The Maccabaean · Vol. XXXII, No. 9 · September 1919
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The Maccabaean

even a greater menace. For here we are dealing with a class of entrepreneurs, the farmer and planter, whose resources, as a rule, are very limited and who, as a rule, will be dependent on credit for establishing themselves. Could anything be done which will more certainly insure his failure than to force him to pay excessive prices for his machinery, implements and fertilizer, for the material for his house and barns, for the food and clothing for himself and his family; to force him, moreover, to apply for a large loan, on probably more difficult terms, than to apply for a small loan on easier terms? And, from the social point of view, could anything be done which is more sure to jeopardize the success of the entire colonization program than to force our credit institutions to advance the largest possible loans to the farmer and planter and industrialist rather than the lowest possible ones? And could anything be done which will more surely guarantee the success of the individual farmer and planter, and so of the entire colonization work, than to enable him to secure equipment at the lowest possible prices, and thus have to carry the lowest possible burden of debt and interest charges? Furthermore, since, as was shown, the dependence of Palestine on imports is so extensive and universal, high prices means a leveling down of the general consumption norm. For, in spite of casual appearances to the contrary, a higher cost of living means a lower standard of living. The lowest possible prices to the ultimate consumer must be regarded as the most vital factor in an efficient solution—the term efficient properly understood—of the Palestine import problem.

To sell at the lowest possible price to the consumer involves, of course, buying at the lowest price for the producer. From the viewpoint of the importer, therefore, lowest prices are possible by “buying from headquarters,” as the phrase goes, and in the cheapest market. But this involves a knowledge of the world market and accessibility to it. And in this connection must be emphasized the importance of what is called “quantity buying.” The big buyer can always secure better terms and prices than the small one.

In this summary enumeration of the principal factors in the efficient solution of the Palestine import problem, we refrain at present from discussing the question of exchange and financial arrangements. But their solution will depend on conditions, chiefly political, which are still to be definitely determined. Assuming, however, that we shall be able to trade in English pounds, we must still provide adequate banking facilities if business with the world markets is to be made possible.

III

To what extent does the competitive method meet the efficiency tests above outlined?

We have noted the need for determining, where choice is possible, the commodities best suited for Palestine. No doubt the competitive method tends to bring about such a determination. The process, however, is slow and groping. It belongs to the hit-or-miss variety. The same is true in the case of standardization. After the introduction of a great deal of needless diversity with its accompanying confusion and waste, the inevitable demand for a measure of standardization will force compliance on the part of the competing business units. But the exercise of foresight in anticipating such a demand is hardly to be expected from those who operate for immediate profits. And in this connection the following fact is of prime importance: It is the tendency of the competitive business unit, whose motive is profit, to create a demand not for what is most suitable or economical, but for what will bring it most profits, and

always for what it happens to have on hand or can get cheapest. The extravagances of modern advertising leading, as it often does, to the imposition of essentially worthless commodities on an unresisting public, are both a proof and a resulting evil of this tendency.

The competitive method undoubtedly tends to adjust the supply to the demand. But this adjustment is rarely prompt and is always accompanied by much waste. Frequently, moreover, the supply is artificially kept below the demand for the purpose of maintaining or increasing prices. Warehouse and storage facilities on the best terms are at the command of the larger competitive units only. As regards tonnage, the shortage was until recently quite serious, and without governmental assistance the competitive method would encounter difficulties in securing an adequate supply.

It is in the most vital factor, however, that the competitive method breaks down completely. For while the healthy growth of Palestine in its most critical period demands, as we have seen, the lowest possible prices to the ultimate consumer, the competitive method operates on the principle of prices the highest possible. “All that the traffic will bear,” is its implicit and sometimes frankly explicit motto, and its motive is not service but profit despite occasional hypocritical cant to the contrary. Moreover, the need and the urge for profits will ultimately reign supreme and it will extinguish every initial idealistic impulse. The best are driven to it; the strongest cannot help themselves.

Nor is the average competitive unit itself in a position to buy at the lowest possible prices. The ability to engage in quantity buying depends not only on the size of the market to be supplied but on the size and strength of the business unit. A knowledge of the world market and accessibility to it is possible only to the largest units.

It is generally assumed that the law of supply and demand operates as a natural check to the tendency towards prohibitively high prices under competitive conditions. It is argued that in a market of rising prices an inevitable increase in the supply brings prices down to what is considered the "normal" level. But granting even that such an implicit reliance can be reposed in the law of supply and demand, we are at present face to face with a situation where the law of demand and supply is practically non-operating. The situation is abnormal. In every world market the supply is far short of the demand and bids fair to remain so for years to come. It is a situation which constitutes a fertile breeding-ground for every degree of profiteer.

It seems clear, therefore, that at the very outset of its career and at its most critical period, Palestine is face to face with an import problem which has power to help make or mar its future. It seems clear that to permit the import business in Palestine to operate under competitive conditions is to make certain that a heavy toll will be laid on the industrial and agricultural economy of Palestine. It is to make certain that a tribute will be levied on every inhabitant of Palestine as a consumer. It is to lay an incubus at the very start on the entire construction program.

“There is no other way that will work,” will be the ready answer to all these considerations. It behooves us, however, in view of the seriousness of the matter, to study the question and to hesitate long before surrendering Palestine to a commercial régime, which will act as a drain on its vitality in its tenderest period.

But what other course is there? There is only one other course, though it should be stated at once that no inflexible line of action, determining all details, is here proposed. But the general policy should flow from a frank recognition of the true nature of the import business for Palestine. The policy should be based on the fact that the import business for Palestine is to all intents and purposes a public utility. None of the commonly recognized public utilities