position to coerce the other, a Court of Arbitration does take on the method and the authority of a Court of Justice. But, though colorably the same, the case is really different where one of the parties is materially superior over the other and you can feel the claws through the glove. There, the aim of arbitration is peace first and justice after. Now this falls a long way short of our ideal. We submit there can be no honorable and lasting peace save peace under the Law of Nations— dispensed, not in arbitrary star-chambers, but in open courts of justices, where the strong powers and the weak shall stand equally on their rights. This sentiment animates the recently formed American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, whose impressive meeting in Washington last December is still fresh in mind.
So much has needed to be said, and there is more yet to say, before the relation of a Jewish State to international justice clearly appears. We have noted the importance and the recent growth of the sine qua non of international justice, to wit, International Law. Now we are to ask, how does it grow? And how is it made? For international law speaks both in custom and convention.
To trace the sources of International Law in the past is a most interesting pursuit, but beside the purpose here. We are concerned rather with the latest period, that was ushered in by the summoning of the first Hague Conference in 1898. As the world knows, the Czar was moved to take that step by the epoch-making book of Jean de Bloch, a Jew. On the 20th of May, 1899 —a date to remember!—the Conference met, 26 States being represented. It was called a Peace Conference, and, yet its labors for the most part were devoted to a consideration of the laws of war. Many good people were profoundly discouraged. They had no cause to be. Permanent international peace is not a partridge to fly buttered into one's mouth. War cannot be abolished by the declarations of ever so many Conferences, any more than murder has been abolished by all the statutes in the world. So that the statesmen said at The Hague in 1899, and again in 1907: "We cannot abolish war directly, but we will dig under it and around it. We will regulate the
operations of war to make their prosecution not only less cruel, but more difficult for belligerents and less burdensome upon neutrals. We will perfect the machinery of good offices and mediation, of commissions of inquiry, and of arbitration, in order to postpone, even where we cannot prevent, war. Finally, we will establish international courts of justice, which shall continuously develop international jurisprudence and insure the just and equitable settlement of all, or as nearly as poss.ble all, international disputes.— The Hague Conferences, in effect, are international legislatures.”
Now, I want to call attention to the most fundamental and far-reaching principle of the Law of Nations, and it is this: that, regardless of creed, color, or political constitution, regardless of relative magnitude or importance, all States are equal. We are, indeed, familiar with the notion, in English-speaking countries, that all men are equal before the law. That is to say, John D. Rockefeller and his chauffeur, John D. Robinson (if that's his name), President Taft and Professor Joe, the bootblack, are all equally amenable to the law of the land and equally entitled to its protection. Precisely so, in the eye of international law, the smallest state stands on a par with the greatest, in respect of legal rights and status. Stated even thus baldly, this doctrine appears to be a notably significant one. But events since 1898 have given it a significance which mere mention of the doctrine will not disclose. It is not only as great a doctrine as that of the equality of men before the common law; it is vastly greater. It means not only equality before the law, but equality in making the law. Legal equality is one thing, legislative equality another and a far greater thing. For legislative equality within a State, you have to go back to Athens in its prime. There every citizen, because of his citizenship, had an equal voice and hand in the making of the laws. In a modern State such equality is unthinkable. In the most enlightened States of our time, to say nothing of the others, the legislatures consist, not of all the citizens, but of their representatives. And it is to be remembered these "their representatives" by no means represent all the citizens. Usually not even the majority of them. They repre-