Page 6. — "Die Welt" — No. 25.
(continued from page 5)
…of our senses. Dogmatically as they dissolve the world into mere semblance, they too are driven to render an account of the world of appearances, and so they treated the latter as though they were real. This dualism now determines the destinies of Greek philosophy. Not only the disintegrating appearance of the Sophists and the renunciation by a Socrates of any closed view of the world are consequences of the scepticism resulting from the Eleatic inquiries, but even the noblest products of the classical philosophy of Greece are unable to overcome this dualism. Plato sought by his doctrine of Ideas on the one hand to rescue the transcendence of pure Eleatic Being, on the other to create a principle of individuation for the appearances, for the single things. The Ideas, however, have indeed a subjective, but no objective existence. Plato transformed categories of thought into principles of Being. Aristotle perceived this also. He denies to the Ideas the sovereign existence which Plato had conferred upon them. But how does he himself proceed? He too places the task of philosophy in the knowledge of the unchangeable essence. And what criterion, then, has he wherewith to recognise this unchangeable essence? In contrast to Plato he finds the reality of every thing in the form immanent within it. But whence do we obtain knowledge of the single things? Surely only through the senses? Where, then, exists a criterion which should put us in a position to confirm the truth of these appearances? And thus the Aristotelian metaphysics also could bring forth no trustworthy criterion. It too was unable to bring the categories of the understanding into accord with the fulness of appearances. What further takes place in Greece towards the solution of this problem is philosophically of but small moment. Stoicism, which turns the so-called sound common sense against the critical thinking called forth by the bankruptcy of the Aristotelian philosophy, did indeed gain great influence in Rome as a philosophy of life, since it was cut as if to the very body of the Roman national character; it could not, however, satisfy the purely metaphysical impulse of the Greek people. And when the shattered conditions of its own homeland permitted no natural further development of philosophy, the Greek spirit sought, under the influence of other circles of ideas hitherto unknown to it, to grasp infinity by a salto mortale of thought. It was in Alexandria that the world-views of the Hellenes and of the Jews first came into contact. It is incorrect to ascribe to the ethical view of life of the Jews the great influence which the Jewish mode of thought assumed over the Greek world of that day. The Greeks brought forth an independent ethics quite as much as an independent metaphysics. The Greeks saw rather in the Jewish Jehovah (the Existent) — names of God play in general a great part in the theosophical speculations of this period — the pure Eleatic Being, the Nous of Anaxagoras, the Platonic Idea of the Good, as well as the Aristotelian actus purus. Whereas each single one of these conceptions proved insufficient for an explanation of the world, whereas the conception of Eleatic Being admitted of no multiplicity of existences, the Nous of Anaxagoras was brought into application only as a makeshift, and the gulf between the Platonic transcendental Ideas and their images could not be bridged, the Jewish conception of God, which was apprehended not merely as the highest abstraction of the world but as the highest Being, appeared able to unite all things within itself. The highest Being is no longer a logical concept, which may contain no contradictory marks; in Him all opposites are dissolved. What appears to our understanding as a contradiction is not present in Him as existing. God can do all things if He will. And thus there subsists no dualism between thinking and perceiving, spirit and matter, for all are manifestations of the will of the one omnipotent Being. Upon this conception only a subordinate part can naturally fall to the understanding. All dialectical inquiries are but preliminary stages to the truth which is to be attained by the way of intuition. And thus arises that philosophy of intuition which found in Philo its classical representative. If, now, in this kind of philosophy one is able to descry no advance of rational thought, if one here meets with not a single conception of equal rank with the Platonic, nay, with not a single abiding achievement which should have enlarged the possessions of philosophy even upon the logical side, this circle of ideas nevertheless offers a great interest by reason of the extraordinary influence which it gained upon the development of European culture. The Alexandrian Jews, saturated with Greek culture, who believed themselves to possess in their traditions concerning God the final solution of all metaphysical questions, could see in their Scriptures only the exoteric husk of higher truths. The highest conception of Being can no longer be apprehended in a national sense. The historical, and therefore accidental, relation of God to the people of Israel must be transformed into a necessary and purely human one. Ceremonial laws and the exclusively national ordinances must be set aside as the expression of that which is temporal and has become historical.
Symbol and allegory, which had already been employed in ample measure by the ancient Greek thinkers, but pre-eminently by the Stoics, furnished the means of carrying this method through. And so the Jews of Alexandria preached a world-religion which not only solves the highest questions of Being, but also procures for the individual, anxious for his weal and woe, a stay and a resting-point in God, the Father of all men. Here, then, we have to seek the primal beginning of Christianity and of that antinomianism which hitherto, in misapprehension of the facts, has been ascribed solely to the appearance of the Apostle Paul. Here too must research set in, in order to find a sufficient ground for the origin and development of Christianity, which, as the realisation of an idea, can by no means be explained by anthropological and ethnological means. The customary opinion that Christianity is to be regarded as a protest against Pharisaism, upon which the character of antinomianism was then impressed by Paul, is untenable upon internal and external grounds. How, moreover, should the thought of a world-religion arise upon the exclusively national soil of Palestine? How could the Neoplatonic mental structure of a Logos be here transferred without more ado, and without special presuppositions, to the object of the national hopes? How could the revolt against all that existed be so much as possible here?
Moriz Friedländer has now taken up this problem afresh in his work published last year, "Judaism in the Pre-Christian Greek World," and more fully in his latest work, "Pre-Christian Jewish Gnosticism."*) He takes a decided stand against the dogma of a Jewish Christianity and a Gentile Christianity, and seeks rather to demonstrate that the Gnostic parties of the Cainites, Ophites, Sethians and Melchizedekians, which pass for Christian heretics, already existed in pre-Christian times at Alexandria; that accordingly the antinomian tendency is of a far older date than the so-called Pauline Gentile Christianity. Already in pre-Christian times, Friedländer instructs us, there was among the Greek-educated Jews of Alexandria an extremely radical wing which had drawn the utmost consequences of the allegorical method, had dissolved all legal ordinances into symbols, and, to the vexation of those who still fancied that they stood upon the conservative ground of Judaism, had taken up a position decidedly hostile to the Law. If, then, the author succeeds in finding in the Alexandrian literature the two circles of thought which touch one another in the writings of the New Testament, and if we can determine with the greatest probability the causes which were able to cleave the Jews of Alexandria into diverse parties, and among the people of the Law katexochen to call into life a decidedly antinomian party, then the conclusion lies very near that the same causes lie at the bottom of the analogous religious currents in Palestine also, the more so as the religious life there, in so far as it moves in national grooves, offers us no clue for the explanation of this remarkable phenomenon, unless we are willing beforehand, by the adoption of a theological standpoint, to renounce a rational explanation. But if we ask how it comes that the new ideas took their triumphal course through the world from Palestine, the answer is not difficult. The peculiar conditions of Alexandria might well bring forth religious currents; but however grand the movements may have been, and however much the speculative products of this period bear an exclusively theosophical character, the over-cultivated Alexandrian Jews nevertheless lacked the originality and immediacy of feeling wherewith to create a new religion. Only upon the classic soil
*) Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1898.