No. 4 — "Die ✡ Welt" — Page 3
(continued from page 2)
…through a common history, through a racial type, physical and mental, common to all, are marked out as an independent people; so long, and this is the main point, as hundreds of thousands, nay millions, of Jews feel themselves to be national Jews, to belong together, to form one people, the Jewish people; so long must an assertion on the Jewish side that Judaism is merely a series of metaphysical and ethical ideas, which in the end anyone may combine at his own discretion with his other ideas, wishes and endeavours, be regarded not as a conception of Judaism but as an apostasy from Judaism, as a desertion of the colours. At any rate, if we wish to express ourselves parliamentarily and mildly, such a view can be regarded not as a scientific conception of Judaism but only as a political endeavour to bring about the dissolution of Judaism arbitrarily and by force. That this view, even as a political endeavour, has long since gone bankrupt; that, because it wills something unnatural, it has been recognised on all sides as impossible, and, because it is unworthy in its aims and contemptible in its utterances, has everywhere been answered by the non-Jewish world around it with scornful laughter — this need be remarked here only in passing. At all events it is clear that a scientific consideration of Judaism must from the outset exclude the Goldheim-Reform view as a merely political and not a scientific tendency. There thus remain only the other two views open to discussion: the essence of Judaism consists, as does that of every other people, in its nationality; and the other view, that the essential thing in Judaism is its national-traditional religion.
Now it must indeed be admitted that with the Jewish people, quite otherwise than with other peoples, nationality and religion are so closely and inseparably bound up and intermingled with one another that it can scarcely be determined where the bounds of the one cease and those of the other begin. Everything national is there sanctioned by religion, and everything religious in turn founded upon nationality. And if the literature of a people may be regarded as the reflection of its soul, then the soul of the Jewish people is without doubt its religion, for its whole literature of three thousand years is at bottom nothing else than the development and elaboration of its religion.
Nevertheless it is impossible to approve without more ado the unqualified identification of Judaism with the Jewish religion, and to accept the Jewish religion as an exhaustive definition of Judaism. For it would follow from this that only he could be regarded as a Jew who is also convinced of the truth of the purely religious views of Judaism. This, however, is impossible for two reasons, and the view from which it follows is therefore untenable. Firstly, it is an irrefutable fact for the psychologist that in every larger community of thinking men there must be a proportionally considerable number who by their natural disposition cannot acknowledge any articles of faith laid down once and for all. Now, how can we set up a principle for the cohesion of a race which from the very outset excludes a large part of it from its community?! Secondly, experience teaches us that there are a great many Jews who in religious matters are freethinkers and yet feel themselves no less Jews than the most religious of their kinsmen; and since they feel themselves such, such they are!
The one-sidedly religious conception of Judaism is therefore untenable. But the one-sidedly nationalist conception of Judaism is likewise obscure, confused, and still far from scientifically clarified. Descent alone, the mere accident of birth, can, so far as the individual is concerned, no more make the Jew than any other member of any people into what he is in respect of his nationality, as we shall show further below. And what sense is the well-known saying supposed to have: "I am a Jew because I feel myself a Jew!"? That is surely exactly the same as if one were to say: "I am a Jew because I am a Jew." It is pure tautology! Certainly the man who means this saying honestly is a good Jew. But the question was, after all: what makes one a Jew? What is the definition of Judaism? Or in other words: What, then, is that which you feel yourself to be? There has been, and still is, so much dispute as to what really is the essential mark of nationality at all, whether the common language, or the history lived through in common, etc. Now, whatever is put forward as the mark of nationality does not quite apply to the Jewish people. A common vernacular the Jews have long since ceased to possess. A common history, in the sense in which other peoples have one, can no longer be ascribed to the Jews of to-day either. For the Jews of the various countries have, even as Jews, a different history to show, and have moreover shared the destinies of the peoples among whom they live, lived through the great historical events of those peoples, the good as well as the bad, and helped to bring them about. But some fixed mark, a positive foundation, a content, Judaism and the feeling-oneself-a-Jew must surely have, like every other nationality. For to make a distinction in this respect also between the Jewish people and other peoples would be to abandon thought and to believe in miracles. This content of nationality may perhaps be of a different kind, differently shaped, with the Jewish people than with other peoples; but a content there must of course be in it too. The Jewish religion, to be sure, would have a very rich and manifold content to show. But religion cannot be put forward as the essential thing in Judaism, as we have already shown above; for Jewish nationality in the Diaspora, on the other hand, we can find no fixed, indisputable content; and yet the existence of a Jewish people must count as a fact for every honest, normally thinking man, just as much as that of any other vigorous people! We therefore find ourselves in a dilemma!
The solution of this dilemma lies very near at hand.
There is in Judaism a neutral zone between the religious and the national feeling — neutral, however, not in the sense that it belongs to neither, but, on the contrary, in the sense that it is common to both. By far the greater part of the possessions of the Jewish religion, and even within the religious domain the more important part, is properly and originally national content. Only, everything national among the Jews, as among the ancient peoples in general, or perhaps in a still higher degree than among them, received a religious character as well. But this religious sanctioning of the national does not diminish the value of the latter as such. For him who is indifferent to this religious sanctioning, the thing simply remains what it properly and originally is, namely a Jewish-national content of life. And this Jewish-national content alone is able to replace for us in the Dispersion all that which other independent peoples in the way of national