The Maccabaean · Vol. XXX, No. 6 · June 1917
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THE MACCABAEAN

priest. The prophet represented the spirit, the priest the letter. The prophet was guided by ethics, the priest by legalism. The prophet, however, was not only opposed to the priest, but he also stood for the moral against the immoral life everywhere. The priest was only one of the many existing forces. Modern Christian theologians who represent the contest between prophet and priest as constituting the whole of ancient Jewish history lose sight of the fact that the prophets did not contend against the priestly institution as such but only against its degeneracy, as indeed they fought against degeneracy of any kind.

As long as the prophet lived and labored, legalism, always closely allied with moral baseness, was confined within bounds. But when the spirit of prophecy had died out and the need of checking the religious and moral degeneration became urgent the Sopher, and later the rabbi, arose and took upon himself a part of the prophetic function. But while the prophet, though standing on tradition, drew his inspiration from the mainspring of real, actual life, the national life being still possessed of reality, the rabbis’ activity was altogether confined to the book, because there was no longer a national-political life. Moreover, although the rabbi is the successor of the prophet he is his antipode. The prophet was an artist, the rabbi a jurist; the prophet was a creative genius guided by life, the rabbi a commentator and interpreter; the prophet was a man of affairs, the rabbi a bookworm. ‘The prophet urges moral actions, the rabbi study of the Torah. Prior to the Babylonian captivity there was not a single Hebrew term for “school.” The Talmud has no less than ten. The prophets announced the destruction of the state, because of moral and religious degeneration of the people, the rabbis assign as a reason for the destruction of Jerusalem the neglect of the instruction of the children. The prophet puts the moral deed above everything; the rabbi says: “Vetalmud Torah keneged Kulom” (the study of the Torah is above everything). Conscious of being different from the prophet the rabbi taught: “A scholar stands higher than a prophet.” The Bible tells of great deeds and of great men; it is full of action and life; the Talmud tells of the framing of laws, of expositions and interpretations of the laws—and is to the Bible as are didactics to epics. The rabbi is the prototype of the pious Puritan and the ethical intellectualist. To him every motive of the will is foreign, every psychological motive odious. His teaching is prosaic, sober, dry, and emotionless—and what is worse, styleless. The Bible, too, is not any too rich in forms, but it has a style, being of a natural growth, but the Talmud is absolutely styleless and formless. This fact may be accounted for, not by its being Babylonian, but by its being psychological. All style is psychological-personal: “le style c’est l’homme”—and the Talmud is in its Halachic part pure intellectualism.

If we now look at the development of the ancient Jewish mind as shown in its successive representatives we must come to this conclusion: The originally synthetic mind of the prophets which contained as much intellectualism as voluntarism, was changed with the advent of the Halachic rabbi into a dry, analytic intellectualism to the exclusion of all voluntarism and psychologism. The absolutism of the Jewish law together with the inherent extreme insistence on principle which always characterized the Jewish mind have gained supremacy for the rabbinic psychological intellectualism.

This mental development from synthesis to analysis, from psychologism to intellectualism, was necessitated by the course of the historical process, although we do not know all the phases of this peculiar, because extreme, development. “Few chapters in the history of jurisprudence,” says Emanuel Deutsch, “are as obscure as the origin of the oral law.” The many knocks and bumps which the state received by internal and external forces made new laws and enactments necessary. As the Law was not a law framed by a majority of the people but was given by divine authority, and as the Urim and Thumim, the oracle of the high priest was lost at the destruction of the first temple and as there was no prophet who could decide, it was necessary to find some other way by which the new laws could be shown to be in harmony with the old divine law. And so they began to draw inferences, to find analogies, to seek for precedents and so forth. In this manner, many students believe, the oral law originated and rabbinism began to flourish.

This view, however, is open to serious objections. The Talmud contains a great many laws and enactments which had no basis at all in the life of that time, as for instance, religious prescriptions which had meaning only as long as the temple existed, civil and criminal laws, which after the destruction of the Jewish state could not longer be applied in practical life and therefore could not have sprung up from the needs of the time. The same is true also of many ceremonial laws which on account of the changed conditions of life were eo ipso without effect. And even those religious laws which are still applicable today have been weighed down in the Talmud with so much "gray theory" that they reveal the awful alienation of the rabbis from the world. In order to guard the law against trespass they surrounded it with "fences and screens" (Gedurim and Sejagim) and then elaborated these "fences and screens" more minutely than the law itself. Whole tractates of the Talmud, as Zebachim and Menochoth, which treat of the sacrifices, Sanhedrin, which treats of the criminal law, are nothing but "gray theory" and had no relation to real life and to the needs of the people of that period. Therefore it is hardly safe to say that the Talmud was the theoretical expression of the life of the time in which it was produced.

The only sufficient explanation of the world-ignoring formalism so characteristic of the rabbi is to be found in the nature of the Jewish law and in the weakening of the psychological powers at the close of the age of antiquity. A similar transformation we observe in Greece. The "divine" Plato is succeeded by the "Chinese" Aristotle. But the Aristotelian rationalism was at least guided by nature and therefore could not so easily degenerate into scholasticism. The "Universals" controversy started only after Aristotelian thought had lost its connection with natural philosophy. But in Judaea the incipient rationalism was from the start based by the rabbis on another structure reared by reason—the law, and therefore it degenerated at once into scholasticism. The rabbi operates in the Talmud with determined categories and with a logic adequate for the Talmud, just as the Aristotelian does, but every eminent rabbi has categories of his own and a methodology of his own. (Thus even as regards pure formal methodology the Talmud is without style and without system.)

The Jewish law being the law of the eminent intellectual personality and of the rational God was, as said before, from the start an a priori law of reason. As long as there lived in the young people great