Tzvi Hirsch Kalischer · Seeking Zion, Jerusalem Edition · 1919
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Mount Tzvi

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…are set aside; then he would again be exempt also for the offering up. And do not answer me from what we say (Zevahim 114a): Gilgal, with respect to Shiloh, is "lacking time", and Moses said to them, "Ye shall not do"; from which Tosafot above proved that even when the altar is damaged it counts as "lacking time"; for according to the approach of Tosafot here they perforce disagree with this, since they hold liable for the offering up. And one must say that the case of Gilgal is different, for it truly was "lacking time", since the time to build the Temple had not yet arrived until King Solomon, as we say (Sanhedrin 20b): Israel were commanded three commandments on their entry into the Land: to appoint for themselves etc., and to build the Chosen House; and it is explained there that the building of the Temple is the last commandment of the three. Which is not so in this time, when every day is its time, as the Responsa Hatam Sofer, Yoreh De'ah, section 306, raised a difficulty against the decisors who hold that one who inflicts a blemish on holy things in this time does not transgress, because it is not fit for offering: surely one who says, "Behold, I am a Nazirite on the day the son of David comes," is forbidden to drink wine, for "Today, if ye will hearken to my voice," as is found in Eruvin 43, and in Maimonides; and in many places we say, "the Temple will speedily be built". Certainly it is possible to say that it does not count as "lacking time" in this time. And behold, the Turei Even (Megillah 10a) proves from several discussions that the main view is as the words of Rabbenu Hananel, that even according to the one who says it was not sanctified, the high places are forbidden. And according to what is explained in Maimonides (chapter 3 of the Laws of Disqualified Consecrated Things), that we hold as the halakhah that living animals are not set aside, and it implies that Rabad also holds so, if so, one must again hold liable one who offers up outside in this time, even according to the approach of Rabad that the holiness of the Temple is now annulled; nevertheless, since the sacrifice itself is not entirely set aside, it is possible to compare it to one who slaughters at night, as I wrote above. And now their astonishment at Rabad quickly departs, that he was silent toward Maimonides on this law of one who offers up in this time; because indeed, in the essence of this law of Maimonides both of them are equal, and only in the reason of the matter do they differ: Maimonides holds liable in this time because it was sanctified for the time to come, and Rabad, who holds it was not sanctified, nevertheless holds liable because living animals are not set aside. And one must not raise a difficulty against this from the stricture of Rabad (in chapter 4 of the Laws of the Passover Offering), who objects against Maimonides, who ruled concerning one whose Passover offering was lost that the second shall be offered as peace-offerings; and Rabad objected to this, that it should pasture until it becomes blemished, and with its value he should bring peace-offerings; and see the Kesef Mishneh, who wrote to answer the approach of Maimonides, that he follows his own approach, that living animals are not set aside; for from this it is proved at first sight that Rabad holds that living animals are set aside. But in truth this cannot be, for Rabad was silent toward him (in chapter 3 of the Laws of Disqualified Consecrated Things and in chapter 15 of the Laws of the Procedure of the Sacrifices), where Maimonides wrote that living animals are not set aside; and one must perforce say that Rabad holds like Tosafot, who wrote (in Pesahim 96b) that concerning a lost Passover offering, which was set aside by hand, all agree that it is a setting aside even with living animals. But we still have to explain why Maimonides needed the reason that it was sanctified for the time to come, since even if it was not sanctified he would also be liable according to his approach that living animals are not set aside. To this one may say that Maimonides holds like Rashi, who does not hold like Rabbenu Hananel that the prohibition of the high places in this time holds according to all, but that according to the one who says it was not sanctified, the high places are again permitted; and consequently it is impossible to hold one who offers up in this time liable, for since the high places were permitted, there is no ground to hold liable one who slaughters and offers up outside. And according to this we will say that Maimonides and Rabad are divided and disagree in the dispute of Rashi and Rabbenu Hananel, according to the one who says it was not sanctified, whether the high places were permitted or not. And behold, although we have concluded that Maimonides and Rabad are both equal in the law of one who offers up outside in this time, nevertheless one can find that there is a practical difference in law between them also in one who offers up outside, namely in one who offers up in the Court, aimed at the place of the altar: for according to Maimonides certainly no liability whatever of one who offers up outside applies, for on the contrary, surely

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