The Maccabaean · Vol. XXI, No. 7 · January 1912
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THE MACCABAEAN
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the Suez Canal. Moreover when Persia has been flattened out and turned into the prize packages of the powers, there will be a new value added to the possession of Palestine for the railroad which will eventually run into Bagdad will have its western terminus in Jaffa.

No strange power has checked Italy taking Tripoli because all diplomacy is charmed by the sacred term “fai accompli.” Turkey could not prevent the accomplishment of the first step. Why should anyone interfere with the second. This is exactly what happened when England bombarded Alexandria and) France took Tunis. The failure of the natural owner to resist kept the neighbors out of the melee. Suppose now, and if vou check off the square of latitude and longitude above the Tropic of Cancer, your supposition is replete with Natura reason, suppose now some power did to Palestine what Italy did to Tripoli, what would happen ?

You have some vague notion that the powers would get at each other's throats. Not a whit. They did not do that early in the nineteenth century when the British and French landed at St. Jean d' Acre. No one has questioned the Russian Monastaries in Palestine. There would be a fuss, true, but not interference.

The situation would be this: if A. takes Palestine then B. must save equivalent nehts in Morocco. And then we could bid a complete farewell to all) Zionist aspirations. Reshon [6 Zion would he as important to the Jewish future as Alliance N. J. and Jerusalem would have the value of an oriental Stonehedge.

lf, however, Palestine conld offer no more protection than that it could keep its enemy away whilstit yelled for the international police, there would be another story to tell, Twenty-four hours offensive resistance would mean something: forty-eight hours resistance would lead all the world to question whether the offensive power could do the job and in that question would he the salvation of the inhabitants of Palestine,

This is not a forced argument. It is only since the Arabs have resisted the capture of the Tripolitan cities that the world has begun to question seriously the righteousness of the Italian seizure—the indignation grows with the lack of success.

Would a paper charter protect Palestine

from the guards and landing parties of Povondia? Not at all. But just one of the things for which we need a charter is that, incidental to the measure of self-government which would be given the Jews, would be the right to organize military groups for the protection of the fatherland. The building of forts to protect harbors, etc. Does that sound strange? I have never lived in the Utopia of a powerless non-desiring world.

Why does not Turkey do it? Turkey is poor. She never has had a financial system that was worth while. She never has had a population—in recent centuries—that could give natural strength to her possessions. She has not done things because East is East and trusts eternally that the West is also East in procrastination.

No Monroe Doctrine guards Palestine. Its creation was implied in those two words “publicly secured.” Turkey was to give the charter to the Jews just as the British government gave one to the British South African Company, and the powers were to countersign so as to ereate a guarantee of neutrality. In other words, the Basle pro- evrain demands for the Jewish home security within and without. And as ] once ventured to observe in Flouston, Texas, we could depend upon the natural fecundity of the Jews to repair ina generation whatever weakness was found in this exterior protection.

To summarize this objectionable lesson in polities: T believe we should revert to the charter idea because only a document of this kind can protect what we have, and provide us with the right to guard what we desire to possess in Palstine. Of course, it is far easier and it looks more practical to get up a corporation and buy land in Palestine— than to work out the problems of the international chesshoard but—we should have to get back to the argument over first principles, and that, as a very dear friend used to say, is the best way of clearing up a question, but intensely wearisome to those who do not enjoy that kind of thing.

Well, well, you say that things can't be done, what is the use of talking, the young Turks will not listen. These young Turks have become older Turks in the school of experience and some things could be said. I believe, that would impress them now—whatever was the case two years ago. What could be said? Let us first see whether even the Zionists want to listen.