The Maccabaean · Vol. XXXIV, No. 1 · July 1920
16printed page
scan 15 of 28
Facsimile · scan 15 of 28
Scan of p. 16
Text · transcribed from the scan

The Maccabaean

the Turks became the ally of England and was treated throughout the war with scrupulous consideration as though its alliance counted as much in the final victory as the association of France or of the United States. We know that the Hedjaz was not an absolute creation de nihilo. Arab revolt against Turkish dominion had been going on for many years. Indeed, the sherifate of Mecca was only in form an appointment of the Ottoman Padishah. Actually it was an hereditary and autonomous, if vassal, state. And throughout the desert, many Bedouin tribes did not even formally acknowledge Turkish suzerainty. When Hussein became King of the Hedjaz by British recognition, it was, we must remember, as monarch of a specific locally limited Arab territory, not as general ruler of Arabia that Britain acknowledged him. His vague claims to general sovereignty over all men of Arab race or Mohammedan religion were never admitted even by close neighbors in South Arabia and treated with little patience by non-Arabian Muslims.

And yet a national Arab state had been formally brought into existence, and a highly intelligent race, of great and varied potencies, had been restimulated into self-consciousness. With Mohammedan Egypt seething with national agitation, with India torn by similar agitation, there was an inevitable wave of nationalist feeling that swept the peninsula from Alexandrietta to Yemen and found its climax in the Kingdom at Damascus—as yet unacknowledged by the outside world but very much acknowledged by such Arabs as have been brought into contact with Western culture.

To this class a very large number of Palestinians belong, both of the effendis, some of whom have been trained in Western Europe, and of the peasantry who have been reached by the active and eloquent preaching in which nationalist propaganda has been clothed. It is plain that if Arab national sentiment were anything akin to French or English, the placing of a non-Arab national wedge between north and south—as Zionism purposes to do—would encounter a formidable resistance that might endanger the whole movement, and holds the germ of more than one bloody Passover.

But Arab nationality is not quite of the substance, consistency or quality of French or English,—or even of Egyptian. As has been said, Hussein ibn Ali has rivals and gainsayers in his own corner of Southern Arabia. Those whom we are prone to regard as the essential Arabs, the Man of the Desert, the Bedawee, is far indeed from any conception of national unity and swoops down indifferently on Christian, Jewish or Arab villages if he thinks it insufficiently guarded. Local jealousy accordingly and ancient tribal cleavages indicate the inadequacy of the basis on which Feisal hopes to build; but over and above that there is a circumstance that makes the Arab state a very different thing from that projected by certain of its most rhapsodical supporters.

A common language is at the present day a powerful national bond. In Western Europe and America there is very little that could be considered better or stronger. But in the East there is a still more powerful solvent of nationalities and that is religious differences. Any considerable group marked out by a religion different from its neighbors inevitably tends to political dissociation from them. Now between Mohammedan Aleppo or Damascus and Mohammedan Hedjaz there is the Lebanon, a country mainly inhabited by Arabic speaking Christians, if we momentarily disregard the Druse minority. We need no theoretical considerations to prove that Christian Lebanon will not readily form a part of an integral Arab state. King Feisal of Damascus has not yet established his government, but Christian Lebanon has already seceded,—or better has refused to enter it,—nor is it likely that in that respect the situation will change. Arab national feeling predicated upon a common tongue, must therefore be qualified by the fact that right here, in ancient Syria—at least the southern portion of it—there is a territory that must be withdrawn from such an Arab nation.

And just as a single integral Arabia is an impossible project, a single integral Syria is for just the same reasons impossible. Syria has the same fundamental centrifugal tendencies as Arabia. Muslim Syrians of Homs, Aleppo and Damascus will not form a state with Lebanon Maronites, and these last are the men who most vigorously oppose such a state. It is a curious fact that in the earlier stages of readjustment, Christian propagandists both in Beirut and in America have called for an integral Syria in the hope that it would include Palestine, only to find with horror that the impulses they invoked threaten to make them a negligible province in a Mohammedan emirate. If in Arab national aspirations there is a pressing problem and a real danger, those of Syria,—even when European intrigues stir the ashes and blow the bellows—are of little moment.

The program of 1920 was an event of which the roots have not yet been all laid bare. It was, however, not the first flare of a nationalistic conflagration. On the contrary, it seems rather to have been the outburst of Hebron fanaticism girded, it is true, by the national feelings with which the whole Levant has been shaken during the last year, and which rival European policies have for their own purposes kept active and operative. Given its opportunity by official remissness,—it seems unfortunately true that the remissness was particularly flagrant—that thing happened which above all should have been avoided but which despite its immediate horror, may be turned to common advantage.

Ishmael and Israel are to live together. That is the future. The present problem —the real Arab problem—is to remove the causes of antagonism which will postpone or embitter that association.