sion of a faith in its ultimate and fundamental worth. It is thus that religion has meant so many things to humanity. In the integrating of all facts of life with the individual organism, religion conserves the highest of all facts—individuality. In trying to account for all the facts of life, religion has functioned as the initiator, the organic nurturing principle of civilization.
There is another phase of the question. In a fluid life, wherein things tend to slip away from us, civilization must grow largely by the conservation and accumulation of steps already gained. The static is thus a necessary half in the battle for a larger life. While this is so, however, humanity, in striving ahead, finds that the conservation of steps already gained constitutes a distinct problem, because of inequalities in individual men, the instinct for self-advancement in sipte of precedent and the impulse of exploitation. It thus becomes necessary to some extent to make a fetish of the Past. The sense of the worth of the Past is expressed by being religionized, with the result that religion assumes a conservative pose. On the other hand, the equally regular inclusion within the domain of religion of the elements of the individual nature constitutes a reactive agency which produces periodic explosions within a rapidly-solidifying conservative life. Religion is thus neither essentially conservative nor essentially radical. But it is organic, organically indicating and stimulating the next advance of a collective life in relation to the whole of that life rather than to any particular element in it; while, incidentally, the conservative and radical elements respectively, lend their moving force within that particular struggle for related realization. The function of religion, therefore, is not to point to an abstract worthy life, but to continue a type of life in its own particular evolution in relation to all the facts of life. It is therefore of different content with different types of life, or social groups, and with the same group at different nperiods in ıts history.
Such a thing as a universal religion becomes thus an impossibility. The existence of such a religion would presuppose humanity as a single historic group, with the contemporaneous element of interaction between the masses of all parts of the world equal to those enjoyed by the individuals within the separate historical or social group. But since it is from mere physical necessity alone true that the masses existent in any portion of the globe are unable to live a collective life with the masses of every other portion, a common religion, the expression of a common collective life, with a common historic tradition, is impossible. Diversity in religions will thus continue inevitably, just as the plurality in individuals, each with his particular life and memories. Not only is it true that a universal religion is impossible, but that all religions must be the direct outgrowths of the life of individual groups. Such groups must have behind them not only common physical descent, but a common historic tradition growing out of a common life. Mere birth is thus perhaps negligible as a factor in nationalitv and national religion.
But now the argument turns back upon itself. If religion is a group thing, it has equally a personal phase. The question thus arises: “Must our personal religion be always bound up with a national or social expression? Are there not elements in my own nature which are naturally and by right objects of religion? What is the connection between the religion of the group to which I belong and the religion which relates to my own personal life?” This question is indeed difficult. and is fundamentallv imnli-
cated with the problem of present Jewish life. In answer, I must first briefly attempt to analyze the nature of personal religion.
a Ar Di Brei Tr lf we can imagine the organs and even the cells of our bodies as possessed of deliberative consciousness, and then picture them, in their efforts to live a complete life, as divided between the desire to become more highly specialized even than they are, or to attain the whole gamut of pleasure in undirected growth we can form some conception of the function of religion in human life. For the religious impulse to the organ or cell would mean a ycarning to be related to the whole human organism as the perfect kind of organ or cell doing that particular kind of work. The religious impulse would thus conserve both the individuality of the particular organ ‚and that of the whole human organism to which it is related. Religion, in other words, is ideally the manifestation of the impulse to find your particular place in life, Thus, the individual himself is ideally a religious being when all his powers are animated by the single desire to realize and be merged in an individuality which will fully embody them all.
But any organism is also an organ; it may not exist by itself, but only in relation to a totality of organic life which it logically implies and with which it is fundamentally bound up. Thus, individuals are bound up in each other; similarly, groups of individuals stand in various organic relationships to each other.
Possessed of reflective consciousness, each organ sees itself both as organism and as organ—an end in itself, and as contributory end. As the former it tends to seek realization in universal terms; as the latter, it must select certain concrete goals and means. If the organism could see itself both ways equally at once, it would live its perfect life, for the two conceptions merge and flow into one another. But our consciousness is such that we inevitably cut and dissect things; so that we must see a whole truth in opposite halves; it thus comes about that when we assume a truth as matter of course, we look upon the opposite half and actually strive for and act upon it.
a en a EHRT DE, DS ick che In the conflict between the conceptions of self as organ and as organism, we thus adopt one and act upon the other. Wherever conditions are such, therefore, that one-half of a truth is constantly thrust upon us, it is in a prior conclusion that the other is assumed and quiescent. Thus, in the period of history when people were grouped in tribes, the individual was more conscious of his tribal relationship than of his own individuality, because tribal assocations were constantlv thrust upon him. When nations were evolved, the reality of the nation did not so thrust itself upon the individual because one had to go a longer distance to discover unlikeness—outside the nation. The individual thus assumed the nation and directed conscious attention to himself ; so that personal realization began to play its role. At this time, therefore, personal religion asserts itself. The individual assumes the nation, thinks of himself as end in itself, begins to seek self-advancement other than the recognized type, and comes to look upon his personal life as a religious thing. His religion now accounts with self-realization, sorrow, failure, efficiency —purely personal relationships. He now looks to his traditional religion. He sees it dealing with matters removed from his personal life, erystallized into a worship of historic forms. He thus begins to disregard it and to seek satisfaction in a more personal relation with the object of religious sentiment. When such an experience has become common to an extent. a revolution is effercted within