THE DECISION OF MR. JUSTICE EVE ON THE BANK STATUTE ALTERATIONS
Mr. Justice Eve, who decided the case in the English courts for the alteration of the statutes of the Jewish Colonial Trust, delivered the following decision, the reasoning of which will doubtless be interesting to all Zionists:
This is a petition by the Jewish Colonial Trust (Limited) praying the confirmation by the Court of a special resolution altering the provisions of the company's memorandum of association with respect to the objects of the company. I am not called upon, in exercising my discretion, to consider the wisdom of the proposed alteration; all I have to decide is whether it is unfair to any of the members, or, adapting Lord Macnaghten's query in "Poole v. National Bank of China" to the present case, I have to ask myself, Is the alteration fair and equitable as between the two classes of shareholders? The result is, of course, that I must disregard all those parts of the evidence and of the arguments which have been addressed to the point whether it is desirable for the company to make the alteration.
Turning now to the particular facts of the present case, and bearing the foregoing principles in mind, I find that the company was incorporated on March 20, 1899, and that the two first objects for which it was established are stated in the memorandum of association. The special resolution of which confirmation is sought by the petition would modify these two clauses. In other words, the company proposes to eliminate from its objects the promotion, development, working, and carrying on of industries, undertakings, and colonization and emigration schemes in any part of the world outside Palestine, Syria, or other parts of Turkey in Asia, the peninsula of Sinai, and the island of Cyprus. Is it possible to deny
that this is an abandonment of some of the objects specified in the company's memorandum? I think not; and, the alteration proposed being one that is required in order to enable the company to abandon these objects, I cannot accept the view that the Court has no jurisdiction to confirm the resolution. This being so, it is necessary for me to state the material facts which I have to consider in determining in what manner the discretionary power of the Court ought to be exercised. As I have already stated, the company was incorporated in March, 1899, and it was no doubt brought into existence as an instrument calculated and intended to promote the ultimate realization of the Jewish aspiration of a return of the Jews to Palestine, there to find "a publicly and legally assured home." The extremely wide powers conferred upon the company by clause 3 of its memorandum of association are, subject to certain provisos by way of limitation, contained in the same clause, and in particular are providing that all the powers shall be exercised in such a manner as, in the opinion of the council, shall tend primarily to the creation of a legally assured home in Palestine of the Jewish people, or shall be otherwise advantageous to people of the Jewish race either generally or in any particular country or place. The capital of the company is £2,000,000, divided into £1 shares, of which £100 are called "founders' shares" and 1,999,900 are called ordinary shares; and by the memorandum it is stipulated that the holders of the founders' shares shall in respect of such shares be collectively entitled at every general meeting of the company or any poll to so many votes as shall be equal to the aggregate number of the votes to which all the persons or corporations present, either personally or by proxy, at such meeting or voting on
