277 Accordingly, there would only be a difference between talent and genius like that between great and maximal giftedness. time elapsing between A and D. After frequent repetitions, no active searching is needed at all, and D moves so close to A in time that consciousness no longer has the necessary time to dwell on B and C as such; in any case, B and C hold no interest, but D does, which is precisely the goal being sought. Once B and C have sunk below the threshold of consciousness in this way, they quickly sink ever further, so that one can now say that D is immediately associated with A.
Now, this process of abbreviation can go even further. Imagine that a new series of active idea associations runs through the ideas A, D, G, and K (whereby the association of D and G and of G and K can itself already be an abbreviated one), and that this series also recurs more frequently on certain occasions, then through the same process of elision, A will ultimately become immediately associated with K.
Whereas in the first abbreviation procedure between A and D the logically mediating intermediate links could still be restored with slight reflection, in a further continued abbreviation procedure this restitution of the intermediate links can ultimately become very difficult, indeed, with an inherited tendency or predisposition to such abbreviated associations, it can ultimately become completely impossible.
The phenomenon of abbreviated idea association or the skipping of several logical intermediate links is most striking in those cases where one is no longer conscious of the time before practice was attained, and where, as a rule, inherited dispositions are already at the root, which left only the fine-tuning to practice and thereby greatly shortened the period of awkwardness.
Although even in discursive thinking, where all logical intermediate stations are fully executed in conscious stopping points, the transition from one idea to another is an unconscious process, and thus the new idea enters intuitively — one can, in contrast to this thinking which moves in short steps, only recognize an intuitive thinking in the narrower sense when a discursive mediation through currently present, closely juxtaposed logical intermediate links is no longer apparent.
We see here a possibility of gaining a principle of explanation for so-called intuitive thinking, which, even if it does not solve all the riddles of the conceptions of genius at a single stroke, nevertheless gives a hint as to the path by which one might ascend from an understanding of the commonly occurring abbreviated thought processes to the rarer, most productive forms of the same (v. Hartmann).