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… and virtue, for their part, again differ only as a wild blade from a philistine) &c.
To this very day the revolutionary principle has stuck to fighting only against this and that established thing, i.e. to being reformatory. However much may be improved, however strictly "thoughtful progress" may be kept to: always only a new master is set in the place of the old, and the overthrow is a — building up. It remains the difference of the young philistine from the old. Like a petty commoner the Revolution began, with the raising of the third estate, the middle estate; like a petty commoner it runs dry. Not the individual human being — and he alone is the human being — became free, but the citizen, the citoyen, the political human being, who for that very reason is not the human being, but a specimen of the human species, and more specially a specimen of the species citizen, a free citizen.
In the Revolution it was not the individual who acted in the history of the world, but a people: the nation, the sovereign nation, would effect everything. An imagined I, an idea, such as the nation is, comes forward acting; i.e. the individuals lend themselves as tools of this idea and act as "citizens."
The commonalty has its power, and at the same time its limits, in the fundamental law of the State, in a charter, in a lawful or "just" prince who himself conforms to "rational laws" and rules by them, in short in legality. The period of the bourgeoisie is ruled by the British spirit of legality. An assembly of provincial estates, for instance, is ever calling to mind that its warrants reach only so and so far, and that it is called at all only by grace and by disgrace again