Page 10 — "Die Welt" — No. 47
(continued from page 9)
. . . dilettante, and scornfully he points out that "the most dangerous dilettanti are the scholars themselves," — namely the gifted among them, who "long after life and feel that every kind of knowledge gains shape and sense only through contact with another knowledge." . . . All that is indeed quite true; only it is a pity that the obliging mediatress of knowledge is called, not dilettantism, but, as has long been known, philosophy, and that Chamberlain must feel this himself, since he sets before his preface the words of Plato: "The lover of wisdom stands midway between the scholar and the ignorant man." This "lover of wisdom" of Plato's surely cannot be the dilettante — at best a plain carter who carries bricks of knowledge to the scholars, who, after all, cannot know everything. Rather can only a master-builder of ideas be meant thereby, a philosopher — to whom, as Chamberlain so often and quite rightly sets forth, the quality of the artist belongs. One sees, then, that Chamberlain is far from giving up his claim to artistic intuition, even though he does call himself a dilettante. For the rest, his tickling fit of modesty does not last long — already in the "general introduction," which follows immediately upon the "preface," nothing more is to be noticed of it. There he speaks of the method of his book, and in doing so discusses quite calmly the difference between the artist in the narrower sense and the artist in science, claiming for himself the method of the latter.
At the same place one may also inform oneself how Chamberlain conceives artistic scientific quality, and how he marks it off against artisthood in the narrower sense. There it is said of the man of science: "Shape he shall, yet only that which is there, not that which his fancy may delude him with . . . . Therefore we must demand of those artistic shapers a thoroughly positive bent of mind and a strictly scientific conscience. Before he opines, he must know; before he shapes, he must examine." We shall see how far he himself answers to these demands.
The foundation of Chamberlain's system is the races. Not any sort of hypothecary primal races — "race is not an original phenomenon" — but the historically individualised races. Race-formation takes place continually, the mixing of blood playing therein a great part. The race does not require unmixedness in order to be genuine and strongly marked. A strongly marked race is in every case an advantage. Yet there are noble and ignoble races. The conditions for the rise of a highly noble race are these: the original material must be good and must further ennoble itself in an in-breeding of sufficiently long duration, this last, however, being determined by a right selection in breeding. Thereupon an admixture, of no too long duration, of foreign, but not too foreign, blood must take place. If this last condition is not fulfilled, there arises a degenerate bastard race. All history is the history of races and in part the history of personalities. The several races and personalities are always new. There are no identical beginnings, no repetitions, no analogous developments, no general progress — in a word, no history of mankind. Noble races produce their peculiar cultures through the mediation of the creative artists, philosophers and religious geniuses whom they bring forth. Only through culture does man step forth out of animality. Distinct from culture is civilisation, the sum of political and social life, "an ant-state existence continually raised to a higher power, more comfortable and less free." A highly developed civilisation is compatible with a low culture, a rich culture with a primitive civilisation.
Such are Chamberlain's fundamental views. From them flow in detail, among others, the doctrines of the culture-capacity, the race-bastardy and the race-guilt-consciousness of the Jews, as well as of the "chaos of peoples" and of the leading cultural glory of the Teutons — under which name, however, Chamberlain comprehends the unbastardised Slavs, Celts and Teutons in the narrower sense. But we will save up these details for the next time. There we shall also discuss them again in connection with the fundamental views. To-day, however, we will try to learn something from these latter themselves.
Chamberlain will hear nothing of primal races. "Aryans," "Semites" are to him mere counters. Thereby these concepts are to be conceded no more than a certain methodological office. Yet this habit of giving out the order-making effect of hypotheses as their very essence, and so denying them every objective value, is, for the rest, too widely spread for me to make a reproach of it against Chamberlain. Behind it there may even at times lie a strict and mistrustful scientific spirit. But one would do Chamberlain wrong by such an assumption. Not only does he himself put the old counters of science into circulation as scientific coin in dozens of cases — he even strikes new counters of his own, which he naturally endows with all the greater rate of exchange. Hither belongs, for example, his enlarged Teutonism. What are these Teutons other than a hypothetical primal race? To be sure, that he will never admit, and he will speak of a complete lack of understanding of his doctrines. To him the Teutons are a race still "experienced" to-day. As though the usual division into "Aryans" and "Semites" rested upon anything other than "experiences," and as though hypotheses in general were anything other than projections backward from experiences.
But everything depends upon the kind of the experiences, thinks Chamberlain. What of skull-measurements and the like! Out of the abundance of the notorious facts the living races arise before our eyes. Now, it is not everybody's affair to find so much evident and notorious as Chamberlain does. But granting that all people had this easily convinced eye — in the facts themselves there lies as yet no scientifically usable "experience." They obtain their scientific serviceableness only through their grouping into a total picture; this grouping, however, is just as much a hypothesis as are the doctrines which build themselves upon skull-measurements and the like. Withal Chamberlain does not consider for a moment before calling to his aid the means of the scholars which he so derides. And not merely their means, for that matter, but their theories as well.
Thus he appeals diligently to Darwin and enters energetically for the inference from the animal to man — where he can thereby prop his doctrinal edifice scientifically. But to draw from it conclusions also which do not suit his book — no! There he prefers to call Darwinism a baseless hypothesis — that same Darwinism which, unconsciously and ununderstood by himself, fairly spurts out of his whole system, and without which he might simply shut up shop.
For apart from the frothy infusion which he has poured upon his work out of the can of his a priori ideas, of his "experiences" — that work stands and falls with the idea of development. Chamberlain holds that there is development and progress — the two he confounds, indeed, more than is permissible — only in the individual, that is, in persons and races. Mankind, however, appears as an individual only when seen from a great distance, with an extra-historical eye, compared, say, with analogous phenomena upon another planet. Naturally Chamberlain has no notion that it is possible to transfer this distance, this planetary standpoint, into a scientific-artistic, intuitive brain, and therefore he can see in it nothing more than impractical star-gazing. He himself in one place calls progress the unfolding of what is already present, but will not perceive that the fundamental stock of mankind also has its own unfolding, which then causes the analogies of civilisation among the various races.
That there is an opposition between civilisation and culture has struck Chamberlain as it has struck many another. He has also discovered that the former represents the economic and political life, the latter the individual intellectual life of a people. But Chamberlain has not fully mastered the opposition. In the first place he has not exhausted it. It has remained hidden from him that civilising activity, in contrast to the
