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With the time of the bourgeoisie begins that of liberalism. People want to see the "reasonable," the "timely," and so on, established everywhere. The following definition of liberalism, which is meant to be said in its honour, characterises it completely: "Liberalism is nothing else than the knowledge of reason applied to our existing conditions."*) Its aim is a "reasonable order," a "moral conduct," a "limited freedom," not anarchy, lawlessness, ownness. But if reason rules, then the person succumbs. Art has long not only let the ugly pass, but deemed it necessary to its existence and taken it into itself: it needs the villain, and so on. In the religious domain, too, the most extreme liberals go so far as to want the most religious human being to be regarded as a citizen, i.e. the religious villain; they will hear no more of courts of heresy. But against the "reasonable law" no one is to rise in insurrection, else the severest — punishment threatens him. What is wanted is not a free movement and validity of the person, or of Me, but of reason, i.e. a dominion of reason, a dominion. The liberals are zealots, not exactly for the faith, for God and so on, but certainly for reason, their mistress. They brook no unruliness, and therefore no self-development and self-determination: they hold in tutelage no less than the most absolute rulers.
"Political freedom," what is one to understand by that? Perhaps the freedom of the individual from the State and its laws? No, on the contrary, the bondage of the indi-
*) Ein und zwanzig Bogen, p. 12.