The Maccabaean
United States than does the ocean. . . . How shall I redeem them?
nem: ... “You know what it means. The Americans do not. To abolish even the Jewish Pale of Settlement is but a fraction of what is expected of me. Yet that alone would involve a profound modification of the autocracy as at present established. Here in the bracing atmosphere of the great republic such a feat may seem insignificant. But on the other side of Eydtkuhnen it is high treason to think of it. But Tr _-:1 I. or L.r
a Wwäis mW Sy MWWEe The impressiveness of this touching piece of confidence would be heightened could we but know how many of these statesmanlike doubts and misgivings were uttered by Mr. Witte in his conversations with American-Jewish high-finance. Unfortunately, about this deponent sayeth not. From the whole tenor of the passage it would appear that the misgivings came after the pledges were given—which is quite human in a tight fix, but not exactly “great.” Perhaps our millionaires interviewed by Mr. Witte will reveal some day, first, what Mr. Witte’s pledges were, and, secondly, how far they believed in them. The first revelation would be an interesting contribution to Russia and the second to Jewish psychology. Meantime, in default of competent testimony, we venture upon this guess: Mr. Witte promised whatever he thought his hearers would think redeemable, knowing full well that he could do nothing for the Jews beyond the gesture of academic remonstrance against the worst abuses. Mr. Dillon, however, whose otherwise admirable acumen leaves him regularly in the lurch wherever his pages turn upon his great and good friend, will not have it so. What—the Necker of Russia palter and equivocate ‘with the representatives of American-Jewish high-finance? Perish the thought! Says Dr. Dillon (page 377 of “Telinse.” bottom) :
“That is why I (videlicet, Dr. Dillon) wrote a few months later: ‘“Witte’s views are immaterial to the issue, for if he were liberal as Abraham Lincoln, he would still be almost as powerless as a Sioux chief, unless he had a strong Liberal following, and that was denied him chiefly by the Jews.” .
And there you are. An impotent ambition is worsted in an effort to smuggle liberalism into the Czar’s administration. He has the genuine Borussic baseness to exploit his personal reputation as a “liberal” in financial negotiations, carried on to prop the very regime& he is supposed to withstand. His liberal pledges—whatever they may have been—are shown, through the drift of after-events, to have been utterly worthless. No one knows definitely, to this day, what he promised to do for the Jews. But whatever it was, he did nothing. If his pledges remained empty air, the cause was (according to Dr. Dillon) the attitude of Judaeorum turpissima gens. We hope our readers won’t be misled by our reference to such eccentric apologetics into ignoring the book—it is highly important in subject-matter, well documented, and eminently readable.
Mr. Segal Looks at the World
The Law of Struggle. By HYMAN SEGAL, Author of "The Book of Pain-Struggle," etc. Massada Publishing Co., pp. 161.
We own to a feeling of kindness for Hyman Segal, well known as former mentor and guide to the readers of THE MACCABAEAN. In the midst of the tremendous din and uproar of peace in the making, a young man capable of keeping his mind upon the universe and its laws, real or supposed, is certainly a remarkable asset of our Jewish civilization. Mr. Segal has published now the records of his worldview. The first thing that should be said in their praise is that they are both readable and brief —two qualities desirable rather than common in philosophical literature. His sober, uninvolved style may serve as a pattern for expository arguments, and his ability to comprise, in seven brief chapters, a phenomenology of the Universe in keeping with his main thesis, is no mean feat for an autodidact to achieve.
In any effort to do his book justice, the fact should be emphasized at the outset: Mr. Segal is an autodidact. Though acquainted with the philosophical achievements of those who looked at the world before him, he has little regard for such disciplines of definite standing as formal logic, modern psychology, history and economics.
It is characteristic for his way ot pıvncering, that the definitions of his two basic terms, viz., “law” and “struggle,” do not give him any philosophic concern. He does not lack circumspection in the world of phenomena. On the contrary, his powers of observation are admirable. What he lacks—to use a term of Schopenhauer’s—is philo- sophische Besomenheit—that cautious, painstaking faculty developed by academic training which insists upon an exact terminology and upon a practical examination of all facts in support of a preconceived theory. Mr. Segal, in numerous passages scattered through his book, obliter- ates the true meaning of the word “struggle” by rupturing the bounds of its definition. It is furthermore plain that he has given little thought to the fact, and its corollaries that the word “law” used in an extra-judicial sense, in such combinations as “laws of nature,” “law of diminishing returns,” etc., is purely a metaphor. His disregard for correct terminology becomes rather irritating in passages of fundamental importance, as for instance, when he essays to restate the position of philosophical idealism—thus: “In fact, time, space, dimensions have no existence apart from sensitiveness (recte: sensuous per- mMontinn\ and are mara inridantc frante: nmnrinr Iarme\ nf it”
el Mn ie Er Eee What is really remarkable about his volume is not its defective side, but its many attractive lineaments. His work is not only readable, as aforesaid, but it is eminently suggestive and thought-provoking as well. Quite apart from the validity of his thesis or the strength of its supports, Mr. Segal has splendidiy acquitted himself of one of the main functions of philosophic expusition—he compels his readers to think by luminously exhibiting the common denominator or the joint application of seemingly wide-apart phenomena. There are passages in the book that are as good as any paragraph in Huxley. There are others reminiscent of Arthur Brisbane at his very best. Among the latter, we find the following on p. 11, which we put before our readers as a fair specimen of Mr. Segal at his best, and as an “ndurement to read his hook:
“Our view of pain must become more comprehensive and we must recognize struggle even when not accompanied by the startling signs of physical strife. Physical conflict has always been held out to us as almost the synonym of struggle. And yet, even in this class of struggle, it is not necessarily the most clamorous and ferocious antagonist who is the most redoubtable. So, too, we are accustomed to think of the lion, the tiger, the bandit and the burglar as-very formidable fighters indeed, but as a matter of fact, they are very feeble strugglers and have long been out-classed; so much so, in fact, that they hardly enter into our calculations today. -
“On the other hand, there are a great many far-reaching struggles in nature that seldom arrest our attention. Who, for example, stops to think of the battle-royal that goes on between the insect and the plant, the ants and iheir prey, the innumerable little invaders such as the nits that settle upon the eye-balls of the African buffalo or the combats which go on in our own blood.”
Mr. Segal’s terminology may be faulty and his thesis a doubtful rifacimento of pragmatism, but we are sure that won’t diminish the delight of his readers in his bright universality of outlook, his poetic faculty of enlarging the sympathies of his audience, and an aura of youthful originality in exploration which pervades the entire book. We are pointing with pride to Mr. Segal as a popular philosopher, whose first training-ground in the discipline of letters was the journalism of that Zionistic movement which claims him as one of its native talents. J. F.
An Apology for an Apologia
An Ethical Philosophy of Life. By FELIX ADLER. D. Appleton & Co., New York, London.
A book by Prof. Adler would in all circumstances arouse the interest of the reading public. But a work by him, which professes to be a summary of his “Weltanschauung,” an “Apologia pro Vitä Suä,” appearing as it does in the lengthening shadows of a remarkable life, must prove doubly and trebly interesting. There is something that appeals to the imagination, something thrilling almost, in the fact of a Great Dissenter nailing his theses to the door of his self-built cathedral. Only, in the case of Doctor Adler’s book this imaginative quality adheres to the sheer external advent of his magnum opus, rather than to its internal character, which is over-