ality, and bore more lightly upon strangers than upon the Jews themselves. For, whilst the former were excluded from certain of the privileges of citizenship, the Law exempted them from many of the burdens which the people of Israel were expected to bear.
The idea of duty as an obligation inherent in man generally, resulting from the consideration of those principles of right conduct, which are common to all nations, led to the belief that there was a Natural Law, according to which human life should be regulated, and that a system of Ethics was capable of being deduced from human nature. The frequent reference in philosophical writings of the Greeks and Romans, particularly in those of the Stoics, to life according to Nature was the outcome of this wider view of the significance of law. This difference between Civil and Moral Law is clearly presented in a passage quoted by Maine from an ancient treatise: "All nations are ruled by laws and customs, are governed partly by their own particular laws which are common to all mankind. The law which a people enacts is called the Civil Law of that people, but that which Natural reason appoints for mankind is the Law of Nations." This higher law was originally an appendage only of the Civil Law, but subsequently came to be regarded as the "Model to which all laws ought, as far as possible, to conform."
Whilst, therefore, among the Romans, the Natural or Moral Law was gradually evolved from the Civil Law, in the Jewish State these two systems had a common origin and were closely
interblended. They are parts of the same Torah, which derives its authority from God. The introduction of this idea of Natural Law shows how gradually Greek and Roman ideas struggled on towards that Ethical Code in which Jewish legislation had its origin. Not only in this, but in many other particulars the revelation of the Bible anticipated the conclusions of philosophical thought. But Moral Law, as a mere eclectic system, resulting from a comparison of the laws of nations, and the selection of those principles common to them all, gained a totally different and higher sanction when it was shown to have an independent origin and to be associated with the all-embracing and undefined term "Nature."
Between the discharge of obligations forming part of the code, instituted for the better government of a community, and the regulation of conduct, in accordance with the law inherent in human nature, and external to and independent of all arbitrary codes, there is a difference as wide as between the city in which we dwell and the Universe, the extent of which we try in vain to imagine. It is a great step in advance to recognize that there are laws of conduct, which are not dependent for their origin on the will of a conqueror or ruler, or community, or even on traditions custom and observance, but on the very nature of things, determining the relation of man to the world outside him. In this expansion of the idea of law, we see the connecting link between civil government and the reign of law, as extending to those sequences of phenomena, which it is the supreme end of physical science to discover; and the
