)
“Signatures in Jewish or Hebrew script which appear upon a private document issued at home in the language customary in the country are to be regarded merely as a manual mark.” (Court Decree of 19 February 1846, No. 938, J.-G.-S.).
Despite the Constitution, these pre-March exceptional laws have remained in legal force to this day. The famous, so frequently discussed Article 19 of the Fundamental Law of the State: “All the races of the state are equal in rights, and every race has an inviolable right to the preservation and cultivation of its nationality and language,” appears indeed to find application to all races, only not — to the Jews.
This does not, however, preclude that the Hebrew or Hebrew-written documents, respectively business books, are, despite their invalidity, subject to the stamp duty. The treasury gives nothing away.
But on the Jewish side, too, efforts have hitherto been lacking to procure a repeal of the Court decrees. Since this could come about only by way of a statute, and a government bill was not to be expected, it would have been the affair of the Jewish deputies, in particular of the representatives of Jewish majorities from Galicia, to undertake the corresponding steps. Since the beginning of the parliamentary era in the year 1867, however, we find not so much as a single, even merely platonic, motion of initiative from a Jewish deputy in this direction.
But one might at least have expected that the new Code of Civil Procedure — which overturns the whole lumber of forms and opens door and gate so wide to the free conviction of the judge — would at the same time clear away the laws of the police state that violate civil liberty. This too has not come to pass.
In § 294 of the new Code of Civil Procedure it is stated:
“Private documents establish, in so far as they are signed by the issuers or provided with their judicially or notarially authenticated mark, full proof that the declarations contained in them proceed from the issuers.”
Thus far, then, all would be well. The paragraph speaks of no script and of no language. But the Introductory Statute to the Code of Civil Procedure says in Article VII, clause 2: “The provisions of the civil law remain untouched by which the evidentiary force of a private document is made dependent upon certain requirements.”
The documents in the Hebrew language or Hebrew script thus remain henceforth as well “invalid and void,” while § 294 will find application to Chinese, Japanese documents, and the like.
But what appears most strange and downright incredible is that, during the parliamentary deliberations upon the statute, not a single Jewish deputy — indeed not one of the four representatives of Jewish majorities from Galicia — so much as took the floor on this question. Dr. v. Rapoport and Dr. Rosenstock, Dr. Bloch and Dr. Byk — who were sent to Parliament in the year 1891 by the Jewish small traders and tradesmen, the former indirectly, the latter directly — did not, during the whole session, up to the adoption of the statute in the year 1895, find it worth the trouble so much as to protest against this violation of equality of rights and this grave injury to their own electors. Or were these gentlemen ashamed to demand that in a land where 68 per cent of the population are illiterate, the Jews be permitted to use their Jewish business books as means of proof? They preferred to keep silent. Dr. Byk, who every year delivered a speech on the justice budget, and also in November 1894 on the “Law concerning the deliberation and resolution upon the introduction of the new Code of Civil Procedure,” felt himself so entirely the spokesman of the Polish Club that he no longer knew how to remember his Jewish majority of Brody-Złoczów.
