Max Stirner · The Unique One and His Property · 1845
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…I not, then these gods will always remain in the right and in power against Me, while I shall fear their right and their power in impotent “fear of God”, shall keep their commandments, and believe I do right in all that I do according to their right, as, say, the Russian frontier guards hold themselves entitled to shoot dead the escaping suspects, since they murder “on higher authority”, i.e. “with right”. But I am entitled by Myself to murder, if I do not forbid it to Myself, if I Myself do not fear murder as a “wrong”. This view underlies Chamisso’s poem “das Mordthal”, where the grey-haired Indian murderer compels reverence from the white man whose brethren he has murdered. I am not entitled only to that which I do not do with a free courage, i.e. to which I do not entitle Myself.

I decide whether it is the right thing in Me; outside Me there is no right. If it is right [recht] for Me, then it is right. Possibly it is not on that account yet right for the others; that is their care, not mine: let them defend themselves. And were something not right for the whole world, but right for Me, i.e. did I will it, then I should ask nothing about the whole world. So does every one who knows how to value himself, every one in the degree that he is an egoist, for might goes before right, and that — with full right.

Because I am “by nature” a human being, I have an equal right to the enjoyment of all goods, says Babeuf. Must he not also say: because I am “by nature” a first-born prince, I have a right to the throne? The rights of the human being and the “vested rights” come