Die Welt · Vol. VII, No. 17 · 24 April 1903
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Page 14. — "Die Welt" — No. 17.


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...-stretched, out into infinity, into the nebulous regions of rapturous fancy. And at last, in the thirties of the century, the world-embracing system of Hegel, which carried idealism to its utmost consequences and did not shrink even from the absurd, gained the upper hand and dominated every branch of science and of social life. As a counterweight to this doctrine, which proclaimed panlogism, the sovereignty of the Idea, and which thereby utterly crushed every real science, above all that of the human psyche, there arose the doctrine of a contemporary of Hegel's, a dry, sober thinker — Herbart.

To the unity of Hegel and Schelling he opposed a plurality; against the all-embracing, all-grounding metaphysical first principle he set many "Reals," irreducible, ultimate principles. And whereas the other metaphysicians explained the phenomenon of matter, of the objective world, from the properties inherent in it, Herbart for the first time, anticipating the modern theory of atomism and energetics, applied the "method of relations," that is, he derived all phenomena from the objective relations of the Reals (monads) to one another. The Kantian distinction, too, between the "thing in itself" and "appearance," which makes the visible world a product of the subject, he rejects with his principle: So much seeming, so much indication of being. Hence time and space are to him not merely a priori forms of the human mind, but really existing, actual relations. But Herbart exercised a still greater and more decisive influence upon the development of psychology. He entirely rejected the old rationalist psychology of the Wolffian school, with its doctrine of the "faculties of the soul," and made the attempt to set up a new, scientific, mathematically exact doctrine of the human mind, and worked out the "mechanistic psychology." The primary elements of the "soul" are, according to him, the ideas, which wage a perpetual struggle for survival and supremacy. One idea may check another, and then a feeling arises; one idea may combat another, and then an act of will arises; ideas may wholly displace one another or fuse with one another, and out of this play of ideas, which, to speak in Darwinian terms, wage their "struggle for life" (struggle for existence), arises the whole life of the soul with all its most complicated phenomena. — — Such, then, was the foundation of the new exact psychology, among whose continuers and adherents Moritz Lazarus belonged.

The doctrine of the master explains to us the theories of the disciple. All his later works, from his first, "Das Leben der Seele" (1855), down to his studies in folk-psychology, rest upon the Herbartian psychology; rest upon it only, but are not confined within it. Lazarus was no blind, unconditional follower; he took only what he held to be of value, namely the method, the dynamics of mental phenomena. Lazarus has left us no systematic, rigorously executed psychological edifice; his works are for the most part monographs on single psychological phenomena, which he explained and illuminated from his general standpoint. For he was no metaphysician, but an exact psychologist. "To enter at once upon the deepest and highest problems is a sign not of depth but rather of superficiality," he says in one place. I call him an exact psychologist although he had not applied the method which modern psychology recognises, the physiological one, though he did not take up a hostile attitude towards the newer psychology, as did many other psychologists of the older school. He is exact because he inquires not after the origin, the metaphysical first principle of this or that psychical phenomenon, but after its process; not after the "Why," but after the "How."

But if he was not so creative in general psychology, he was so in one branch of applied psychology, which he created and to which he gave its name — in collective or folk-psychology.

A vague notion, an indefinite conception of such a discipline, of a psychology of the masses, had long been in the air; G. B. Vico with his "Scienza Nuova," Herder, Wilhelm v. Humboldt and others already had a presentiment of this science, but really to found it, to create it and to give it its name was reserved for Lazarus. From his very first appearance in the year 1855 he laid the foundation of this fruitful science, now so flourishing. He carried over the same psychological laws which he had discerned in individual psychology to the domain of the national spirit as well, which he held to be an autonomous, self-subsisting entity, though not, to be sure, in the objective sense of the word. At a stroke he set the new science not upon the steep path of metaphysical speculation, but upon that of exact research. And however remote he was from positivism in other respects, his definition of the corner-stone of his science — the concept of the "national spirit" — nevertheless reads almost positivistically: "National spirit — that which is common to all individuals in their inner activity ... The sum of all mental occurrence in a people, without regard to the subjects, is its objective spirit." (Cf, "Zeitschr. für Völkerpsych. etc.". Vols. I and III, and "Leben der Seele," Vol. I, pp. 323—411.) Like the great thinker, his friend and brother-in-law H. Steinthal, he traced the phenomena of the folk-psyche back to their furthest beginnings, to the origin and development of language. Only through language, only through the joining together of single individuals, through the widening, the projection of the individual psyche, of the "I" into the "We," did man truly become man. And the more highly individuality is developed, the stronger, nobler, more moral is its common life with other individualities. (Cf. Ueb. s. Freundschaft: (L. d. S. III.) From this it is plainly evident what position Lazarus was bound to take in the doctrine of the Ought, in ethics, to which, however, we shall return.

(To be concluded.)