The Maccabaean · Vol. XXXII, No. 7 · July 1919
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The Maccabaean

Signs are in evidence that the Haluka Spirit is beginning to disintegrate under modern influences. The young men of Jerusalem who have been studying in the Yeshibot and who have been supported by the Haluka have organized for the purpose of improving their position, economically and socially. They consist of the young Orthodox element both in Jerusalem and Jaffa, and they have organized themselves under the name of Hazair Haerez Israeli. These former Haluka beneficiaries have the following twofold aims:

1. Creating agricultural groups which shall remain under the supervision of the organization until they can be settled on the soil.2. The advancement of handicrafts among the young men.

The Future of Haifa and the Peace Conference

The future of Haifa, which has evoked a good deal of discussion in the English paper recently, is again the order of the day. It was reported that the British Government had designated the sum of two million pounds for the improvement of the Haifa harbor and for other Palestine improvements. Concerning this project, Palestine, the organ of the British Palestine Committee, writes as follows:

We very much doubt whether anything definite with regard to Haifa or any other big Palestinian undertaking can be taken in hand so long as the legal status of Palestine remains undetermined, nor is it probable that the present very provisional and makeshift military administration is adapted for great enterprises. Nevertheless, Haifa must play a big part in the economic future of Palestine and the Near East generally.

Everyone agrees that Haifa and the Bay of Acre are potentially the best port on the coast of Palestine. That does not say so much, for the only other port is Jaffa, which is very inadequate. In the ancient mediæval world there were numerous Palestinian ports. The names of Tyre and Sidon are only the most famous of these, but the ships of antiquity and of the Middle Ages were small, and what would make a good harbor then would be quite useless today. Haifa and the Bay of Acre, however, ought, without much difficulty, to be made better than any port on the coast of Syria, as well as better than any port on the coast of Palestine. Beirut is far from being a good, natural harbor, and it has this further disadvantage: the mountains run down quite close to Beirut, and communication with the interior is by means of a mountain road or a narrow rack and pinion railway. Haifa, on the other hand, is at the mouth of the great valley of Jezreel. All the traffic of Galilee, of Samaria, and the Jordan Valley pours naturally into Haifa. The approach to the Trans-Jordanian Plateau from Haifa via the Yarmuk Valley is also relatively easy, so that Haifa is the port for that great producing region. Nor is that all.

Ports on the coast of Syria and Palestine will compete not only for the local traffic of Syria and of Palestine, but also for the commerce of the vast Hinterland of Mesopotamia, which has a limitless future before it. Damascus is commonly called the port of the desert. It is also the commercial center of Southern Syria. There will assuredly be a battle royal between Beirut and Haifa for the traffic which concentrates at Damascus. Not commercial factors alone will decide. If they did, the victory would certainly go to Haifa, but a good deal will depend upon which Power rules in Damascus. The French claim Damascus. The British are putting forward no pretensions, but on the other hand, Damascus is claimed by the Arab State. If Damascus falls to France, then France will use every art to divert the traffic of Damascus to the port of Beirut. In that case we may see the

administration of Palestine perhaps in co-operation with the administration of the future Arab State seeking to set up a rival to Damascus, which shall attract the trade of the desert and direct it to Haifa. Bozrah might well be that mart. It is on a network of old Roman roads and has a considerable commercial history behind it. Beirut will have to face for the traffic of Syria other serious competitors besides Haifa Tripoli for Central Syria and Alexandretta for Northern Syria. In the event of Damascus falling to the Arab State almost certainly its traffic will be diverted to Haifa, and its prosperity be greater than ever. It is fairly plain, therefore, that the battle proceeding at Paris over the delimitation of spheres has a very important commercial bearing and that the economic future of great cities, notably Damascus, depends upon its outcome.

Damascus, depends upon its outcome. The new Haifa will look far beyond the valley of Jezreel, the valley of the Jordan, the Hauran, and the desert to Mesopotamia. The Bagdad railway project was, among other things, a project for developing the wealth of Mesopotamia and diverting the stream of that wealth to a favored spot. Germany decided that the Western outlet should be Alexandretta. Now that Great Britain controls the Bagdad railway and Mesopotamia the British Government will assuredly determine the Western outlet, and quite certainly Great Britain will choose an outlet in Palestine. Haifa is clearly destined by the British Government to be the Mediterranean seaport of Mesopotamia. How the railway connection shall be made will depend in part upon the frontiers decided at Paris. At the present moment Haifa has continuous railway communication of a kind with Bagdad, but it will have to be made much more adequate.

But the question whether Haifa shall tap the resources and the commerce of Mesopotamia by the long route, Mosul-Aleppo-Homs-Damascus, depends upon more consideration than the simple one of railway connection. Along that route there are rivals to Haifa which could bring the commerce of Mesopotamia to the sea with a shorter railway journey—Alexandretta, Tripoli, and Beirut, for example. There is again the political factor. If Mosul, Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus are in the hands of a Power in rivalry with the mandatory Power of Palestine, then it will certainly aim at diverting traffic from Upper Mesopotamia away from Haifa. It will be recalled that the secret agreement of 1916 promised France "the coastal strip of Syria, the vilayet of Adan, and the territory bounded on the south by a line Aintab-Mardin to the future Russian frontier, and on the north by a line Ala-Dagh-Zara-Egin-Kharput." This would give France, at least so the French interpret it, Mosul and Northern Mesopotamia as well as the land of the Aleppo-Damascus railway and the Mediterranean ports connected with it. Of course, these territories are now being disputed at Paris. It is highly probable that Great Britain will have Mosul. It is not equally certain, however, that the Arab State will have Aleppo and Damascus. If these towns and the district they embrace fall to France, the British Government will almost certainly take in hand an alternative railway route to Mesopotamia, which will connect Mesopotamia more directly with Haifa and be for the whole of its length under British control.

There are no technical difficulties in the way of building such a railway and motor roads, but the economic prospects of such a line are rather more obscure. The line would link up the Tigris and Euphrates and should develop a very promising country in that section. West of the Euphrates it would traverse the Syrian desert. Very little is known of that country, and it is possible that it is better than its reputation, but that will have to be proved.

Without doubt, it would be better to consider all these problems—railways, commercial development, and communications generally—not from the standpoint of rivalry but from a standpoint of co-operation. In breaking up the Ottoman Empire we are breaking up a single economic unity. It would be far better to preserve the advantages of this economic unity, rather than to substitute for it a host of rivalries. If the Peace Conference were free to examine the disposition of the Turks' heritage in the spirit of the League of Nations, instead of being deflected by the strain of warring ambitions, that is what it would seek to do.