The Maccabaean · Vol. XXXIV, No. 1 · July 1920
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The Maccabaean

In many countries national liberty was being forcibly repressed. On the surface it appeared, indeed, that those vast state-conglomerations were solid enough. It seemed that they were growing more firmly knit rather than less. The improvement of the means of communication, the existence of immense conscript armies drawn from all parts of them, the constant external pressure of the danger of war—these were influences that made for consolidation. Yet, in fact, the disruptive forces within them were continually gaining strength. The spread of education among the peoples, and with it a knowledge of national history and of politics, was undoubtedly the chief of those forces.

And the men of intellect among the little nations felt themselves cramped. They worked under a sense of oppression. They were in revolt because they felt hindered in producing the best of which they were capable. They missed the sympathy, the encouragement, the co-operation of a free people with which they could feel at one. For it is from the union of an individual of genius and of a free community that noble things are born.

“All the great things,” Disraeli wrote in “Tancred,” “have been done by the little nations. It is the Jordan and the Ilyssus that have civilized the modern races. An Arabian tribe, a clan of the Aegean, have been the promulgators of all our knowledge; we should never have heard of the Pharaohs, of Babylon the Great, and Nineveh the Superb, of Cyrus and of Xerxes, had it not been for Athens and Jerusalem.”

He exaggerates, of course. No one would contend seriously that the great countries have counted for nothing in human progress. But the fact remains that the part played in history by some of the little peoples has been glorious. Energetic minds among them have become more and more conscious of their achievements; they have thrown off their old humility; they have fostered a sturdy national pride. Studying the records of their own past, reviving the memories often of a former greatness, cherishing the hope of a renascence, in a score of centers they have dreamed and have preached, have planned and organized, with the results that now we see. In spite of the apparent solidity of the political systems in which they lived and the strength of the agencies that maintained them, they have got their way. As always, ideas have determined action. As always, the spiritual and intellectual forces have proved stronger than the material.

But the question is, where all this will carry us? This outburst of fervid nationalism, this disintegration of the big units, is it really progress? Or, in relation to the more distant aims of the human race, is it reaction? Should men of foresight seek to stimulate it, or to check it? If we of the British Empire approve of separatism in Bohemia or Finland or Armenia, should we approve it also in the Orange Free State, or in Quebec, or in India?

When a choice is offered between two alternatives, it will be found as often as not, on the case being examined, that the decision is not confined by any means to those alternatives. The right answer is not “I will have A.,” or “I will have B.,” but often “I will have both A. and B.,” or “I will have neither.”

That is clearly the case here. The world is not compelled to choose between suppressing, on the one hand, the national sentiment and political freedom of the little peoples, and, on the other, sacrificing the incalculable benefits of big State units and of close intercommunication. The two can co-

exist. It is the task of thinkers and statesmen, particularly among the smaller nations, to reconcile them.

In Ireland, for example, one scale of the balance is now overweighted. In a natural reaction against the persistent survival of an alien government, in their anger at the disappointment again and again of their hopes of liberty, the Irish people support, for the time being, the doctrine of Sinn Fein, of “Ourselves Alone.” But “Ourselves Alone” is a thoroughly immoral doctrine. It is little better than “Deutschland über Alles.” No nation has a right to cut itself off from mankind, and to take as its maxim “Ourselves Alone,” any more than an individual has a right to cut himself off from his neighbors and to make egoism his rule of conduct.

The cause of Irish liberty is based upon a sound political principle. But to preserve the British Empire from splitting into its component parts is a sound policy also. It will be no service to the world for the one-fourth of its population, who now form a single unit, to separate into a score of independent and, perhaps, antagonistic, states. That the British system has known how to reconcile the liberty of the parts with the unity of the whole is its chief virtue. Its failures—in the American Colonies, in Ireland—have been proofs, through the very fact that they were failures, that the general rule is right and to be abandoned only at peril.

So also when we come to consider the states newly formed in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. The force of the disruption may keep them apart at first. They are the product of a violent reaction against the over-centralization of Russia and Germany, of Austria and Hungary, and of the Young Turks. It would be too much to expect that, from the outset, they would fall into their permanent places. “Progress,” it has been well said, “moves in a spiral curve.” The course of events is not in one direction; it often passes again over the same spot, but on a higher level.

Although the tendencies of the present time are mainly separatist, it may be that, after a while, we shall come round the curve; the advantages of big units will be recognized again; attempts will be made, by federation or by some looser organization, to recreate the combinations in Western Russia and in Central Europe, which in their old forms have failed. Perhaps there will be added to them other consolidations—in Scandinavia, in the Balkans, in Central and Southern America.

Meanwhile, the essential is that those units which are already in fairly close conformity with what appears to be the best type should not be destroyed or injured during the period of centrifugal stress through which we are passing. Separateness may be encouraged, but not separation. In the British Empire, statesmen and peoples can best serve the permanent interests of the world if they maintain the Empire’s unity, while they complete the process of extending to each part, as speedily as each is able to make good use of it, the fullest liberty of self-government and of self-development. It is Redmond and Botha and Laurier and Sinha who point to the right road; it is De Valera and Hertzog and Bourassa and the Indian revolutionaries who point to the wrong.

If the hopes of the future depend upon the success of the League of Nations, this general policy is best fitted to promote it. It is through it alone perhaps that, without violence to the legitimate desires of the little peoples, the

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