THE MACCABAEAN
The Story of the Capture of Jerusalem
(Continued from page 85)
opposition was encountered by the Yeomanry in the early morning, the works covering the left of the enemy's line being strong and stubbornly defended.
“During the afternoon, as soon as it was seen that the attack had succeeded, mounted troops were ordered to take up the pursuit and to occupy Huj and Jemmamah. The Fifty-third (Welsh) Division had again had very severe fighting on the 6th. Their attack at dawn on Tel el Khuweilfeh was successful, and though they were driven off a hill by a counter-attack, they retook it and captured another hill, which much improved their position. The Turkish losses in this area were very heavy indeed, and the stubborn fighting of the Fifty-third (Welsh) Division, Imperial Camel Corps, and part of the mounted troops during the 2d to the 6th of November drew in and exhausted the Turkish reserves and paved the way for the success of the attack on Sheria. The. Fifty-third (Welsh) Division took several hundred prisonere and come onne dnrineg this fichting.
EVACUATION OF GAZA
"The bombardment of Gaza had meanwhile continued, and another attack was ordered to take place on the night of the 6th and 7th.
“The attack on Outpost Hill and Middlesex Hill met with little opposition, and as soon, _after they had been taken, as patrols could be pushed forward the enemv was found to be zone.
“During the 8th the advance was continued, and interest was chiefly centered in an attempt to cut off, if possible, the Turkish rear-guard which had held the Tank and Atawineh sys‘tems. The enemy had, however, retreated during the night 7th-8th, and though considerable captures of prisoners, guns, ammunition, and other stores were made during the day, chiefly in the vicinity of Huj, no large formed body of the enemy was cut off. The Turkish rearguards fought stubbornly and offered considerable opposition. Near Huj a fine charge by some squadrons of the Worcester and Warwick Yeomanry captured twelve guns and broke the resistance of a hostile rear-guard. It soon became obvious from the reports of the Royal Flying Corps, who throughout the 7th and 8th attacked the retreating columns with bombs and machine-gun fire, and from other evidence, that the enemy was retiring in considerable disorganization, and could offer no very serious resistance if pressed with determination.
"Instructions were accordingly issued on the morning of the 9th to the mounted troops, directing them on the line El Tine-Beit Duras, with orders to press the enemy relentlessly. They were to be supported by a portion of the force, which was ordered to push forward to Julis and Mejdel.
“By the 9th, therefore, opertions had reached the stage of a direct pursuit by as many troops as could be supplied so far in front of railhead. The problem, in fact, became one of supply rather than manceuvre. The question of water and forage was a very difficult one. Even where water was found in sufficient quantities, it was usually in wells and not on the surface, and consequently if the machinery for working the wells was damaged, or a sufficient supply of troughs was not available, the process of watering a large quantity of animals was slow and difficult.
Ninety-two
ON THE JERUSALEM ROAD.
“On the evening, of. November 9 there were indications that the enemy was organizing a counter-attack towards Arak el Menshiye by all available. units of the force which had retired towards Hebron, with the object of taking pressure off the main force, which was retiring along the coastal plain. It was obvious that the Hebron force, which was believed to be short of transport and ammunition, to have lost heavily and to be in a generally disorganized state, could make. no effective diversion, and that this threat could practically be disregarded. Other information showed the seriousness of the enemy’s losses and the disorganization of his forces. Orders were accordingly issued to press the pursuit and to reach Junction Station as early as possible, thus cutting off the Jerusalem army, while the Imperial Camel Corps was ordered to move to the neighborhood of Tel el Nejile, where it would be on the flank of any counterstroke from the hills
“Operations on the 10th and llth showed a stiffening of the enemy’s resistance on the general line of the Wadi Sukereir, with center about El Kustineh; the Hebron group, after an ineffective demonstration in the direction of Arak el Menshiye on ‘the 10th, retired northeast and prolonged the enemy’s line towards Beit Jibrin. Royal Flying Corps reports indicated the total hostile forces opposed to us on this line at about 15,000, and this increased resistance, coupled with the capture of prisoners from almost every unit of the Turkish force, tended to show that we were no longer opposed to rear-guards, but that all the remainder of the Turkish army, which could be induced to fight, was making a last effort to arrest our pursuit south of the important junction station. In these circumstances our progress on the 10th and 11th was slow; the troops suffered considerably from thirst (a hot, exhausting wind blew during these two days), and our supply difficulties were great, but by the evening of the 11th favorable positions had been reached for a combined attack.
“The 12th was spent in preparations for the attack, which was ordered to be begun early on the morning of the 13th, on the enemy’s position covering Junction station. Our forces were now operating at a distance of some thirty-five. miles in advance of their railhead, and the bringing up and distribution of supplies and ammunition formed a difficult problem.
ENEMY COUNTER-ATTACKS.
“The positions reached on the evening of the 21st practically marked the limit of progress in this first attempt to gain the NablusJerusalem road, The Yeomanry were heavily counter-attacked, and fell back, after bitter fighting, on Beit ur el Foka (Upper Bethoron). During the 22d the enemy made two counterattacks on the Neby Samlil ridge, which were repulsed. Determined and gallant attacks were made on the 23d and on the 24th on the strong positions to the west of the road held by the enemy, who had brought up reinforcements and numerous machine guns, and could support his infantry by artillery fire from guns placed in positions along the main road. Our artillery, from lack of roads, could not be brought up to give adequate support to our infantry. Both attacks failed, and it was evident that a period of preparation and organization would be necessary before an attack could be delivered in sufficient strength to drive the .enemy from his positions west of the road.
Orders were accordingly issued to consolidate the positions gained and prepare for relief.
“Though these troops had failed to reach their final objectives, they had achieved invaluable results. The narrow passes from the plain to the plateau of the Judæan range have seldom been forced and have been fatal to many invading armies. Had the attempt not been made at once, or had it been pressed with less determination, the enemy would have had time to reorganize his defence in the passes lower down, and the conquest of the plateau would then have been slow, costly, and precarious. As it was, positions had been won from which the final attack could be prepared and delivered with good prospects of success, By December 4 all reliefs were complete, and a line was held from Kustal by the Neby Samwil Ridge, Beit Izza, and Beit Dukka, to Beit ur el Tahta.
CLOSING IN ON HOLY CITY.
"Favored by a continuance of fine weather, preparations for a fresh advance against the Turkish positions west and south of Jerusalem proceeded rapidly.
------- vieteded fed “On the seventh the weather broke, and for three days rain was almost continuous. The hills were covered with mist at frequent intervals, rendering observation from the air and visual signaling impossible. A more serious effect of the rain was to jeopardize the supply arrangements by rendering the roads almost impassable—quite impassable, indeed, for mechanical transport and camels in many places. : 70
“The troops moved into positions of assembly by night, and, assaulting at dawn on the eighth, soon carried their first objectives. They then pressed steadily forward. By nightfall our line ran from Neby Samwil to the east of Beit Iksa, through Lifta to a point about one and a half miles west of Jerusalem, whence it was thrown back, facing east. All the enemy’s prepared defences west and northwest of Jerusalem had been captured, and our troops were within a short distance of the Nablus-Jerusalem road.
