Theodor Fritsch · Handbook of the Jewish Question · 1944
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How different the Jew! He is dominated by the restlessness of the nomad, who knows and recognizes no anchor points and certainties in the infinity of existence, for whom the visions of this world whirl past his eyes incoherently, kaleidoscopically. He does not have the confident intuition of being sheltered in creation. The world, rather, is to him something alien, hostile, contradictory, full of evil coincidences. He feels himself driven out of God's paradise on account of his lustful obtuseness. He is driven by fear and worry about what could threaten his existence. Therefore, it is his highest endeavor to secure for himself the preservation of life for the longest possible term, to draw to himself whatever of the world's goods is attainable, in order to live as eternally as possible in this world, in which light and shadow are evenly distributed, exclusively on the light and pleasure side of existence. He is never concerned with understanding creation and feeling at one with it, but always only with violating it, with dominating it and, if possible, its Creator. – Evil, to him, is not in a Faustian sense part of that power that wills the good, but an emanation of a fundamental demonism in the world, and he feels that he himself is a piece of this demonic element. His way, therefore, of asserting himself between good and evil, between the necessary alternation of light and dark in this world, is not a taking of sides, a heroic struggle and overcoming, but a pact-making even with evil, an attempt to circumvent the adversities of existence through cunning.

His relationship to the deity is only to be understood in this way (how much Judaism has already flowed into the German soul in this respect!), for Yahweh, the Old Testament precipitate of the Jewish spirit, is himself a selfish and vengeful superhuman demon, who is feared more than loved, to whose decrees the Jew does not submit in blessed child-of-God-ship, but which he seeks to avert or circumvent through incantations, flatteries, sacrifices of alien, outwitted life, and even through deceit. (The Old Testament teems with evidence for this attitude.)

Thus, for the Jew, the sharp, cunning intellect is the first and most important means of his self-assertion and his will to power. But it is not an intellect that draws its strength from the full depth of the soul, but a detached, one-sidedly overbred faculty for dialectics, for analysis, a decomposing poison that has freed itself from the natural control of conscience. This intellect is capable of proving everything and refuting everything, as it recognizes nothing above itself. To it, nothing is sacred. It has become an end in itself.

Since the Jew does not possess his own, independent, complete spiritual culture, and cannot possess one for lack of a clarified world of feeling, but lives as a nomadic parasite in other cultures, he clings preferentially in these cultures to that which is necessarily rationalistic in them or is handled as such. This applies especially to the philosophies of the peoples. The Jew naturally has no sense for the fact that it is not the rational structural elements, but the fundamental values of soul and feeling that support a philosophical system, through which it first truly becomes an expression of the nature of its adherents. To him, the intellectual parts are always the only noteworthy components of a worldview. He engages with them, he exercises criticism on them, they are, by him, disregarding the essential, the ineffable, for which they symbolically stand, gnawed to pieces, decomposed, broken down into their conceptual elements, completely soulless, bent into shape and rationalized according to his own mentality. Thus it is that the Jew has created nothing of his own in German philosophy, but that he has settled in the following of all our classical philosophers, not as a confessor, but as a rationalistic know-it-all, not as a Kantian or Hegelian, but as a Neo-Kantian, as a Neo-Hegelian, etc. – 238 –