There is no nation and no society, however young, which, in the early stages of its existence, did not pass through this or a similar state, a state in which disparate elements, by means of imitation and self-renunciation, crystallized Into a single social body about great human centers. Later, when the mind of man has developed, the cause of self-renunciation and, therefore, of imitation, may be not only physical strength, but also some great spiritual power.
Imitation of this kind, with a "central" man as the inspiration, necessarily diminishes from generation to generation. Since each generation receives the former products of imitation, that is, the acquisitions that have become common property, and since the character of society gains in completeness with the spread and enlargement of these acquisitions, the time eventually comes when the character of society is entirely formed and clearly defined on all sides, and the chiefs of the living generation no longer have the opportunity to add fundamental innovations of their own. In this period the only common center of imitations is the past aggregate of those "central" men who in their time impressed the mark of their personality on the whole of society. And in the same way in which the products of imitation during the formative period were united into one social regulation, so the early creators of that regulation unite into a single center of imitation, which, as it were, forms an abstract, peculiar entity. The creators are summed up in the conception "ancestors," in relation to whom the later generations and their leaders renounce their individuality, and, humbly conscious of their own nothingness, look up reverentially to the glorious heroes of the past.
At the same time mutual imitation among the individuals of the living generation does not cease; but it is confined to unimportant details, and has no common center. Moreover, it is the result of totally different causes. It now springs
from competition, whose motives are envy and self-love, instead of from the self-renunciation of humble respect, which finds no fitting object for its veneration in the present, because all are equally dependent on the past. Many succeed in attracting the attention of society and in raising themselves above their fellows by some deed, whether theoretical or practical in its nature. The success of such men stimulates others to imitate them, not because they would renounce their own individuality, but, on the contrary, because they want to raise themselves to the same heights.
And as the one kind of imitation differs from the other in its motives, so does it differ in its character. In renouncing self the individual wishes to make the spirit of the one whom he imitates part of his own being. The spirit is manifested in deeds. Hence he exactly imitates the deeds, without departing from the form in which that spirit so attractive to him has clothed them. In competition, on the other hand, the imitator wishes solely to stamp with his own personality those deeds which the one whom he imitates has succeeded in accomplishing in accordance with his own personality. The imitator, therefore, strives to vary his model in so far as his spirit and condition differ from the spirit and the condition of the one imitated.
The latter kind of imitation is also of great advantage to society. If self-renouncing imitation, which has "ancestors" for its central point, provides the retarding power that holds society firm and stable, then a competitive imitation provides the impelling power that drives society forward, not through violent eruptions and sodden convulsions, but through slight continuous changes, which in the course of time swell to a mighty current breaking through the confines of "ancestry."
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