The Maccabaean · Vol. XX, No. 3 · March 1911
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scan 33 of 54

State, in ratifying, may make reservations as to particular provisions), it follows that the provisions of such treaties, until denounced, are part and parcel of the law of nations. In other words, since 1899 the world has been furnished with the machinery for international legislation. Now, it is important to observe that by a regulation adopted at the 1907 Conference, it needs a unanimous vote to accept a convention. That is to say, no instrument can be submitted for signature by the plenipotentiaries, much less for ratification by their governments, that has not met the approval of every one of the States in Conference. Can democracy further go?

The Conferences themselves have <done the impossible and gone further. In my illustration, a Httle while ago, of the Jegislative equality of States. I happened to name, as one among the rest, the Duchy of Luxemburg. Now, Luxemburg 8 something less than a sovereign State, in the strict sense. By the treaty of London of May 11, 1867, Article I, Luxemburg is dedlared to be a perpetually neutral State under the guarantee of the courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia. It is clear that a State may, of its own volition, remain neutral in a war between other states, and such neutrality is an exercise, not a surrender, of sovereignty. But the case is categorically different where a State ‘s seutralised by the convention of other States. Here. the neutral State does yield wo—is deprived of—a cardinal attribute of sovereignty, to wit: the right to wage war. Other examples of neutralized States are well-known, such as Switzerland and Belgium— Switzerland by the Treaty of Vienna of June 9, 1815, Article 84—Belgium bv the treaties of 1831, 1839. and 1870. These States, then, are not wholly sovereign in the sense of international law. 34 pre-cisian may insist that sovereignty is not susceptible of different degrees. but. like a wife, you either have it or haven't it. Well, we need not go this length for our argument. Let the neutralized States he called. if you please, semi-sovereign. Semi-sovereign States. then. are allowed to stand on the same footing. in the international parliament at The Hague. with the absolutely sovereign States. This is something more than democratic. one is

almost tempted to call it quixotic. In the ancient Roman State they had a ldrger class of cives sine suffragio—citizens without the right of suffrage. Jlow large ; that class is in the United States I need *. not say. Now, can you imagine within any State, ancient or modern, a class of men who, though not citizens with alf legal rights, are vet voters, are yet legislators? This very situation we find so hard to imagine within a State obtains to-day between the States. At The Hague the old Roman formula has virtually been reversed. There the rule is, suffrage even without sovereignty, without full sovereignty. To such a posture have international relations, in the legal sense, been hrought within our dav.

At this point, if not earlier, a cynical reader may “laugh inwardly,” as Jason does in Longfellow’s play. I can hear it said, “Why, this fellow writes as if he had never heard of the commonplace of political science, that theory, and reality, rarely, if ever. coincide. Does he mean to tell us that all the States of the world, the great powers and the pocket republics, are really equal?” I agree. The States are really not equal. The little States are more powerful than the great States. That in brute power, in wealth, in political influence, the States do vary, and vary enormously, no one in his senses will deny. That in past international conferences the great powers have generally held the whip hand, is true as well. But immdiately three qualifications need to be made. The first, respecting the brute fighting strength of the great powers— Dreadnoughts and that sort of thing—and respecting, therefore, their political influence, too, which depends so largely on dreadnoughts.—the first qualification is, that the great Powers, individually as in alliance, neutralize each other for the most part, and in actual fact. one power or another, however great its military establishment, may, at a given moment, be as powerless to effect its object as the weakest little principality you can name. This is not always so, of course: but in the present state of international politics its happens more often than not. And largely from this state of affairs follows our second qualification, that within recent years the resort to international con-