The Maccabaean
whelmingly of the technical kind. Despite its title, there is more Philosophy in it than Life.
The reader, who will seek in this book for a genuine Human Document, the self-revelation of an aspiring Life, will be, I think, disappointed. There are ample personal touches, many evidences of a richly endowed and rather intense personality, but a clear-cut itinerary of a spiritual journey there is not. The author has not succeeded in answering the questions, of greatest moment particularly to the Jewish reader, Why did he leave his Rabbinate, his Faith, his People? Wire-drawn technicalities in the matter of a not over original ethical eclecticism do not seem to supply an adequate statutory ground for this triple divorce. . . .
On its technical side, the student of philosophy will recognize in Prof. Adler's "system" an Ethics of the autonomous, self-realisational type. Autonomous, since the author professedly goes further than any other writer in separating Ethics, as a self-contained discipline, from Religion, Metaphysics and Science. There is a sharp break between physical and spiritual (or ethical) nature, since we know and can know nothing about the material "world," while, by reason of the inner necessities ("reality-creating functions") of our mind, we know all there is to know about the ethical "universe"—namely our own spiritual individuality or "worth." Self-realisational, for Doctor Adler's chief concern seems to be to arrive at a synthesis of Man as an individual and Man as a social being: to save the individual from the clutches of the present-day modish Sociology.
This synthesis he reaches rather simply, and in a familiar manner—except for the mystic tinge he gives it. His answer is: The Individual realises himself through Society. Or, in the Adlerian phrasing: "The individual realizes his own "worth" by letting it play upon the similar "worth" of others. All men are members in the "republic of souls," forming together the "ethical manifold," and their chief task is to stimulate and arouse each other's "worths." (Souls?) The idea appears somewhat Swedenborgian, for it is Swedenborg who said: "Every soul exists in a Society of Souls, from which all its thoughts passed into it, as the blood of the mother circulates in her unborn child." Compare now with this foetal figure the picture given by Adler of his pretty Ethical Universe: "We may think of a fountain from which stream forth jets of indescribable life-power—playing out of it, playing into other life, and evoking their kindred and yet unkindred life-wavers, waves effluent and refluent."
Doctor Adler's concern for individuality, for difference, as the basis of the moral life causes him to revise Kant's categorical imperative. The naked sense of obligation, of law, makes for selfsameness rather than for difference. But such ethical equalitarianism does not exist. To say, in the Kantian manner, "So act that your action gain the force of universal law," is to presuppose the possibility of uniform action and uniform character —manifestly impossible. Adler, therefore, re-phrases the Categorical Imperative in the following manner: "So act as to elicit in another the distinctive, unique quality characteristic of him as a fellow-member of the infinite whole." Summed up, this means that Kant bases his ethics upon moral example, while Adler bases his upon moral influence. Let others declare if the difference is vital or no.
His whole thought, then, converges in the teaching of the "worth" of Individuality. And Adler extends his teaching from the individuality of the unit to the individuality of peoples and races. Each people or race has an individuality, or soul, which it is ethically bound to respect and cultivate. And with this we reach the great irresolvable contradiction in Adler's book, and for the matter of that, in his life. For if individuality is sacred, and if peoples have their individuality just like men and women, why, in the name of common-sense and right, is an exception to be made in the case of the individuality of the Jewish people? Why is Adler one of the extremest assimilationists, opposed to Zionism, to Jewish Nationalism even in its spiritual aspects? And how could Adler sever himself from his people, in whose individuality he naturally shares, and whose genius has left its indelible stamp upon his personality, his very ethical outlook upon
life which has led him so far from the "source whence he was hewn"?
This is the question of questions, which the book fails to answer. The technical pedantries with which this book is replete certainly fail to even hint at an answer. But failing to furnish an answer to this insistently curling interrogation-mark, the book is in no sense an Apologia. It is but an apology for an Apologia. Nevertheless, it is a book of considerable interest by reason of what it presents, and still more so, by reason of what it—omits.
J. B.
The League of Nations
The League of Nations: The Principles and the Practice. Edited by STEPHEN PIERCE DUGGAN. Boston. Atlantic Monthly Press.
The Idea of a League of Nations. By H. G. WELLS, in collaboration with VISCOUNT BRYCE, WILLIAM ARCHER, A. E. ZIMMERN, GILBERT MURRAY and others. Boston. The Atlantic Monthly Press.
For Zionists, the subject of the League of Nations is one that cannot be easily disregarded or avoided. For, as Norman Angell pointed out in an excellent paper in the Menorah Journal a year ago or less, the fate of the small nations—among which we must include Palestine—depends primarily upon the justice with which the machinery of the League is organized for the protection and safeguarding of the small states. The old order, based primarily on the more or less indiscriminate use of force, militated against the small nation-state. Under that order, Palestine would not be an independent agent but would be forced, by the exigencies of the balance of power, to sue for the support of a great nation to which it would have to play the part of vassal. This does not mean that even with a League of Nations that old order may not be duplicated. It certainly may. But a just and comprehensive League will make impossible that bartering that was the basis of international relations before and after 1914.
Volumes upon volumes on the League of Nations have been published, and many excellent ones among them. Although the Idea of a League of Nations is Wells' latest book, it seems to the reviewer to be somewhat inferior to his "In the Fourth Year," which, however, dealt only in part with the subject of the League.
The other volume under review, that which is edited by Prof. Duggan, is far more comprehensive. There have collaborated in the writing of it no less than seventeen accredited authorities on law, politics, government, history and international relations, including Carlton J. H. Hayes, John Bassett Moore, A. Lawrence Lowell, Frederick Austin Ogg, Frances Bowes Sayre, Glenn Frank, Harry E. Barnes and Lindsay Rogers.
Prof. Rogers discusses "The League of Nations and the National State" and what he has to say about the small state has reference to a problem familiar to us.
Prof. Rogers scents a danger in the multiplication of small states as possible breeders of war. “Not the principle of nationality,” he states, “but the principle of toleration of different nationalities is necessary.” Prof. Barnes, in a paper following, treats largely of the same matter. He shows that the spirit of nationality, when inspired by no motive higher than itself, is by no means an unmixed good, as witness the passionate nationality of the Balkan states. One might point out to Prof. Barnes, however, that the evil in nationality springs not from its essence but from its excesses. He states this axiom: “The more states there are in existence the greater will be the opportunities for, and possibilities of. war.”
Prof. Rogers, to revert to his paper, presents an angle of the subject which has heretofore not been treated with the thoroughness it deserved. He speaks of the necessity of a new state philosophy, arguing that inasmuch as the character of the League depends upon the character of the nations composing it, so is it necessary that the League, to be democratic, should be composed of democratic states. He seems to assume that a reconstruction toward democracy is necessary, for he writes: "A mere league of nations without a reconstruction of the states which compose it will not, however, guarantee international peace." H. S.