Page 12. — "Die Welt" — No. 24.
(continued from page 11)
...Judaism. It is no bad picture, to behold the loftily erect figure of the Jewess loyal to her stock, before whom the spineless, feeble figure of Levita lies in the dust.
Jewish Science and Literature.
The Philosophical Significance of Salomon ibn Gebirol.
Among the "Popular-Scientific Lectures on Jews and Judaism" which have appeared in print, the lecture of the Jena professor Rud. Seyerlen upon "The Mutual Relations between Occidental and Oriental Science, with Particular Regard to Salomon ibn Gebirol" (Leipzig, M. W. Kaufmann, 1900. Octavo) occupies the second and third place. It contains an excellent appreciation of the supposed Arabic philosopher Avencebrol or Avicebron, whose thesis — that all finite beings, not only the corporeal but no less the intelligible substances also, consist of matter and form — was as vigorously defended by Alexander of Hales, Duns Scotus and the Franciscan school as it was combated by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and the Dominican school, and thus formed one of the foremost points of contention between the two great Orders. Nevertheless no attention whatever was thereafter paid to this thinking by the history of philosophy; he was passed over by it in silence — nay, disappeared from it altogether.
For his works did not exist in print, and of their existence in manuscript form nothing was known. It was the Frenchman Aimable Jourdain who first drew attention to the high significance of the lost man for the history of philosophy. And the author too had a great share in the renaissance of Gebirol. At the end of the year 1855 he succeeded in discovering, in the Mazarine Library at Paris, in a collective volume of Latin manuscripts, a complete Latin manuscript of the Fons vitae, occupying 57 folio leaves of parchment and dating from the thirteenth century. Without being furnished with the name of the author, it bore the simple title: De materia universali. At the close, however, a postscript states that the book proceeds from Avencebrol and was translated from the Arabic by Johannes with the assistance of Doimegus, that is to say, by the Jew Hispanus ben David and the Archdeacon Dominicus Gundisalvi. Seyerlen thereupon gave, upon the basis of this Latin translation of the complete Fonds vitae, the first comprehensive presentation of Gebirol's philosophy drawn from the sources. This merit cannot be rated too highly, "for, far from being merely a 'text-book of Neoplatonic philosophy,' as Joel will have it, we have in Gebirol's Fons vitae the work of a thoroughly original thinker, who undertakes a wholly peculiar welding into one — such as had never before existed, as boldly conceived as it is energetically carried through — of the Aristotelian doctrine of principles with the Neoplatonic view of the world; a welding in the consequence of which there are opened out, for philosophical knowledge, results and prospects that may even to-day lay claim to a living interest."
What is properly characteristic of Gebirol's thinking lies — as the Christian schoolmen of the thirteenth century, and before all Thomas Aquinas, already recognised and brought out — in his conception of matter and form as the two integrating, because constitutive, essential components of every finite being, of the spiritual as well as of the corporeal. Herein he takes the concepts of matter and form entirely in the Aristotelian sense; that is, he grasps the concept of matter unequivocally, as he does that of form. It is one and the same matter which is diffused throughout the whole universe and which extends from the highest intelligible down to the lowest corporeal sphere, save only that within the one matter a difference of degree does indeed come to light, answering to the greater nearness to or distance from its original source, so that in the upper spheres it is clearer and finer, in the lower denser and darker.
To the full height of his philosophical significance, however, Gebirol rises there where he makes the attempt to comprehend the two principles of all that is finite out of the absolute Being. The final result at which he arrives in this respect is that he distinguishes in the Godhead itself essence, essentia, and property, proprietas. The property (proprietas) he calls will, wisdom, creative word. It, the property, is the origin and the authoress of form; for it is that which puts forth out of itself the forms originally present within it and realises them in matter, while matter for its part springs from the essence of the Godhead: it is the essentia prima as such, in distinction from its proprietas, out of which matter emanates, as the water streams forth from the spring. "Therefore," Gebirol declares, "matter bears itself as the throne of the One, and the will, the bestower of form, sits upon it and rests above it."
How indeed the will — which in itself is to be one with the essence and, like it, infinite — as soon as it enters into action and apprehends itself as will in distinction from the essence and realises form, is to bear itself as the principle of the finite; how further matter, although it streams forth from the essence of the Infinite, is nevertheless, just as much as form, to possess from the outset the determinateness of the finite: that remains unexplained, although, even apart from the notion of emanation, a solution of these problems might be discovered from Gebirol's principles without any great difficulty, as Seyerlen sets forth in a luminous manner.
And now comes the cardinal point, in which I cannot agree with him. "To whom," he exclaims, "should not the parallel with Spinoza here at once leap to the eye — Spinoza, who distinguishes in the absolute substance the two infinite attributes of extension and of thought, as Gebirol distinguishes the two sides, essence upon the one and will or knowledge upon the other?" Here Seyerlen decidedly incurs a confusion of concepts, because Gebirol's dualism is no dualism at all. Gebirol by no means invites a parallel with Spinoza, because the essence, the essentia prima, cannot be severed from the Godhead, cannot be distinguished from it, cannot be set up as something specific over against it, since it signifies the absolute Being of the Godhead. God has properties, but He has no substance, because He is the substance. With Spinoza it is quite otherwise. He says that absolute Being is in itself an empty abstraction void of content. In order to be something, it must have an essentiality that is accessible to the understanding and to the senses. This essentiality the substance has in its attributes; they constitute the essence of the substance; the substance is the sum of its essential properties or attributes. The essentia is no constitutive moment or element of the substance, since it is identical with it. The author is therefore in the wrong when he continues: "But who would not also see the difference which comes to light between the two, inasmuch as with Spinoza the two infinite attributes, together with their infinite mode, run along beside one another wholly unmediated and proceed in their movement entirely independently of each other, each for itself a full expression of the substance, without any reciprocal action whatever upon one another,
