The Maccabaean · Vol. XXXII, No. 6 · June 1919
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The Maccabaean

build up the industries in that country, we must minimize the economic risk of those whose help we ask. We want to protect the laborer and the consumer from the unconscionable exploitation of the entrepreneur. At the same time, in our efforts to secure this protection, we must not go so far in sterilizing individual initiative as to kill all effort and enterprise. We must not expect to be able to summon into being the free and creative activity necessary to make a nation upon the lines of an orphan asylum. The new state can not be built on charity; nor must our co-operative planning take the form of the denial of self-interest. On the contrary, we should make the most of self-interest in so far as it is not mutually conflicting and destructive.

Granted that the individual in or out of Palestine who seeks to invest in its industrial possibilities, is not actuated by mercenary motives. Still he does not enjoy the prospect of losing his investment. Nor should we throw upon the devoted settler who brings his capital into the country the burden of either consuming his principle or making a haphazard choice of how to employ it upon a hit-or-miss basis, with its tragic possibilities. Again, it must be remembered that Palestine is to be the home of the most aggressive, the most class-conscious proletariat in the world, and will not allow itself to become the victim of trade-war without turning upon the capitalist and all his works. How, then, shall we manage to make the interests of labor and capital accord and come to the service of a new, untried and commercially unattractive experiment?

Capital, as a rule, can not be had save on one or two conditions; either large profits to cover a corresponding risk to the capital engaged or moderate profits as a return for a minimum of risk in a given enterprise. Of the two it behooves us to offer capital security of investment and pay a minimum profit for its use. In other words, it pays us far better to accord security to capital and, in the giving of security, earn the right to control its operations and the maximum return for the laborer and the consumer, than to permit it to run amuck and pay the premium on trade risk and economic anarchy. The very fact that Palestine is not yet in the full grip of vested interests and that the Jewish investor or entrepreneur is not actuated primarily by the wish to exploit it economically makes the experiment much more feasible there than in places in which capital has already obtained a foothold.

In my book, "The Law of Struggle," I have shown how this can be effected, at somewhat greater length than is possible here. Briefly, it can be accomplished through the application of the franchise to all industrial operations in Palestine upon certain well-defined conditions. A franchise is an island, as it were, in the sea of industrial anarchy. The state or municipality that grants it virtually says to the traction or lighting company receiving it, "I will free you from the risks of trade-competition. No one can steal or win your custom. I will engage to protect you in your market. And inasmuch as I have removed the element of economic risk from your operations, you must permit me to limit your prices. Have no fear of your neighbor with capital and run your business as efficiently as possible."

Now let us apply this principle in Palestine. But instead of limiting ourselves to so-called public utilities, let us assume—it is a safe assumption—that all industries, in so

*Massada Publishing Co., New York. $1.50 postpaid.

June, 1919

far as they are at all necessary, are public utilities. We might apply the principle to a tannery or—what is immediately necessary—a building federation. Or let us say that we want to introduce an entirely new industry in Palestine, in order to help meet our problems of settlement, and our choice falls upon a sugar-factory.

To begin with, as previously explained, our engineers will have ready for us full information as to the amount of acreage that should be cleared, the best land for the purpose, the labor and equipment necessary to plant cane sufficient for a given output of sugar, specifications for the factory and equipment and the amount of labor and capital necessary for productions of various magnitudes. Equipped with prospectuses embodying all this information, our Palestine Industrial Bureau would say to the prospective investor or capitalist, be he one or a million:

We realize that in asking you to invest in this enterprise, we are asking you to assume a certain risk to your capital. In order to eliminate all risk incident to competition and the instability of the values to be created by our proposed sugar factory, the government will endow it with a franchise or the exclusive right to manufacture and trade in sugar in Palestine. Of course, no public franchise can be granted without reserving the right to fix or limit the selling price of sugar in Palestine, as otherwise the public would be at the mercy of the sugar industry. Therefore, the franchise will be subject to the following conditions:

1. The right is reserved to limit the selling prices for sugar in Palestine, through a Standardization Commission to be appointed by the government. Full allowance will be made in whatever prices are set to cover operating and selling costs, including labor, interest on capital invested, depreciation of the plant, industrial insurance, taxes and all necessary charges, besides a margin for expansion. No restrictions need apply to export prices because we have no assurance that prices on foreign products are not inflated due to conditions of economic anarchy prevailing abroad, which might give the foreign exporter an undue advantage in the exchange of foreign for domestic commodities.

2. The investor in this enterprise will receive for the use of his capital the value of money operating at a minimum of risk. (As interest is usually high in "new" countries an interest of 8% might be accorded to the investor during the first five or ten years of the enterprise, especially as no other form of profit will accrue to the investor as such. It is true that in the pioneer days of California, say, interest was as high as 12%, but here we contemplate the elimination of the degree of risk prevailing in unsettled countries, through the industrial franchise which spells security. However, as it is our aim to attract capital from other fields in which it may be profitably engaged, it is best not to be too niggardly in paying for its use.)

3. If the investor also wishes to contribute his personal services to the enterprise, he will receive, beside interest on his invested capital, the value of his services based upon the wage-schedule in similar enterprises elsewhere and living conditions in Palestine, that is, Jewish standards of living.

4. Although the destructiveness of trade-competition will be eliminated, the field will be left clear for individual initiative. All employees, whether executives or unskilled laborers, will receive, besides their compensation as em-

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